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 INTRODUCTION     
 
Section 1:  Terms of Reference 
On 4 February 2010 the Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan T.D., requested the 
Governor of the Central Bank to conduct a preliminary investigation of: 
―....the performance of the respective functions of the Central Bank and 
Financial Regulator over the period from the establishment of the Financial 
Regulator to the end of September 2008.   In that context I should note that 
you may consider the inclusion of any matter you feel should be brought to 
my attention which might inform the preparation of the statutory inquiry.‖1  
 
This preliminary investigation is part of a larger exercise by Government to:  
―....thoroughly examine the conduct of the banking sector in recent years in 
order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the root causes of the systemic 
failures that led to the need for extraordinary support from the State to the 
domestic banking system.‖  
 
Parallel to this exercise, a second preliminary report is being prepared by Klaus Regling 
and Max Watson.
2
   The two reports, which were requested to be completed by 31 May 
2010, will provide ―a basis for the Government and the Oireachtas to prepare the terms 
of reference for the second stage, which will involve the establishment of a Statutory 
Commission of Investigation.‖ 
The approach used in preparing this Report is presented in Section 2 of this 
Introduction, the structure of the Report in Section 3, the composition of the team in 
Section 4 and some abbreviations of entities in Section 5. 
Section 2:  Approach 
In preparing the Report, an in-depth review of the powers, responsibilities, philosophy, 
mandate, resources, policies and actions of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator 
was first carried out on the basis of:  (i) publicly available sources such as Annual 
Reports, Strategy Statements, Financial Stability Reports, proceedings of the 
Oireachtas, and speeches;  and (ii) minutes and Board papers of the Central Bank and 
Financial Regulator as well as extensive internal files, principally of the Financial 
Regulator.  
                                                          
1
  The letter setting out the Terms of Reference is included in Annex 1 below. 
2
  There were a number of meetings between the two groups to exchange views and avoid unnecessary 
duplication. 
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Documentary material only takes one so far.   In order to obtain additional background 
information as well as elicit views of key officials, an extensive series of interviews were 
undertaken running to about 120 hours; all persons requested to attend an interview did 
so.   All of the directors of the CBFSAI and the Regulatory Authority as well as all senior 
management, managers and deputy managers in relevant units of the CBFSAI during 
2003-2008 were interviewed (Table 1 shows only the more senior of these).  In addition, 
several other officials of the CBFSAI provided invaluable assistance on a number of 
important issues.   
Table 1:  Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland:  Relevant Senior 
Management and Function Heads;  Board and Authority Members 2003-2008 
Governor: J. Hurley    
Chair – FR: B. Patterson To April 2008 J. Farrell From May 2008  
CEO – FR: L. O‘Reilly To January 2006 P. Neary From February 2006  
Director General: L. Barron To August 2007 T. Grimes From August 2007 
Consumer Director: M. O‘Dea    
ADG Prudential: P. Neary To February 2006 C. Horan From February 2006 
ADG Economics: M. Casey To April 2005 T. O‘Connell From April 2005 
Head, Banking Supervision: C. Horan To February 2006 M. Burke From May 2006 
Head, Financial Stability
a
: F. Browne    
     
Board Members: J. Hurley    
 B. Patterson To April 2008 J. Farrell From May 2008 
 L. O‘Reilly To January 2006 P. Neary From February 2006 
 L. Barron To August 2007 T. Grimes From August 2007 
 T. Considine To June 2006 D. Doyle From July 2006 
 D. Begg    
 F. Danz To October 2006 A. Gray From December 2006 
 G. Danaher    
 R. Donovan To April 2008 B. Hillery From May 2008 
 J. Dunne    
 M. O‘Donoghue To April 2008 D. O‘Brien From May 2008 
 D. Purcell    
     
Authority Members: B. Patterson To April 2008 T. Grimes From April 2008 
J. Farrell    
 L. O‘Reilly To January 2006 P. Neary From February 2006 
 M. O‘Dea    
 A. Ashe    
 G. Danaher    
 F. Danz To October 2006 A. Gray From December 2006 
 J. Dunne    
 D. Purcell    
 D. Quigley    
 
a 
Up to January 2008, Head, Monetary Policy & Financial Stability;  from January 2008, Head, Financial 
Stability & Payments Oversight Department. 
Note:  The same person may appear under several headings (e.g., as a member of a board as well as a senior 
official). 
Source: Central Bank and Financial Regulator.  
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To obtain a fuller picture, interviews were also conducted with a number of senior 
officials of other agencies including:  Kevin Cardiff, Secretary General and William 
Beausang, Assistant Secretary, Department of Finance;  John Corrigan, CEO, and 
Michael Somers, former CEO, National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA);  Joe 
Meade, former Financial Services Ombudsman;  as well as three former bankers: Brian 
Goggin, former CEO of the Bank of Ireland;  Eugene Sheehy, former CEO of Allied 
Irish Banks; and Michael Walsh, former Chair, Irish Nationwide Building Society 
(INBS).   A special debt of gratitude is owed to all of these individuals for spending 
extensive time to assist the work.    
There are legal constraints on the detail which can be published on individual credit 
institutions.   The Report is bound by overriding constraints under EU law, and general 
central banking and regulatory practice, as reflected in Irish Law in Section 33AK of the 
Central Bank Act, 1942 (as amended) which prohibit, subject to certain exceptions (in 
relation to criminal law, for instance), the disclosure of confidential information in 
relation to identifiable individual credit institutions.  
Section 3:  Outline of Report 
The Report is divided into eight chapters.   A summary and conclusions are presented in 
Chapter 1.   Chapter 2 deals with the macroeconomic background during the period 
reviewed, while Chapter 3 describes the structure of the Central Bank and Financial 
Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) and the respective powers and functions of its 
two constituent institutions, the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, as well as the 
relationships between them. 
The next two chapters are concerned with micro-prudential regulation – the supervision 
of individual credit institutions by the Financial Regulator.   Chapter 4 sets out the goals 
and philosophy of micro-prudential regulation – often characterised as principles-based 
regulation, while Chapter 5 assesses the record of the Financial Regulator in micro-
prudential supervision. 
The following two chapters address macro-prudential regulation, i.e., the monitoring 
and assessment of the overall financial system and efforts to help ensure financial 
stability.   Chapter 6 reviews the assessments made by the CBFSAI in its annually 
published Financial Stability Reports, while Chapter 7 deals with the issue of follow up 
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actions by the CBFSAI to address emerging concerns regarding financial stability.   
Chapter 8 discusses the events leading up to and including the crisis at the end of 
September 2008 and the provision of the State Guarantee on 30 September. 
Section 4:  Investigation Team 
This Report is the result of intensive work undertaken during the past four months by 
many individuals.   The team was led by the Governor, Patrick Honohan, and comprised 
Paul K. Gorecki, seconded from the Economic and Social Research Institute, Donal 
Donovan, formerly of the International Monetary Fund and Rafique Mottiar, formerly 
concerned with monetary policy and implementation at the Central Bank.   Nodhlag 
Cadden, Internal Audit, Central Bank, Sean Kinsella, at present on secondment to the 
Central Bank from the Department of Finance, Kevin Kirby, Currency Issue 
Department, Central Bank, and Suzanne Pepper, General Secretariat, Central Bank, 
reviewed FR files and were responsible for keeping a record of the interviews.   
Margaret Murray arranged the interviews while Irene McKenna was responsible for 
administrative support.   The investigation was also able to draw on the services of a 
number of officials of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator to provide data and 
other quantitative information. 
Section 5:  Some Conventions 
To ensure consistency the following conventions are used in this Report.   The Central 
Bank and Financial Regulator
3
 as institutions will generally be referred to either by 
these names or CB or FR, respectively.   The combined CB and FR will be referred to 
as the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland or CBFSAI.   The 
Board of the FR will be referred to as the Authority while the CBFSAI Board will be 
referred to as such.  
The term bank is sometimes loosely used to include all types of credit institution. 
As noted above, legal constraints limit the information that can be discussed with 
respect to identifiable credit institutions.   However, in order to maximise the amount of 
information that can be provided, and for clarity of exposition, credit institutions may be 
referred to as Bank A, Bank B and so on.   In order to further guard the confidentiality 
                                                          
3
 When the Financial Regulator first started it was called the Irish Financial Services Regulatory 
Authority and it subsequently rebranded itself as the Financial Regulator.   However, in this Report 
Financial Regulator (FR) is generally used regardless of the date. 
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of individual credit institutions, these codes are scrambled. Thus Bank A in one context 
is not necessarily be the same bank as Bank A referred to in another context.   Customer 
identities are protected in the same way.   
Unless otherwise indicated, the source of all statistical material provided is the 
CBFSAI.  
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CHAPTER 1:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
Section 1:  Introduction  
1.1 This Report covers the period from the establishment of the FR in 2003 to the end of 
September 2008 when the provision of exceptional Government support, in the form of 
the comprehensive State Guarantee for the liabilities of the Irish domestic banking 
system was announced.   It deals with two distinct aspects:  crisis prevention (in the 
years before 2008); and crisis containment (starting with the onset of the global liquidity 
crisis in August 2007). 
1.2 The Report seeks to answer two questions.   First, why was the danger from the 
emerging imbalances in the financial system that led to the crisis not identified more 
clearly and earlier and headed-off through decisive measures?   Second, when the crisis 
began to break, were the best containment measures adopted?   The Report has 
addressed both aspects with a particular focus on the performance of the Central Bank 
and the Financial Regulator throughout the period. 
Section 2:  Crisis Prevention 
1.3 The weaknesses of Irish banks that were exposed by the near-collapse of global debt 
markets in late 2008 need to be viewed against the background of the overall domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances that had built up during most of the decade (Chapter 2).   
The Government‘s procyclical fiscal policy stance, budgetary measures aimed at 
boosting the construction sector, and a relaxed approach to the growing reliance on 
construction-related and other insecure sources of tax revenue were significant factors 
contributing to the unsustainable structure of spending in the Irish economy. 
1.4 The growing construction boom was fuelled by the increasing reliance of Irish banks on 
wholesale external borrowing at a time when international financial markets were 
awash with cheap investable funds.   This greatly increased banks‘ vulnerability to 
changing market sentiment and ultimately triggered their downfall. 
1.5 But the weaknesses of Irish banks were not caused by the interruption in the flow of 
cheap money from abroad.   Even before the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, Irish residential property prices had been falling for more than 18 months and few 
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observers expected their fall to end soon.   Heavy loan-losses on the development 
property portfolio acquired at the peak of the market were becoming inevitable.   It is 
conceivable that, had international financial markets remained calm, the two main banks 
(AIB and Bank of Ireland) might have been able to manage their emerging loan-loss 
problems without Government assistance by drawing on (and/or augmenting via new 
issues) their capital, assisted by a few more years of profits on other lines of business.   
But, given what has now been revealed about the quality of their loan portfolio (by the 
National Asset Management Agency NAMA and through the Prudential Capital 
Assessment Review PCAR process), it seems clear that at that point Anglo Irish Bank 
and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) were well on the road towards 
insolvency. 
1.6 How was this situation allowed to emerge?   Before considering the role of the 
CBFSAI, it must be stressed that other actors were heavily involved.   In an important 
sense, the major responsibility lies with the directors and senior managements of the 
banks that got into trouble.   They are the first line of defence to protect those who have 
entrusted them with their funds.   Mortgage brokers and similar intermediaries, 
incentivised to generate mortgage business, probably played a part at the retail level.   It 
may also be the case that auditors and accountants should have been more alert to 
weaknesses in the banks‘ lending and financial position.   While these aspects have not 
been independently researched for this Report, they merit further investigation. 
1.7 Nevertheless, apart from the above elements, the key protection in any national system 
against the emergence of a banking crisis should be the central bank and regulatory 
function – the main focus of this Report.   It is clear that a major failure in terms of 
bank regulation and the maintenance of financial stability failure occurred.   Indeed the 
same can be said to a greater or lesser extent with respect to several other advanced 
economies.   However, the task in this Report is to characterise the ways in which the 
failures occurred in the Irish context and to identify the underlying reasons.   Three 
broad areas have been identified (dealt with more comprehensively in Chapters 3 to 7):  
(i) the design of and approach to micro-prudential aspects, especially the supervision of 
individual institutions;  (ii) the approach to macro-prudential or overall financial 
stability policy;  and (iii) the failure to undertake decisive and effective remedial 
measures. 
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 - Micro-prudential policy (Chapters 4 and 5) 
1.8 At no point throughout the period did the CBFSAI staff believe that any of the 
institutions were facing serious underlying difficulties, let alone potential insolvency 
problems – even at a late stage as the crisis neared.   Explaining this is not easy 
considering that all the staff involved were specialists, working diligently on what was 
understood to be an important task.   Thus, the failure was clearly of a systemic nature 
rather than related to any one individual.   A variety of factors were at work. 
1.9 First, the style of supervision adopted did not generate the most relevant or useful 
information to anything near the extent required.   By relying excessively on a 
regulatory philosophy emphasising process over outcomes, supervisory practice 
focussed on verifying governance and risk management models rather than attempting 
an independent assessment of risk, whether on a line-by-line or whole-of-institution 
basis.   This approach involved a degree of complacency about the likely performance 
of well-governed banks that proved unwarranted.  It was not just a question of 
emphasising principles over rules, it was the degree of trust that well-governed banks 
could be relied upon to remain safe and sound. 
1.10 True, the largest banks had established reasonable governance structures and acquired 
complex risk management software.
4
   But in their anxiety to protect market share 
against the competitive inroads of Anglo Irish Bank and UK-based retail lenders, their 
management tolerated a gradual lowering of lending standards, including decisions to 
authorise a numerous exceptions to stated policies.   Also, the implementation of 
policies, for example with respect to ensuring adequate documentation and perfectibility 
of security, turn out to have been defective.   The result was a much greater 
accumulation of risk than the bankers had envisaged or indeed that they seemed to 
recognise.  
1.11 By not challenging in detail such aspects as the security underlying large developer 
loans (including the extent to which development projects were co-financed by the 
developers‘ own funds) regulators did not realise just how vulnerable the lenders were 
                                                          
4
  The shortcomings of mechanical risk-management software in accurately measuring risk have been 
exposed by the US subprime crisis; they were neither needed nor effective for the much less complex 
portfolios of Irish banks.   Nevertheless, much effort was devoted by both the banks and the Financial 
Regulator to implement the complex new Basel II/EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) framework 
which soaked up a significant fraction of the resources available for supervision.  
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to property price declines.   More generally, in their reliance on assessments of systems, 
structures and models, they downplayed quantification of risks.   Even when 
confronted with evidence that the banks themselves had insufficient information, the 
regulators failed to grasp the scale of the potential exposure. 
1.12 Broadening the scope and intensifying supervision, especially its quantitative aspects, 
which could have addressed the above problems, would have required considerable 
additional staff resources and training to help offset the asymmetry in skills vis-a-
vis the regulated institutions.  It was already difficult to staff-up to intended levels 
given the high salaries and plentiful job opportunities available at the time in the private 
financial sector.  Only a small number of staff within the FR were directly involved in 
prudential supervision of credit institutions – no more than two per major firm.  
1.13 Second, even if armed with the necessary information, to be effective there would have 
had to be a greater degree of intrusiveness and assertiveness on the part of regulators 
in challenging the banks.   Although management of the FR would not accept that their 
―principles-based‖ approach ever implied ―light touch‖ regulation, the approach was 
characterised as being user-friendly in presentations aimed at expanding the export-
oriented financial services sector.   There are other indications of an unduly deferential 
approach to the banking industry which may have contributed to a reluctance to second-
guess bankers in any aggressive manner.   Together, these might have partly constituted 
what is described in the literature as ―regulatory capture‖.5   Thus, it would have been 
known within the FR that intrusive demands from line staff could be and were set aside 
after direct representations were made to senior regulators.  Also, attempts to formalise 
some of the principles (through Director‘ Compliance Statements and a Corporate 
Governance Code) both came to naught following industry lobbying (and, for the first 
of these, in the face of concerns expressed by the Department of Finance).  
1.14 Consistent with this regulatory climate, there was a pattern of inconclusive 
engagement on the part of supervisors with regulated entities and lack of decisive 
follow-through.   In one key case, where the Financial Regulator had identified serious 
weaknesses requiring corrective action, despite a protracted correspondence extending 
over many years, the problems had still not been solved prior to the crisis.   By not 
                                                          
5
  For a critical discussion, based on extensive worldwide evidence, of how the performance of bank 
supervision and regulators can become subject to capture, see Barth et al., (2006). 
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adhering to time-bound deadlines for escalation, the FR allowed some important matters 
to drift.   At the same time the appetite for legal challenge was limited which meant that 
in practice entities were given the benefit of the doubt; no penalties for breach of 
prudential regulations were ever imposed on a bank before 2008.   If unsuccessful, test 
legal cases could have helped garner support for additional legislative powers. 
 - Overall financial stability policy (Chapter 6) 
1.15 The major tool of overall financial stability policy was envisaged to be the Financial 
Stability Report (FSR).   The language of successive FSRs was too reassuring 
throughout, even as late as November 2007, and did little to induce the banks – or the 
public and policy makers – to adjust their behaviour to avoid the threats that lay ahead.   
The FSR drafting overemphasised the central forecast whereas it is the downside 
scenarios and the condition of the weakest institutions that are the most relevant for a 
financial stability assessment.   Admittedly, the views of outside bodies such as the IMF 
and OECD – especially in later years – were not sharply different and must have 
provided reassurance to any internal doubters.   In particular, the relatively glowing 
2006 update of the IMF‘s specialised Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
mission – an exercise designed precisely to identify any weaknesses in prudential 
regulation and financial stability policy – would have been enough to set any doubts 
that may have existed at rest.   The FSAP Report‘s misinterpretation – for whatever 
reasons – of the prevailing Irish situation must be considered unfortunate. 
1.16 Although the FSRs included significant analytical material analysing the 
underpinnings of the property boom, the relatively sanguine conclusions tended to be 
reached on a selective reading of the evidence.   This was particularly true in the case of 
the 2007 FSR when, despite internal evidence available to the contrary, the central 
conclusion regarding a ―soft landing‖ was not based on any quantitative calculations or 
analysis.   This appears to have been a ―triumph of hope over reality‖.   More generally, 
a rather defensive approach was adopted to external critics or contrarians.   For years 
many observers had raised some concerns publicly or privately, albeit sometimes in 
coded form, about the sustainability of the property boom, which was indeed dramatic 
by international standards.   For example, even though they appeared after most of the 
damage had already been done, the two 2007 articles by Morgan Kelly, while not 
backed up by in-depth quantitative research on the Irish situation, should nevertheless 
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have raised more warning flags than they did and prompted a rethink of the reassuring 
message of the FSR published in November of that year. 
1.17 Such quantification of risks as was attempted was carried out in the context of the stress 
test exercises reported annually in the FSRs.   Although many caveats were noted, too 
much confidence was placed in the reliability of the tests which were overseen by 
desk-based analysts without sufficient engagement by hands-on regulators.   Not being 
sufficiently close to practical banking, those relying on the stress tests may have had an 
unrealistic appreciation of what the bankers could and could not know.   Thus, for the 
―bottom up‖ tests, banks were asked to calculate possible loan losses in the event of a 
given (unfavourable) macroeconomic scenario.   Apart from the fact that the scenario 
was insufficiently severe, the capacity of the banks to undertake the exercise differed 
greatly;  indeed none of them had reliable models, tested and calibrated on Irish data, 
which could credibly predict loan losses under varying scenarios.   Furthermore, the 
banks were naturally prone to over-optimism and even (later) denial – the stress tests 
conducted in the summer of 2008 still provide a reassuring picture.   ―Top down‖ tests 
did not put the banks‘ positions under sufficient stress either.   In any event, all took too 
much comfort from both sets of tests‘ relatively benign conclusions.  
1.18 A closer interaction between the staff involved in financial stability and regulatory 
staff could have had the effect of alerting both sides to the limitations of the stress test 
methodology and reduced the sense of complacency.   If regulators had realised how 
risky the macroeconomic picture was for the banks they might have concluded that 
forceful action was needed; conversely, if the analysts dealing with financial stability 
had had a fuller understanding of how dependent banks‘ solvency was on the property 
market holding up, they might have looked at the stress tests with a more sceptical eye.   
However, the inadequacy of the dialogue between economists and regulators was a long 
standing concern (and one which is mirrored in other parts of the world) that would 
have required a greater senior management effort to bridge the methodological divide 
present. 
1.19 More generally, it may be that the institutional separation of the Regulator from the 
rest of the organisation (reviewed in Chapter 3) contributed to an insufficient 
appreciation of the micro-macro interlinkages involved in financial stability analysis.   It 
could also have led to some perceived ambiguity as to which part of the house should 
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take the lead in undertaking follow-up action.   However, the division of labour was set 
out clearly in legislation – the Financial Regulator was responsible for micro-prudential 
supervision and the Governor for overall stability with the power to take micro-
prudential steps if necessary.   In practice, senior Financial Regulator staff were full 
members of the Financial Stability Committee that steered the stress test process and the 
FSR Report itself.   Thus, whatever the other difficulties that may have arisen from the 
organisational structure, it cannot be held responsible for the failure of the CBFSAI to 
identify weaknesses sufficiently and take remedial measures as needed.
6,7
  
 - The failure to take sufficient macro-prudential corrective action (Chapter 7) 
1.20 Effective financial stability policy in a potential bubble also required intrusive macro-
prudential policy measures such as additional capital buffer requirements for risky 
property lending.   Although some initiatives were taken, deference and diffidence on 
the part of the CBFSAI led to insufficient decisive action or even clear and pointed 
warnings.   There was an unresolved anxiety that an aggressive stance would lead to (i) 
a loss of market share by Irish-controlled institutions and/or (ii) the triggering of a 
collapse in confidence, at first in the property market, and later for depositors.   Thus, 
the belated and relatively modest tightening in 2006 of capital requirements for high 
loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages, designed mainly as a warning signal, was adopted only 
after prolonged and agonised debate.
8
  
1.21 It is not clear how much merit the first concern ever had, inasmuch as almost all of the 
foreign-controlled banks operated through locally established subsidiaries which would 
have been equally subject to restrictive regulatory measures.   In any event the 
legislation was straightforward – promotion of the Irish financial services sector was to 
be encouraged but subject explicitly to the CBFSAI‘s mandate to promote financial 
stability.   Far too much weight was also given to the second consideration, especially in 
                                                          
6
  Issues of institutional rivalry may have contributed to inadequate communication between the two staffs 
on occasion.   There clearly was some friction at board and senior management level between the FR and 
the Central Bank on matters relating to human resources and the quality and cost of services (particularly 
of IT resources) provided to the FR.   In addition, while relations between the Governor and successive 
Chairs of the Authority were cordial, the Authority was always anxious to establish its operational 
independence from the Central Bank. 
7
  An additional ―structural‖ issue is whether the Authority gave too high a priority to consumer, rather 
than prudential issues.   While there was a fairly widespread perception that this was indeed the case, 
there are no solid indications that in practice this impeded the Authority carrying out its prudential 
responsibilities.  
8
 Alternative tough measures, such as banning (or disapproving of publicly) 100 per cent LTV mortgages, 
or setting and enforcing sectoral lending limits were not considered seriously as they were felt to be out of 
tune with the principles-based approach and with current international regulatory fashion. 
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the earlier period when decisive intervention could have made a major difference to the 
length and extent of the property boom.   Regulatory measures will inevitably have 
some disturbing effects on markets; indeed this is their main purpose.   The luxury of 
waiting until more clear-cut evidence becomes available must be set against the costs of 
inaction, especially when market participants are comforted and implicitly encouraged – 
or not sufficiently discouraged – to continue with risky borrowing and lending 
behaviour.  
Section 3:  Crisis Containment (Chapter 8) 
1.22 The provision of the State Guarantee on 29 September 2008 greatly diminished the 
immediate liquidity pressures and represented the overarching context within which 
further containment actions were taken in subsequent months.
9
   From late summer 
2007, the CBFSAI had been in increasingly crisis mode as it sought to prepare for the 
consequences of a possible looming liquidity squeeze for some or all of the Irish-
controlled banks.   How well was this phase managed in terms of minimising the 
damage caused by the crisis which eventually crested with the unprecedented guarantee 
decision at end-September 2008?   Partly with the benefit of hindsight, a number of 
elements are relevant to consider. 
1.23 First, almost all of the efforts of the CBFSAI from August 2007 onwards were focussed 
on the important task of improving the contingent access of the banks to liquidity.   
However, as stressed earlier, if the authorities during this period had had better 
information about the underlying condition of the banks and a more alert appreciation of 
the scale of the macroeconomic imbalances present, a focus on building capital buffers 
could have put the banks in a more robust position entering the last weeks of 
September 2008.  
1.24 While the final guarantee decision was taken under pressure of events, the meetings on 
the night of 29/30 September 2008 were the culmination of an intensive series of 
interagency meetings that had been taking place, and had greatly intensified since early 
                                                          
9
 These included the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank, the replacement of some directors and senior 
management of financial institutions and the injection of capital resources.   Over the course of 2009 and 
into 2010, the focus shifted from containment to resolution with the enactment of legislation creating 
NAMA; the regulatory assessment of each bank‘s recapitalisation needs (PCAR); and further injections of 
capital funds, including into the two building societies in which the Government took controlling shares.   
This process provided a good indication of the overall net fiscal cost of the crisis.   Much of this cost is 
attributable to Anglo Irish Bank, whose new management are in the process of completing a restructuring 
plan. 
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that month under the de facto leadership of the Department of Finance, also involving 
the NTMA and the CBFSAI (with the CBFSAI playing a less central role than might 
have been expected).   Despite the relative absence of detailed written records, it is clear 
that the meetings during this period, which involved substantial legal work, made the 
authorities increasingly better prepared to act as the weeks unfolded.  
1.25 As regards the substance of the guarantee itself, it is hard to argue with the view that 
an extensive guarantee needed to be put in place, since all participants (rightly) felt that 
they faced the likely collapse of the Irish banking system within days in the absence of 
decisive immediate action.  Given the hysterical state of global financial markets in 
those weeks, failure to avoid this outcome would have resulted in immediate and lasting 
damage to the economy and society.   There would have been additional lost income 
and employment surely amounting, if it could be quantified, to tens of billions of euros.   
Nevertheless, the extent of the cover provided (including to outstanding long-term 
bonds) can – even without the benefit of hindsight – be criticised inasmuch as it 
complicated and narrowed the eventual resolution options for the failing institutions and 
increased the State‘s potential share of the losses. 
1.26 While there was eventually a broad consensus, including among CBFSAI officials, that 
the guarantee scheme for all institutions was the best approach
10
, the idea of 
nationalising Anglo Irish Bank (implying an associated change in management) as an 
accompanying measure was also on the table. As a contingency (and highly 
confidential) precautionary measure, legislation to nationalise a troubled bank and/or 
building society had been in preparation for some time.
11
   It was felt by some that 
nationalising Anglo Irish Bank – which was facing by far the most serious liquidity 
crisis – would reduce the reputational damage that it was causing to the Irish banking 
system.   This bank‘s business model was also thought by many to be irrecoverably 
broken; although few participants were even beginning to think it might have actual 
solvency issues.   Among the arguments against an overnight nationalisation was the 
fear that it could present undue operational risks and that it might have a destabilising 
                                                          
10
  Other options mooted included extensive use of Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) from the 
Central Bank and/or the creation and use of a domestic fund drawing in addition on resources from the 
NTMA.   The possibility of temporary support from the two largest banks was also envisaged.   None of 
these options could be expected to do more than buy a few days – say until the following weekend.  
11
 This planning was first inspired by the experience of the UK Government in relation to the failure of 
Northern Rock one year earlier. 
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effect on markets. In the event, by the end of the week, the inflow of liquidity took the 
matter off the agenda.  
1.27 Two other aspects are worthy of comment.   First, the reaction of some authorities 
abroad – who were having their own difficulties – suggest that there should have been 
more advance consultation with them.   Second, the wisdom of leaving senior 
management in place while providing an open-ended guarantee to two institutions 
which – it should have been clear – were on the road to insolvency does not seem to 
have been considered.  
1.28 Despite the above criticisms, while overall better preparation during the previous year 
up to and including the guarantee decision could have reduced the extent of the 
downturn and the consequent rise in unemployment and other costs to the State and 
society, the bulk of it was already unavoidable.   In particular, the friction vis-a-vis some 
partner authorities has since dissipated and an effective resolution policy is well on 
track.   Above all, the lending decisions that generated this huge cost were made long 
before the point was reached of the guarantee.   The damage had already been done. 
Section 4:  Overall Conclusions  
1.29 In requesting this Report, the Minister for Finance noted that the Government considers 
it essential ―to thoroughly examine the conduct of the banking sector in recent years in 
order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the root causes of the systemic failures that 
led to the need for extraordinary support from the State to the domestic banking 
system‖.   The specific terms of reference ask that the Report have regard to ―the 
respective statutory powers, roles and responsibilities of the Central Bank and the 
Financial Regulator as well as consider the international social and macroeconomic 
policy environment which provided the context for the recent crisis in the banking 
sector.‖  
1.30 Apart from the role of the CBFSAI, banking practice and Government policy both 
clearly played a central role in contributing to the crisis:  
 i) there is prima facie evidence of a comprehensive failure of bank 
management and direction to maintain safe and sound banking practices, 
instead incurring huge external liabilities in order to support a credit-
fuelled property market and construction frenzy, and  
ii) macroeconomic and budgetary policies contributed significantly to the 
economic overheating, relying to a clearly unsustainable extent on the 
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construction sector and other transient sources for Government revenue 
(and encouraging the property boom via various incentives geared at the 
construction sector).   This helped create a climate of public opinion 
which was led to believe that the party could last forever.   A less 
accommodating and procyclical policy would have greatly reduced the 
need for preventive action from the CBFSAI. 
1.31 As regards the CBFSAI, the root causes appear to have been threefold:  
 i) a regulatory approach which was and was perceived to be excessively 
deferential and accommodating; insufficiently challenging and not 
persistent enough.   This meant not moving decisively and effectively 
enough against banks with governance issues.   It also meant that 
corrective regulatory intervention for the system as a whole was delayed 
and timid.   This was in an environment which placed undue emphasis on 
fears of upsetting the competitive position of domestic banks and on 
encouraging the Irish financial services industry even at the expense of 
prudential considerations. 
 ii) an under-resourced approach to bank supervision that, by relying on good 
governance and risk-management procedures, neglected quantitative 
assessment and the need to ensure sufficient capital to absorb the 
growing property-related risks. 
iii) an unwillingness by the CBFSAI to take on board sufficiently the real 
risk of a looming problem and act with sufficient decision and force to 
head it off in time.   ―Rocking the boat‖ and swimming against the tide of 
public opinion would have required a particularly strong sense of the 
independent role of a central bank in being prepared to ―spoil the party‖ 
and withstand possible strong adverse public reaction. 
1.32 There are undoubtedly many other factors which may have militated against the 
effectiveness of the CBFSAI during this period.   These include: aspects relating to the 
quantity and skill mix of the staffing of the bank regulation function;  an unduly 
hierarchical CBFSAI culture discouraging challenge; management process problems;  
difficulties, related to the rather unwieldy organisational structure, in ensuring 
coordination between economist and regulator sides of the house; and weaknesses in 
preparing for a crisis.   These factors may have contributed to the crisis but were not 
fundamental.   Nor was the failure of Lehman Brothers decisive.  
1.33 One additional element deserving of consideration is the suggestion by some 
commentators that the fact that some banking personages were politically well 
connected might have been a key factor in discouraging aggressive supervisory 
intervention.   None of the persons interviewed during the investigation agreed with this 
proposition, with several noting (rightly) that it was quite predictable that senior 
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banking figures would have political contacts.   While it is easy to imagine that senior 
management or CBFSAI Board or Authority Members might have instinctively and 
almost unconsciously shied away from aggressive action to restrain politically 
connected bankers and developers during a runaway property boom, no evidence has 
been presented suggesting that this was the case.
12
   Furthermore, although the climate 
of regulatory deference might have been unconsciously reinforced by social interaction 
– modest though it might have been13 – organised by regulated institutions, there is no 
evidence or hint of corrupt regulatory forbearance. 
1.34 The question can legitimately be asked as to how much difference more resolute action 
by the CBFSAI would have made.   At the micro-prudential level, a cap on property-
related lending would have curbed the worst excesses, as would have increased, 
accompanied by a more aggressive stance on governance in the case of one or more 
specific institutions.   At the systemic level, a far greater increase in capital 
requirements on risky loans, if implemented several years earlier, would have made a 
major difference. A ceiling or penalty on very high loan-to-deposit ratios for banks 
would also have been effective.  To buttress these measures, the CBFSAI should have 
contained a much stronger message in FSRs and in accompanying public statements in 
order to lay out clearly the very serious risks posed to financial stability by an 
unsustainable housing boom and a vastly overheated economy.  
1.35 The terms of reference for this Report request that it highlight key specific areas that it 
considers appropriate for subsequent examination by the statutory Commission of 
Investigation.   Without ranging too widely, let us mention that as far as the organisation 
and conduct of the financial sector is concerned, the management and operations of the 
credit institutions themselves have not been studied in full detail for this Report.   
                                                          
12
 In the case of Anglo Irish Bank, management was seen by at least FR staff as perhaps ―slick and 
buccaneering‖ but not as presenting a large or imminent risk.   Although it became quite clear to top FR 
decision-makers that senior Anglo figures were well-liked in political circles, and it cannot be excluded 
that this played a part in their subsequent continuation in office for some months after September, there 
was, until very late in the day, no perceived need to take regulatory action against them.   The central 
management figure in INBS was seen as an overly dominating figure that needed to be surrounded by a 
stronger governance structure.   While it was understood by all that he was politically well-connected, the 
failure to resolve the issue is not attributed by anyone involved to his having a privileged status.   While 
unconscious factors may have been at work, FR management and directors agree that there is no evidence 
of political representations being made on his behalf aimed at influencing regulatory decisions. 
13
 Receipt of gifts or entertainment by CBFSAI staff has long been subject to a detailed Code of Ethics 
and Behaviour, including reporting requirements.   Inspection of the register recording benefits received 
indicates that these have been of modest value. 
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Furthermore, the operations of mortgage intermediaries and audit and accounting bodies 
in the period prior to the crisis might also be worthy of examination.  
1.36 This Report does not attempt to discuss certain matters that came to public attention 
after the guarantee was announced and which are the subject of separate inquiries, 
namely the director loans issue, the so-called Quinn-Anglo CFD affair and its 
ramifications, and the question of a back-to-back deposit arrangement.   Awareness of 
these matters (all of them relating to Anglo Irish Bank) has, however, coloured the 
conclusions of the Report. 
1.37 Although the Directors and officials of the CBFSAI differed in many detailed respects 
in their knowledge and understanding of the emerging situation, they do not appear to 
have realised – or at least could not bring themselves to acknowledge – before mid-
2007 at the very earliest, not only how close the system was to the edge, but also the 
extent to which the task of pulling it back from the edge fell to the CBFSAI.   Some also 
still feel that, without the external shocks of September 2008, the system would have 
survived without imposing a cost to the Government.   The Report does not share this 
view.  
1.38 Steps have been taken since the onset of the crisis to correct the main issues identified 
relating to the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator.   New legislation has been 
prepared, and the organisation will shortly publish its strategic plan defining how it is 
strengthening and reforming its operations, procedures and overall approach. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
2.1 The international financial crisis of the past three years has seen extensive government 
interventions to stabilise banks and prevent disorderly failures.   The far-reaching 
measures taken by the Irish Government at end-September 2008 reflected the fact that 
the drain of liquidity which had been affecting all Irish banks had brought one important 
bank to the point of failure.   To forestall the risk that such a failure would drastically 
affect all the other banks, the Government introduced an extensive guarantee of deposits 
and other liabilities.   The gross amount of liabilities guaranteed came to €365 billion, or 
almost 2½ times GNP. 
2.2 The initial expectation of officials at the time of the guarantee was that none of the 
institutions involved was insolvent, and that their problems stemmed mainly from a 
freezing of short-term liquidity in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.   
However, subsequent developments have revealed a more serious and costly situation. 
2.3 In sum, after the banks have sold their largest property-related exposures to the State‘s 
asset purchase vehicle, NAMA, at a price based on their estimated ―long-term economic 
value‖, and after they have made provision for all of their other prospective loan-losses 
the State will have taken sizeable equity stakes in most of the banks, and issued some 
€40 billion or more in Government-guaranteed NAMA bonds (in exchange for which 
NAMA will hold loans of a similar value).   The State will also have had to write-off in  
the order of €25 billion in unrecoverable capital injections into two institutions – Anglo 
Irish Bank and INBS – whose prospective loan losses greatly exceed their initial 
accounting capital.
14
 
2.4 Apart from the experience of Iceland, this has turned out to have been the poorest 
performance of any banking system during the current global downturn.   Yet Irish 
banks had not indulged in the financing of US securitised mortgages, nor were they 
involved in aggressive international acquisitions – flaws that characterised weakened 
banks elsewhere.   Instead, they had been fatally weakened by a deep involvement in a 
world-beating property bubble which took off on the eve of Euro area membership and 
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 Heavy loan losses were also recorded by several of the foreign-controlled banks operating in Ireland. 
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swelled, based on huge capital inflows – more than 50 per cent of GDP in the 4 years 
after 2003. 
2.5 As Shiller (2005) has argued, boom-and-bust cycles are normally based on the 
propagation of a misplaced optimism built on a half-truth which seems to foretell an 
unprecedented stream of prosperity.   A plausible explanation of the global financial 
meltdown is that an exaggerated belief in risk management systems  underpinned 
misplaced confidence in risky investments, triggered the extravagant expansion in 
capital and liquidity worldwide shrank risk premia and generated unsupportable degrees 
of leverage (cf. Honohan, 2008).
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2.6  In Ireland‘s case the scene was set by the seeming effortlessness of the ―Celtic Tiger‖ 
boom which started in the late 1980s and brought sustained growth in employment, 
income and household formation.   Subsequently Ireland‘s becoming a founder member 
of the eurozone brought a dramatic and sustained fall in nominal and real interest rates 
(and removed exchange risk from most foreign borrowing) which in turn justified 
substantially higher equilibrium asset valuations.   These elements helped sustain a 
belief that equilibrium house prices would soar and that housing demand would 
continue to grow for the foreseeable future. 
2.7 Domestic policies did not act as a sufficient counterweight to the forces driving this 
unsustainable property bubble.   Bank regulation and financial stability policy clearly 
failed to achieve their goals.   Neither did fiscal policy constrain the boom.   Indeed, the 
increased reliance on taxes that could only generate sufficient revenue in a boom, made 
public finances highly vulnerable to a downturn.   Specific tax incentives also boosted 
rather than restrained the overheated construction sector.   And, with surging labour 
demand, wage rates in both the public and private sectors moved well ahead of what 
could protect international competitiveness. 
2.8 The economic consequences of the crash have been severe.   The collapse in 
construction, the fall in property prices and the severe knock-on effects on the banking 
system have all undermined employment and the public finances, and left the economy 
in a weakened condition to face the global recession.   It is thus hardly surprising that 
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 As other examples, Shiller points to the belief that internet technology would generate sustained growth 
and profits as the cause of the dot.com bubble, the role of electric inventions resulting in the stock market 
bubble in 1901, and the role of the motor car and related technologies driving the 1920s US bubble.  
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Ireland has experienced one of the most severe downturns of any industrial country, 
with peak-to-trough fall in quarterly GNP estimated as about 17 per cent.
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2.9 The remainder of this Chapter describes the overall macroeconomic background to the 
crisis in more detail.   Section 2 briefly reviews the Celtic Tiger period, Section 3 
describes the emergence of the property bubble and Section 4 examines the evolution of 
the banking crisis.   Section 5 discusses some key specific aspects of fiscal policy and 
competitiveness during the boom period, while Section 6 attempts, as a first round 
approximation, to distinguish the effects of the world-wide crisis on the Irish economy 
from those created by underlying domestic imbalances. 
Section 2:  The Celtic Tiger 
2.10 During the 1990s, Ireland emerged from a lengthy period of economic stagnation 
marked by high unemployment, emigration, and crippling public debt despite high tax 
levels (Ó Gráda and O‘Rourke, 1996, Honohan and Walsh, 2002).   From 1988 to 2007, 
real GDP expanded by 6 per cent per annum on average (reaching double digit growth 
during 1995-2000).   Unemployment plummeted from 16 per cent (on the ILO basis) in 
1994 to 4 per cent in 2000 – essentially full employment for the first time in modern 
history.   Non-agricultural employment jumped from 33 per cent of the population in 
1993 to 41 per cent in 2000 and 46 per cent by 2007.   With Ireland at the frontier of 
economic prosperity, this economic miracle was widely admired and emulated. 
2.11 To understand what went wrong, two different growth phases need to be distinguished.   
Up to 2000 the true ―Celtic Tiger‖ period involved exceptional export-led growth with 
moderate wage and price inflation maintaining cost competitiveness and healthy public 
finances.   This period began in the late 1980s when the Government finally tackled the 
public debt problem with tough spending restraint and managed to negotiate a series of 
social partnership agreements which seems to have brought wage rate moderation (and 
industrial peace) in return for income tax concessions.   EU structural funds amounting 
to as much as 3 per cent of GDP per annum also helped fund an expanded public 
infrastructural program.   These policies, with competitiveness boosted by the 
successful devaluation of 1986, saw living standards converge belatedly towards the 
highest in Europe.   The historic pattern of net emigration was reversed. 
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  The fall in GDP is much smaller at about 12 per cent, because of the sizeable role of the multinational 
corporations, whose export-oriented activity has held up well during the recession. 
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2.12 By about 2000, as the economy approached full employment, and technological 
constraints began to bite, the potential for continued per capita growth at rates 
experienced earlier no longer existed.   Further national growth above the industrial 
country average could only be achieved with continued large scale immigration and 
capital investment. 
Section 3:  The Emergence of a Property Bubble 
2.13  The current difficulties of the Irish banks – whether in terms of liquidity or solvency – 
are directly attributable to their over-lending for land and property investment, much of 
it through heavy short-term wholesale foreign borrowing.   Without the latter, the banks 
would not have been as vulnerable to the world-wide liquidity crisis which intensified 
throughout 2008.   Had they been less heavily exposed to an overheated property 
market, the prospective loan-losses that began to spook investors would have been 
manageable.   In short, although international pressures contributed to the timing, 
intensity and depth of the Irish banking crisis, the essential characteristic of the problem 
was domestic and classic. 
2.14 The preconditions for increasing housing demand emerged gradually with the sustained 
export-led real economic expansion from 1988 and especially from 1994 onwards.   But 
the sharp fall in nominal and real interest rates in the months running-up
17
 to EMU entry 
really triggered the housing price surge.   Average realised short-term wholesale real 
interest rates fell from about 7 per cent in the decade after 1983 (and about 3 per cent in 
the 1990s after the collapse of the narrow-band ERM) to negative territory as EMU 
began (Chart 2.1).   Rates on bank loans followed suit. 
2.15 This combination of higher population, higher income and lower actual and especially 
prospective mortgage interest rates provided a straightforward upward shift in the 
willingness and ability to pay for housing.   But property prices developed their own 
momentum and overshot equilibrium levels.   In effect, purchasers increasingly built in 
an expected continuation in the increase of the relative price of housing.  
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 Fearing excessively rapid economic growth, the Central Bank worked to maintain interest rates high for 
as long as possible before the euro came in; but from September 1998 Irish short-term rates began to 
converge quickly towards DM levels. 
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Chart 2.1:  Interbank Interest Rate Adjusted for Inflation, 1980-2008 
Source:  CBFSAI 
 
 
Chart 2.2:  Real House Prices, Q1 1976-Q3 2009 
 
Source:  Department of Environment, CSO and CBFSAI calculations. 
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2.16 Real residential property prices jumped to almost four times their historic norm (Chart 
2.2), and the bubble also involved a sharp increase in construction and housing well 
beyond population needs.
18
   The share of the (growing) workforce engaged in 
construction rose from about 7 per cent in the early and mid-1990s to over 13 per cent 
by 2007, before falling back to about 6 to 7 per cent by 2010 (Charts 2.3 and 2.4).    
2.17 Even if lower interest rates from 1998 meant a major increase in housing affordability, 
the three-fold increase in average real property prices 1994 to 2006 was the highest in 
any advanced economy in recent times and, long before it peaked, looked unsustainable 
to most commentators (Honohan, 2009).   Still, many hoped for a ―soft landing‖.   A 
significant downward property price adjustment could have been manageable for the 
banks if they had taken adequate precautionary measures.   Whether the economy could 
make the necessary adjustment away from construction, without a significant rise in 
unemployment, was a key question. 
 
Chart 2.3:  House Completions (Monthly), 1975-2010 
 
Source:  Department of Environment 
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  According to the 2006 census, some 15 per cent of the housing stock stood vacant, mostly reflecting 
speculative purchases (less than 3 per cent was accounted for  by holiday homes) 
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Chart 2.4:  Construction Share of Total Employment, 1980-2010 
 
Source:  ESRI Databank, CSO. 
 
Section 4:  The Role of the Banks 
2.18 Banks had not been central to the financing of the export-led Celtic Tiger period and do 
not appear to have played a leading role in the early phase of the property bubble
19
.   
However, the four last years of the boom, from late 2003 onwards, were clearly bank-
led, as new entrants and incumbents competed aggressively, stimulating demand with 
innovations such as 100 per cent LTV mortgages, increasingly offered to middle-
income borrowers, including first-time buyers; mortgage brokers, some of whom 
reportedly paid too little regard to the real creditworthiness of the borrower, started to 
play a more prominent role.   Banks were certainly not tightening credit conditions as 
the average LTV ratio loan rose.   Overall, despite the traditional nature of lending 
during the period while prices rose, there was a distinct decline in loan appraisal quality 
for residential mortgages. 
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  As the ECB survey of bank lending conditions (Chart 2.5) starts only in 2003,  disentangling supply 
and demand for credit  in prior years is not straightforward 
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Chart 2.5: Credit Supply Conditions for House Purchase Loans 
(Change from Previous Quarter) 
 
Source:  CBFSAI 
2.19 Lending to property developers also soared and much of it turned out to be 
unrecoverable thus proving to be the major weakness of the banks.   Complicated cross-
collateralisation meant that banks were much more exposed than they seem to have 
realised.   And although some of the property collaterals were located in several foreign 
locations vulnerability to a correlated downturn in the different markets meant that 
banks would have needed a greater capital buffer to protect against a possible property 
crash. 
2.20  At end-2003, net indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was just 10 per 
cent of GDP; by early 2008 borrowing, mainly for property, had jumped to over 60 per 
cent of GDP (Chart 2.6).   Moreover, the share of bank assets in property-related 
lending grew from less than 40 per cent before 2002 to over 60 per cent by 2006. 
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Chart 2.6:  Stock of Net Borrowing of Irish Resident Credit Institutions from 
Abroad, 1999Q1 to 2009Q4 
 
Source:  Table C3, 7 of the Central Bank Monthly Statistics, and the CSO‘s Quarterly National 
Accounts.  
Note:  GDP are annualised from quarterly data.  
 
2.21 Competitive pressure on the leading banks to protect their market share was driven 
especially by the unprecedentedly rapid expansion of one bank, Anglo Irish (whose 
market share soared from 3 per cent to 18 per cent in a decade, growing its loan 
portfolio at an annual average rate of 36 per cent).   Foreign controlled banks, especially 
the local subsidiary of HBOS, also contributed to increased competition. 
Section 5:  Fiscal Policy and Competitiveness  
2.22 The emergence of macroeconomic vulnerabilities during the bubble period was 
reflected in a deterioration of wage competitiveness and underlying fiscal revenue and 
expenditure policies (ESRI, 2005).   From 1986 to 2000, wage restraint, attributable to 
the centralised pay negotiations, as well as the high initial level of unemployment and 
the dampening impact of immigration, had helped generate and sustain full 
employment.   But after 2000, influenced by the strong boom-fuelled labour market, 
wage competitiveness deteriorated (Chart 2.7).   By 2008, hourly wage rates had 
raced ahead of those of main  
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Chart 2.7:  Relative Hourly Earnings (Manufacturing) Ireland -v- Main Trading 
Partners, 1990-2010 
 
Source:  CBFSAI 
trading partner countries.   Masked by the construction boom, this loss of wage 
competitiveness was certain to affect employment expansion sooner or later.
20
 
2.23 Although Ireland‘s public debt level immediately prior to the crisis was low, the  fiscal 
deficit and public sector borrowing surged  quickly with the onset of the crisis. This 
was partly attributable to a rise in Government spending in GDP (after 2004) which 
became embedded in the system.   The expenditure boost came at a period when 
elements such as the cost of unemployment payments was driving other cyclically- 
related spending down.   However, in light of soaring tax revenues at the time, 
Government decided to increase autonomous spending particularly on public sector pay.   
But the main cause of the borrowing surge was the collapse in tax revenues in 2008-09 
which appears to have been the most pronounced of virtually any country during the 
current downturn. 
                                                          
20
  Public sector workers, who had on average maintained a significant average wage premium relative to 
private sector workers during the Celtic Tiger period, seem to have stretched that premium in the years 
after 2003 (cf. Boyle et al., 2004;  Kelly et al., 2008). 
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2.24 Much of the reason for the revenue collapse lies in the systematic shift over the previous 
two decades away from stable and reliable sources such as personal income tax, VAT 
and excises towards cyclically sensitive taxes.   Revenue became  increasingly 
dependent on corporation tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax (in that order);  the 
contribution of these taxes to total tax revenues rose steadily from about 8 per cent in 
1987 to 30 per cent in 2006 before falling to 27 per cent in 2007 and just 20 per cent  in 
2008 (Chart 2.8).  
Chart 2.8:  Cyclical Taxes as % of Total 1987 to 2009  
(Corporation Tax, Capital Gains Tax and Stamp Duties) 
 
Source:  Department of Finance, CBFSAI Calculations.   
 
2.25 The steady growth in revenue from the above ―fair weather‖ taxes during the two 
decades from 1988 – with only two brief hesitations in 1993 and 2001-02 – created  a 
false sense of security as to their sustainability and induced policy makers to take 
advantage by narrowing the base of the personal income tax and lowering rates.   The 
latter did help buy wage restraint but left the budget seriously exposed to a downturn.   
Had the tax structure been less cyclically sensitive, the fall in revenue in 2008 would 
have been much lower. 
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2.26 Government spending doubled in real terms between 1995 and 2007, rising at an annual 
average rate of 6 per cent.   With the economy growing at an even faster rate, this 
implied a generally falling or stable expenditure ratio of expenditure to GNP until 2003.   
But thereafter the ratio rose, especially after output growth began to slow in 2007.   
And, in a final twist, real expenditure rose by over 11 per cent in both 2007 and 2008, 
an unfortunate late burst of spending which boosted the underlying deficit at almost the 
worst possible time. 
Chart 2.9:  Current Government Expenditure and Revenue, 1960-2010 
 
Source:  Department of Finance, CBFSAI calculations.  
2.27 Throughout this period, the Government made extensive use of taxation incentives 
aimed at the construction sector.
21
   The rates of stamp duties, which were high, were 
lowered several times in recent years (in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007), sometimes 
with the aim of improving the affordability of housing to first time buyers (as was the 
case with the Bacon initiatives 1998-2000).  In addition, different classes of 
construction investment have attracted sizeable income tax concessions extending over 
long periods.   At the height of the boom, in 2004-06, schemes existed for urban 
renewal, multi-storey car parks, student accommodation, buildings used for third level 
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 The effect of taxation on investment in construction is a complex subject [see studies by Barham (2004) 
Indecon (2006), Goodbody (2005), Van den Noord (2005) and Rae and van den Noord (2006)]. 
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educational purposes, hotels and holiday camps, holiday cottages, rural and urban 
renewal, park and ride facilities, ―living over the shop‖, nursing homes, private  
hospitals and convalescent facilities, sports injury clinics and childcare facilities.   After 
some transitional arrangements, most of these incentives were abolished by 31 July 
2008, after the expiration date of the schemes had earlier been extended on several 
occasions during 2000-08.
22,23 
 
2.28 The ceiling on the income tax deductibility of mortgage interest for owner-occupiers 
was increased in 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2008.   By 2006 Ireland was one of only four 
OECD countries which allowed income tax deductibility while not taxing imputed 
rental income or capital gains for owner-occupiers.   Furthermore, no residential 
property tax existed.   Still, the estimated tax bias in favour of owner-occupation was 
only the fifth highest in the EU15 countries (Rae and Van den Noord, 2006).   For 
investors, after 2001 deductibility was limited only by the investor‘s rental income. 
2.29 The above tax policy elements of the tax code certainly influenced the extent of 
construction activity and the level of land and property prices.   In theory they might 
just have shifted the composition of Irish wealth in favour of construction and not 
necessarily have caused in themselves unsound borrowing or lending and defaults.   
However, studies of some of the schemes suggest that they became associated with 
over-building and high vacancy rates – phenomenon which are very evident today. 
 Section 6:  Disentangling the Effect of Lehman Brothers 
2.30 It would be a significant mistake to suppose that the steep economic downturn that has 
been experienced since 2007 is wholly due to the working out and correction of 
underlying domestic imbalances that have been described.   After all, there has been a 
severe world-wide recession, the causes of which involve the correction of imbalances 
in the US, UK and elsewhere – excesses which have their own complexities not shared 
in the Irish case.  
2.31 It is useful to consider more specifically what might have been the relative contribution 
of local factors to the Irish output loss.   As a first approximation, Chart 2.10 compares 
                                                          
22
  Tax incentive schemes in the health sector were not abolished in 2008.   However, these were later 
abolished in the Supplementary Budget 2009.  
23
  For example, in the case of the Urban and Town Renewal Schemes, end-dates of 31 December 2002, 
31 December 2004 and 31 July 2006, had previously been specified. 
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the output path of the euro area countries as a whole to that of Ireland during the 2000s.   
As a very crude exercise the Chart also shows what the path of GDP in Ireland might 
have been had it followed the actual euro-wide trend which includes the impact of the 
global downturn – from 2007 onwards.   The difference between this projected path and 
the actual path – which over a three year period is equivalent to almost a fifth of 2007 
GDP – can be viewed as a not unrealistic approximation of the output loss incurred by 
Ireland due to the need to correct Irish-specific imbalances.   Assuming GDP in Ireland 
in 2010 turns out to about 12 per cent below that of 2007, about three quarters of this 
could be seen as attributable to local factors. 
Chart 2.10:  GDP Ireland and Euro Area (Actual and Simulated), 2000-2010 
 
2.32 If it is further assumed that this part of the output adjustment was inevitable – i.e., even 
without the world-wide downturn triggered by Lehman Brothers – property prices 
would have had to fall disproportionately in any event, given how far they had been 
running ahead of GDP during the boom years.   Moreover, prices had already started to 
fall well before Lehman Brothers – more than 18 months in the case of residential 
property and perhaps nine months in the case of commercial property.   From this 
perspective, property prices were most likely to continue to fall in any case.   Lehman 
Brothers was just the trigger for a more sudden and deeper fall as the economy had to 
adjust not only to the inevitable rebalancing of demand away from construction but also 
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to the decline in world demand.   In sum, the argument that property prices would have 
remained much higher and for much longer had it not been for Lehman Brothers is not 
convincing.  
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CHAPTER 3:  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
3.1 This Chapter describes the establishment in 2003 of the CBFSAI with its novel 
institutional arrangement, in which responsibilities were divided between the newly 
created Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA, also known as the 
Financial Regulator, or FR) – operating under the overall umbrella of the CBFSAI – and 
what was thought of as the Central Bank (CB) proper.  
3.2 Section 2 contains a brief review of the origin of the existing organisational structure of 
the CBFSAI.
24
   Section 3 discusses the formal structure and assignment of 
responsibilities and powers between the components of the CBFSAI.   Section 4 
describes the working methods of the CBFSAI Board and the Authority of its 
constituent but autonomous part, the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority.   
Section 5 concludes.  
Section 2:  Origin of the CBFSAI 
3.3 Against the background of public concern over a number of tax evasion and 
overcharging issues related to banking
25
 and the then recent creation in the UK of an 
unitary financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
26
 the Government 
decided in principle in October 1998 to consolidate prudential and consumer protection 
regulation of almost all types of financial firms in a single regulatory authority.   The 
report of an Advisory Group chaired by Michael McDowell, SC, on how to implement 
this decision, was published in June, 1999.   It envisaged, inter alia, not only the 
centralisation of building society, credit union and insurance regulation with that of 
banking, but also assigned, in addition to prudential regulation, consumer protection to 
                                                          
24
  On 19 June 2009 the Minister announced that a restructured Central Bank of Ireland would replace the 
CBFSAI.   On 30 March 2010, the Minister for Finance published the Central Bank Reform Bill 2010 as 
the first stage in a three-stage legislative process.   A second Bill to be published later in 2010 will 
enhance the Bank‘s supervisory, financial stability and consumer protection powers and a third Bill, 
scheduled for the autumn of 2010, will consolidate all central bank and financial services legislation. 
25
  The Inquiry into the Operation of Deposit Interest Retention Tax (the DIRT Inquiry), conducted by the 
Dáil Committee of Public Accounts, found that certain bank customers were allowed, if not encouraged, 
to deposit funds in accounts held in concealed accounts for the express purpose of avoiding taxes due.   
There were also concerns in the late 1990s that certain banks had adopted a policy of breaching trust with 
their customers by increasing or loading rates of interest on overdrafts or loans, without informing 
customers of the change in terms.  
26
  The move to a single regulator in the UK reflected the blurring of boundaries between different 
financial service providers following substantial deregulation of their lines of business. 
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one agency.   The newly-assigned importance of the consumer protection function was 
underlined by the proposed creation of the statutory position of Consumer Director 
within the Authority, whereas no corresponding position was proposed for prudential 
regulation.  
3.4 While the McDowell Group recommended that the Single Regulatory Authority be a 
completely new, independent, organisation, the preferred choice of a minority of the 
Group (an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Finance and the then Deputy 
Director General of the Central Bank of Ireland) was to locate the Single Regulatory 
Authority as a new division within a restructured Central Bank, and with specified 
statutory functions for the head of division, who would report to the Governor only in 
respect of organisational (e.g., staffing, finance, etc.) issues.   The minority argued inter 
alia that their model would provide for better continuity and accountability, while 
preserving what was already working well. 
3.5 In the event, the Government adopted a compromise between the majority and minority 
positions.   Under legislation enacted in 2003, the Irish Financial Services Regulatory 
Authority was established within the overall new structure of what was to be called the 
Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland.   But IFSRA was not just a 
division of the CBFSAI. It had its own governing Authority, a majority of whose 
members would sit on the CBFSAI Board.  
3.6 According to the 2003 Act the CBFSAI was an entity with one legal personality, but 
with three decision-making bodies (Box 3.1).   IFSRA was a statutory body within the 
legal personality of the CBFSAI, and had powers vested in it to deal with prudential 
supervision and consumer protection.   Under the legal framework, IFSRA was 
autonomous but not independent of the CBFSAI  it took all its decisions and actions 
legally in the name of the CBFSAI.   IFSRA did not have a balance sheet or funds of its 
own which it would have required in order to have had the status of a separate legal 
identity.   The arrangement was that resources and services were provided to the 
Financial Regulator by the CB and its relevant departments. 
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Box 3.1:  Decision-Making Bodies of CBFSAI 
 
 
The 2003 legislation produced quite a complex structure, as is conveyed by the above organisation 
chart from early 2009.  However, the CBFSAI had just three main decision-making bodies: 
 the Governor would be the decision-making body for European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) related tasks – including financial stability issues; 
 subject to the above provision, IFSRA, an autonomous but constituent part of the 
CBFSAI with its own Board (the Authority), Chairperson, Chief Executive and 
Consumer Director, would be responsible for licensing and prudential regulation 
of all financial service providers and for consumer protection across the sectors;  
and, 
 the CBFSAI Board (chaired by the Governor) would be the decision-making body 
for remaining tasks, including the efficient and effective co-ordination of the 
constituent parts of the organisation as a whole and the exchange of information 
between them.  
 
 
Section 3:  Formal Structure 
3.7 The division of responsibilities between the Governor, the CBFSAI and IFSRA was 
novel and contained the hazard of ambiguous lines of responsibility especially in the 
event of a systemic crisis.
27
   However, a number of provisions helped guard against any 
conflict. 
                                                          
27
 This observation was made by Honohan (2002) at the time in comments on the legislation when it was 
introduced (cf. http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/financial_stability/message/161)  
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3.8 Licensing and prudential legislation was clearly to be the responsibility of IFSRA.   
However, in performing its functions, IFSRA had a duty to act in a manner consistent 
with the performance by the Governor and the Board of their CBFSAI functions 
(including the Governor‘s role in contributing to financial stability).   If a matter relating 
to financial stability arose in connection with the performance and exercise by IFSRA 
of its functions or powers, it was required to consult the Governor on the matter and 
could only act in relation to the issue with the Governor‘s agreement.   Thus, as outlined 
in Chapter 7, in December 2006, the Governor‘s approval for changes in required 
capital ratios was sought (and given).   One of the statutory objectives of the CBFSAI 
was to promote the development of the financial services industry in Ireland (but in 
such a way as not to affect its objective of contributing to the stability of the financial 
system).   These two aspects, as described in Chapter 7, did give rise to some conflict. 
3.9 The Governor was also given powers to authorise a CBFSAI employee to investigate 
the business, and carry out on-site inspections, of licensed credit institutions, building 
societies, trustee savings banks, approved stock exchanges, authorised investment 
businesses and authorised collective investment schemes.   In addition, the Governor 
and the CBFSAI Board, with respect to their respective functions, could issue 
guidelines to IFSRA – which would have to be published officially – as to the policies 
and principles that the Financial Regulator (FR) was required to implement in its 
performance of CBFSAI functions.   These powers were not, however, used in the 
period under consideration. 
3.10 These provisions for close involvement of the central banking functions in supervision 
matters – described by the Minister for Finance in his Second Stage speech as intended 
to ensure that financial stability issues and European System of Central Banks (ESCB)  
tasks were dealt with in a coordinated fashion – were included at the suggestion of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) which regarded them as fundamental and encouraged 
that they ―should be made the most of in practice.‖ (Doherty and Lenihan, 2008).  
3.11 Overall cooperation between the CBFSAI and the FR in practice was underpinned by a 
2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between the two entities.   The 
MoU (reproduced as Annex 2) delineated the respective roles of the two entities in the 
area of financial stability, as well as aspects regarding data and information exchange, 
crisis management, and consultation on policy changes regarding financial stability 
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matters.   The MoU sets out the shared understanding that the CBFSAI‘s responsibilities 
included ―overview of the domestic financial system as a whole‖ and ―analysis of the 
micro-prudential  where appropriate  as well as macro-prudential health of the 
financial sector‖; while the responsibilities of IFSRA included the ―prudential 
supervision of banks‖ and ―providing advice, information and assistance in relation to 
the Bank‘s functions to the Bank‘s Board and the Governor‖ (CBFSAI, 2003). 
Chart 3.1:  CBFSAI Board and FR Authority, September 2008 
 
 
Section 4:  The Work of the CBFSAI Board and Authority 
3.12 This section considers the linkages in practice between the Board of the CBFSAI and 
the Regulatory Authority.   The structure of CBFSAI Board and Authority membership 
had some noteworthy features (Chart 3.1) which shows the composition at September 
2008.
28
   Thus the Governor was not a member of the Authority, even though he did 
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  Note that Tony Grimes‘ predecessor as Director General, Liam Barron, had not been a member of the 
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retain certain regulatory functions intended to ensure that financial stability issues and 
ESCB tasks were dealt with in a coordinated fashion. 
3.13 Specifically, responsibility for the management of the Central Bank was vested in the 
Board comprising the Governor, the Director General of the Central Bank, the 
Chairperson and the Chief Executive of IFSRA, the Secretary General of the 
Department of Finance ex-officio, and seven non-executive Directors appointed by the 
Minister for Finance. Of these seven Directors, four had to be members of the 
Authority. The Authority comprised the Chair, the Chief Executive, the Consumer 
Director and seven non-executive Directors (Chart 3.1).   Non-executive Board and 
Authority members were appointed by the Minister for Finance.  
3.14 The turnover of non-executive Directors has been relatively low, a feature which helped 
consolidate expertise and build experience.   The independent status of Board members 
was described by the first Governor, J.J. Brennan, as follows: 
―It should be remembered on this connection that members of the board of 
the Central Bank however selected should not consider themselves as 
acting at that Board in any representative capacity but should place their 
knowledge and qualifications at the disposal of the Board with a view to 
reaching the best conclusions from a currency standpoint in the public 
interest without any regard to any particular interests, official or otherwise, 
with which they may have outside association.‖ 29  
3.15 With no specific qualifications required by legislation, the background of non-executive 
CBFSAI Board and Authority members reflected a variety of experiences including, in 
many cases, prior involvement with financial, economic and related fields
30
.   Although 
it did therefore include specialists and experts in relevant fields, it would be fair to say 
that, in practice, the composition of the CBFSAI Board and Authority is closer to the 
generalist model of a central bank board than to the expert model.   (Both models are 
found across Europe.)   It may not be out of place to observe that this type of board, 
whose members are drawn from a cross-section of professional and public sector 
groups, may be less likely to detect and head off a macroeconomic bubble which is 
                                                          
29
 Cited in Moynihan (1975). 
30
 The question of criteria relating to Board membership has been dealt with differently in other central 
banks.   For example, in the case of the ECB, Article 11.2 of the Statute specifies that individuals selected 
for membership of the Executive Board must be ―persons of recognised standing and professional 
experience in monetary or banking matters‖.   In the Central Bank Reform Bill (Section 24) currently 
before the Oireachtas, there is also a provision that the Minister for Finance ―may appoint a person as a 
member of the Commission if and only if the Minister is of the opinion that that person has relevant 
knowledge of accountancy, banking, consumer interests, corporate governance, economics, financial 
regulation, financial services, law or social policy‖. 
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believed in by peers and which is generating very considerable prosperity throughout 
society.   If an effective challenge against such a consensus were to emerge, it might 
well have to come from persons with more specialised skills in a better position to 
identify micro and macro imbalances and urge a contrarian stance that remedial 
measures were needed.
31
   That, however, is not to prejudge the relative merits in 
general of the generalist and expert models – a group of experts that are out of touch 
with the broader society are prone to other types of error. 
3.16 The practice of the CBFSAI Board has generally been to delegate powers to the 
Governor to exercise and perform all functions, powers and duties of the Central Bank 
with the exception of those powers which would either not be possible or appropriate to 
delegate.   As with the CBFSAI Board, the Authority delegated most powers to the 
Chief Executive and, in her area of competence, to the Consumer Director. 
3.17 The minutes of both CBFSAI Board and Authority meetings typically record only the 
broad consensus on the issues discussed and any decisions taken.   They do not describe 
in any detail the frequent debates and often significant differences of opinion that, 
according to Board and Authority members interviewed for this Report, existed on some 
issues, especially the possible risks to financial stability. 
3.18 A reading of the minutes confirms that discussions at CBFSAI Board meetings often 
covered broad themes such as recent international monetary and financial 
developments, and macroeconomic developments in Ireland and the euro area.   The 
CBFSAI Board also discussed such matters as the Central Bank‘s own investment 
policy as well as general management and budgetary issues.   In addition, the CBFSAI 
Board received regulatory updates from the Authority providing the latest information 
on the main issues they faced.  
3.19 The Authority‘s minutes reveal a wide range of specific issues on its agenda. Initially, 
issues related to the establishment of IFSRA tended to predominate.   Subsequently the 
agenda assumed a degree of stability with particular prominence given to the regular 
Chief Executive‘s Report which included both prudential and consumer protection 
issues.   A prudential pack containing detailed tables on a range of (historical and 
current) prudential indicators was provided to the Authority on a quarterly basis.   This 
                                                          
31
  However, even an ―expert model‖ board could mis-diagnose events, for example, as occurred with the 
FSA in the UK. 
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pack contained data on the aggregate banking system as well as on selected individual 
institutions.   It appears, however, that these data were not discussed extensively, apart 
from occasional specific questions relating to individual institutions.   Several members 
of the Authority have suggested that discussion of a range of relatively minor issues 
may have been at the cost of more system-wide issues.  
3.20 Unsurprisingly, the Authority paid particular attention in the early years to issues 
relating to consumer matters
32
 which were considered by many as being of the highest 
priority.   However, it would be wrong to suppose that over the period as a whole the 
Authority devoted most of its time to consumer protection issues; this is not borne out 
by an examination of the agendas of the Authority.   Furthermore, although the senior 
staff member in charge of prudential regulation – who had equal rank in the 
organisation with the Consumer Director – was not a statutory member of the Authority 
(unlike the Consumer Director), this seemingly anomalous position was addressed by 
the arrangement (which was formally notified by the Chair to the Minister for Finance) 
that he attend all Authority meetings as a matter of practice. 
3.21 Since there was some overlap between Authority and CBFSAI Board membership but 
in one direction only (Authority to CBFSAI Board), issues within the remit of the 
Authority that fell to be considered also at CBFSAI Board meetings would normally 
have been discussed by the overlapping members beforehand; this facilitated these 
members voting as a block on matters of importance to the Authority.   The most 
contentious of these related to the cost and quality of available resources and, in 
particular, the provision of information technology.  
3.22 Documents were shared smoothly between the Authority and CBFSAI Board, and there 
has been no suggestion of any reluctance to share information.   Relevant Authority 
papers including the Chief Executive‘s Report and the prudential pack were provided to 
the CBFSAI Board.   Thus, while it was the Authority that took the lead in deciding on 
issues relating to financial regulation, under these arrangements, any of the issues, 
especially if they might have implications for financial stability, could have been raised 
at the CBFSAI Board. However, this did not happen a great deal before 2008, apart 
                                                          
32
 With the exception of the 2008 Annual Report, all the previous reports and the strategy documents 
submitted to the Dáil emphasised the primary role of the Financial Regulator in the consumer protection 
area. 
42 
 
from the joint meetings of the CBFSAI Board and the Authority that were held to 
consider the draft Financial Stability Reports (discussed in Chapter 6).  
Section 5:  Conclusions 
3.23 The Act of 2003 created a complex structure for the Central Bank and the Financial 
Regulator which could have exposed the system to the risk of some ambiguity in the 
assignment of responsibilities.   This risk was mitigated by the requirements for 
consultation and communication and by assigning clearly overriding powers in the case 
of a policy conflict between the different constituent decision-making bodies – though 
no such conflict arose in practice.   The newly established Financial Regulator, was by 
all accounts, determined to make its mark, notably in the consumer protection field.   It 
was also determined to achieve a degree of operational autonomy which did result in 
friction over the cost and quality of resources provided to the FR.   Such friction may 
have had the knock-on effect of imperceptibly reducing the quality of operational 
interaction and dialogue between FR staff and the rest of the CBFSAI, although 
complaints have not been raised about obstacles to the flow of information.   Though 
few would now defend the institutional structure invented for the organisation in 2003, 
it would be hard to show that its complexity materially contributed to the major failures 
that occurred.  
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CHAPTER 4:  GOALS AND PHILOSOPY OF REGULATION 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
4.1 This Chapter reviews the goals and philosophy of regulation of credit institutions (banks 
and building societies) employed by the FR since its inception in 2003, including the 
extent to which the implementation of the FR‘s philosophy may have tended to 
accommodate industry interests.   The general approach of the FR did not mark a 
change from that of the CB which, prior to the creation of the FR, had had statutory 
responsibility for the supervision of banks.   Rather, the approach of the FR was, in 
essence, a continuation of the custom and practice of the CB.   This is not altogether 
surprising since the Banking Supervision Department (BSD) of the CB was transferred 
to the FR more or less fully intact.   Furthermore, the decision to create the FR was not 
based on any perceived deficiencies in micro-prudential supervision of banks, though it 
did reflect a perceived need to strengthen consumer protection.33 
4.2 The articulation of existing micro-prudential regulatory practice inherited from the 
Central Bank by the Financial Regulator was summarised as ―principles-based‖ 
regulation.   The term is not very clearly defined nor unambiguous in international 
discussion of prudential regulation, and the dichotomy frequently drawn with a ―rules-
based‖ approach is often overstated.   Of course, the regulatory regime was more than 
just a statement of principles.   There were also regulations, rules and codes which were 
intended to govern the behaviour of banks and building societies.   But the underlying 
idea was that the prudential regulator would not be prescriptive in terms of product 
design, pricing and the specific risk decisions adopted by a firm, as long as that firm had 
a robust governance structure, together with reliable oversight and control systems, 
especially systems for managing risks.   Under this approach, the principles and 
associated regulations, rules and codes set out what is expected from a regulated firm, 
breaches of which may lead to enforcement action by the FR.   However, the FR‘s 
preferred approach to enforcement was to seek voluntary compliance with legislation, 
codes and rules.  
                                                          
33
 This is reflected in the fact that the mission statement of the FR puts consumer issues first – ‗To help 
consumers make informed financial decisions in a safe and fair market and to foster sound dynamic 
financial institutions in Ireland, thereby contributing to financial stability.‘  
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4.3 Section 2 presents the objectives, rationale and content of the FR‘s approach to 
regulation.   As understood by the FR, ―principles-based‖ regulation relied very heavily 
on making sure that appropriate governance structures and systems were in place in 
banks and building societies
34
.   The presumption was that this was the key to sound 
prudential decisions.
35
   To this extent, the underlying philosophy was oriented towards 
trusting a properly governed firm; it was potentially only a short step from that trust to 
the emergence of a somewhat diffident attitude on the part of the regulators so far as 
challenging the decisions of firms was concerned.   Given also that, as mentioned 
above, legislation set as a statutory objective of CBFSAI the promotion of the financial 
services industry in Ireland, the situation was ripe for the emergence of a rather 
accommodating stance vis-a-vis credit institutions.   Indeed, early indications of such an 
approach can be seen from the experience with respect to efforts to codify principles 
and establish appropriate enforcement procedures.  
4.4 Section 3 reviews the FR‘s efforts to implement/codify three significant components of 
governance:  
 Directors‘ Compliance Statements; 
 Fit and Proper Requirements;  and, 
 Corporate Governance Code. 
Success was not achieved with respect to Directors‘ Compliance Statements or the 
Corporate Governance Code. 
4.5 Section 4 reviews the enforcement policy of the FR.   A successful regulatory regime 
needs not only to specify what is and what is not expected from credit institutions in 
terms of behaviour, structures and procedures but also to create and employ 
mechanisms to ensure that breaches are dealt with appropriately.   A range of 
mechanisms may be employed from moral suasion to court action to amending the 
licence of a bank or building society. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                          
34
  To that extent, the alternative term ―process-based‖ might be coined to capture the approach more 
accurately. 
35
  This presumption parallels the credulous belief (critiqued by Turner, 2009) that financial markets have 
an effective self-regulating tendency. 
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Section 2:  Objectives, Content and Rationale 
 - Objectives 
4.6 The overall mission or objective of the Financial Regulator as consistently stated since 
2003 was: 
―To help consumers make informed financial decisions in a safe and fair 
market and to foster sound dynamic institutions in Ireland, thereby 
contributing to financial stability.‖36 
Within this overall objective are a series of high-level goals one of which (number two 
in fact) related to micro-prudential supervision: 
―Having a regulatory system that fosters safe and sound financial 
institutions while operating in a competitive and expanding market of high 
reputation.‖37 
4.7 Consistent with this goal, six strategies are to be followed: 
 Adopting a principles-based approach to regulation; 
 Requiring financial service providers to assume their responsibilities; 
 Making the best use of supervisory resources; 
 Putting a comprehensive on-site review process in place; 
 Implementing sector-specific initiatives;  and 
 Working in partnership with the Central Bank.38 
Although principles-based regulation and supervision continues to be stressed in 
subsequent strategic plans and annual reports, there is some slight rewording of high-
level goal two.
39
 
 - Content 
4.8 There are many statements and restatements by the Chair of the Authority, the CEO of 
the FR and others defining principles-based regulation.   A typical statement would be 
the following from the CEO: 
―We are committed to a principles-based approach to regulation.   This is 
achieved by the boards and top management of financial institutions 
committing fully to a culture of integrity, competence and best practice.   
In turn, we will expect them to ensure that this culture flows throughout all 
levels of their organisations.   It is also achieved by financial service 
                                                          
36
  See, for example, IFSRA (2004a, inside cover). 
37
  See, for example, IFSRA (2004a, p. 13) where high level goal two is ―We will set and monitor 
standards for the running of sound financial service providers and fair markets.‖ 
38
  IFSRA (2004a, p. 13). 
39
  For example, FR (2007b, pp. 31-36) 
46 
 
providers having compliance systems, controls and internal audit 
departments that have the standing and the powers to meet the standards of 
behaviour that we now expect of those we regulate.   We set out those 
standards; they must invest in the system and staff to ensure those 
standards are met.‖40 
 The Chair of the Authority also pointed out that for the ―principles based approach to 
work there must be mutual trust, between ourselves and industry and a shared aspiration 
to do our best together.‖41  
4.9 The Financial Regulator eventually set out nine principles to reflect what the FR 
expected from the financial institutions (Box 4.1). They first appeared in the FR‘s 
Annual Report for 2006
42
.   However, it appears that the nine principles were not the 
focus of any systematic checks, either desktop or on inspection; and, unlike the FR‘s 
principles for the protection of consumers, they were never incorporated into a unitary 
Code.
43
   Hence breaches of the general principles for financial institutions were not 
subject to the Administrative Sanctions Procedure discussed below. 
 Box 4.1:  The Authority’s Principles for Financial Service Providers   
 
1. Conduct their functions in a transparent and accountable manner. 
2. Act with prudence and integrity and in the best interests of their customers at all 
times. 
3. To maintain at all times sufficient financial resources to meet their commitments. 
4. Have in place sound corporate governance structures. 
5. Have oversight and reporting systems that allow board and management to monitor 
and control all operations. 
6. Have in place internal controls that are adequate for the nature, scale and 
complexity of their operations. 
7. Have risk management policies systems appropriate to the nature, scale and 
complexity of their operations. 
8. Comply with any regulatory rules set down by the Financial Regulator in relation 
to, for example, solvency and capital adequacy, segregation of client funds, 
consumer protection codes. 
9. When required, to produce accurate, complete and timely information.  
 
Source:  FR (2007a, p. 33).  
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  IFRSA (2004b, p. 4) 
41
  Patterson (2007). 
42
  They were subsequently repeated in the FR‘s Strategic Plan for 2008-2010 (FR, 2007b, p.19).   In both 
the Annual Report and the Strategic Plan the nine principles were introduced as guiding the FR‘s 
approach to regulation. 
43
  See FR (2006i) for the consumer principles embodied in the Consumer Protection Code.   If the nine 
principles had been formally imposed on all firms in a general code, then the FR would have been 
committed to take responsibility for their supervision and enforcement. At the same time the code itself 
would send a strong signal to credit institutions concerning the importance that the FR attached to them in 
terms of prudential supervision. 
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4.10 The FR also noted that to assist financial ―providers to become aware of their legal 
obligations and to clarify what we mean by ‗principles led‘ we issued a number of 
regulatory rules and guidance notes ...‖ (FR, 2007a, p. 33).  
4.11 Reference was made on occasion to the existence of rules in defining and discussing 
principles-based regulation.   For example, the Authority‘s second strategic plan states: 
―We believe that a mainly principles-based supervisory system will deliver 
a good balance between having a competitive industry and requiring high 
entry standards for doing business.   A principles-based approach, with 
technical rules applied as appropriate, encourages adherence to the spirit of 
sound regulatory standards, without being overly bureaucratic.   This 
continues to represent the appropriate supervisory model for Ireland.‖44  
Hence principles-based regulation referred not just to the principles but also to the 
various rules, codes and regulations that underpin financial regulation.  
 - Rationale 
4.12 There was relatively little discussion of the merits of principles-based regulation 
compared to alternatives such as a rules-based approach.   However, in 2005 the CEO of 
the FR stated that: 
―... the present Irish principles-based system mandates the broad regulatory 
framework within which we expect institutions to be in compliance.   It 
sets out basic principles ... It is relatively flexible. ... It is also I would 
suggest, easier and cheaper to comply with. It is a model that has worked 
well in the Irish context. 
―An alternative is a rules-based system.   Here detailed rules across the 
whole range of regulatory powers are set out.   The rules set out clearly 
what must be done and, importantly, what will happen in the event that 
something is not done.   This method implies a very legalistic approach.   It 
suggests doing things right rather than doing the right thing.   It allows no 
scope for interpretation.   It is slow to react to change.   It punishes the 
compliant equally with the non-compliant.   It suggests a system that is 
more costly to comply with because of detailed reporting requirements.   Is 
it better?‖45 
4.13 In the light of this rather one-sided characterisation of the two regulatory approaches, it 
is hardly surprising that the CEO answers in the negative.   In support of that conclusion 
reference is made to the differing approaches to capital gains taxation in Canada and 
Hong Kong.   In Canada much human ingenuity is spent in finding ways around the 
complex Canadian tax code, while in contrast, although it has no capital gains taxation, 
                                                          
44
  FR (2006a, p. 12). 
 
45
  O‘Reilly (2005, pp. 4-5). 
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Hong Kong ―prevents very effectively income shifting through the use of principles-
based regulation, which quite simply states that current income and profits must not be 
converted deliberately into capital gains to avoid the payment of taxes.‖46   In terms of 
enforcement a Hong Kong government agency watches over tax returns for violations.   
There are few violations because ―business fully understands the principles and knows it 
does not pay to violate them.‖47  
4.14 To a considerable extent, the rules-versus-principles debate presents a false dichotomy. 
As the tax examples offered by the FR suggest, relying solely on rules is a recipe for an 
arms race between any regulated entities determined to find ways through the rule book, 
and the Regulator‘s continual redrafting of the rules.  Some aspects of safe and sound 
banking simply cannot be codified.  There must be principles to back up the rule book.  
Any sensible model has both rules and principles.  The more distinctive characteristic of 
the Irish FR‘s regulatory philosophy is rather the degree to which it deferred without 
much challenge to managerial decision-making in the regulated firms and relied on 
governance structures, and on verifying the status of formal or informal risk control 
procedures.  
Section 3:  Creating the Governance Architecture for Principles-Based Regulation:  
Directors’ Compliance Statements, Fit and Proper Requirements & a Corporate 
Governance Code 
 
4.15 A key element in principles-based regulation consists of putting in place a governance 
architecture to ensure that banks and building societies meet specific obligations 
required of them.   This section reviews and assesses efforts by the FR to introduce three 
elements of this architecture: Directors‘ Compliance Statements; Fit and Proper 
Requirements;  and Corporate Governance Code. 
 - Directors’ Compliance Statements 
4.16 One of the motivations for Directors‘ Compliance Statements was the Parliamentary 
Inquiry into DIRT (the DIRT Inquiry), which found serious, longstanding – occurring 
from 1986 to 1998 – misbehaviour by banks in facilitating tax evasion.48   A number of 
recommendations were made by the DIRT Inquiry concerning the governance of 
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 Ibid, p. 5. 
47
 Ibid, p. 5. 
48
 All the material in this paragraph is taken from Dáil Eireann, Committee of Public Accounts (1999, 
Chapter 17).  
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financial institutions, in general, and Directors‘ Compliance Statements, in particular, as 
follows:
49
 
 that the Single Regulator address ethics, professional standards and 
corporate governance in the provision of financial services in Ireland;  
and 
 that detailed rules and requirements in relation to the duties of 
directors of financial institutions to be proposed for the Single 
Regulator. 
More specifically, the Review Group on Auditing in July 2000
50
 recommended that 
auditors make an annual positive statement to the Central Bank (Recommendation 15.2) 
and that ―[T]he Central Bank should have the power to obtain reports from external 
auditors or other reporting accountants on financial institutions‘ accounting and other 
records, their internal control systems and other issues that, in the opinion of the Central 
Bank, are appropriate or necessary for regulatory purposes‖ (Recommendation 15.4). 
This was in addition to a general recommendation that directors of all companies should 
be required to report to shareholders on the company‘s compliance with its legal 
obligations (Recommendation 14.1).  
4.17 The recommendations of the DIRT Inquiry and the Review Group on Auditing were 
reflected in Section 26 of the CBFSAI Act, 2004 that inserted a new Part IV into the 
Central Bank Act, 1997 concerning compliance statements and auditors‘ obligations to 
report matters to the Financial Regulator.   This insertion allowed the FR to require a 
compliance statement from a regulated financial services provider whenever it 
considered it appropriate.   It is important to note that this provision was commenced 
and is in force.   However, it was not a requirement on a financial services provider to 
make an annual compliance statement;  rather, it provided the FR with a discretionary 
power to seek such a statement.  
4.18 The provision itself was viewed by some within the FR as more onerous than the 
corresponding Directors‘ Compliance Statements provided for in section 45 of the 
Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act, 2003.
51
   However, it did allow for 
                                                          
49  These recommendations were written prior to the establishment of the FR within the CB and not as a 
separate institution. 
50
  The Review Group on Auditing was created on the foot of the DIRT Inquiry to examine the issues 
relating to self-regulation and auditor independence. 
51
  One of the Review Group on Auditing‘s recommendations was that, ―[D]irectors of a company be 
required to report on an annual basis to the shareholders on the company‘s compliance with its 
obligations under company law, taxation law and other relevant statutory or regulatory requirements‖ 
(Review Group on Auditing, 2000, p. 25).   This was the basis for Section 45. 
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flexibility in its application and also permitted the FR to issue Guidelines on the nature 
of the compliance statement itself and on how managers of financial service providers 
are expected to exercise control in order to ensure compliance. 
4.19 The Authority took a decision at its meeting on 26 November 2004 to prepare a 
consultation paper on the issue of Directors‘ Compliance Statements with the 
assumption that the new requirements would become operational from 1 January 2006.   
This decision was affirmed at the Authority meeting on 26 January 2005 when it was 
decided that a public consultation paper should be issued.   This did not happen. Instead 
the FR conducted an informal pre-consultation process during October–November 2006 
among selected participants.
52
  
4.20 The draft consultation paper noted the importance of Directors‘ Compliance 
Statements in fostering,  
―... a culture of compliance by developing a greater sense of accountability 
and responsibility among company directors and by developing good 
systems of internal controls within companies so that directors could 
commit themselves to compliance in good faith.   The Financial Regulator 
attaches great importance to the promotion of a good compliance culture 
within regulated entities and would wish that this good culture be set at 
Board of Directors level.‖53  
The paper envisaged Directors‘ Compliance Statements playing a particularly important 
role as part of theme reviews, follow-up investigations into non-compliance and as a 
routine, generic periodic requirement to check the compliance culture.  
4.21 The informal pre-consultation process involved the Industry and Consumer Panels of 
the FR as well as five industry representative bodies plus the Chair of AIB.
54
   In 
briefing the Authority, the CEO noted that the resistance to this proposal from industry 
was very strong.   There was a particular concern with the lack of a materiality threshold 
and it was also suggested that the relevant provisions were unconstitutional.  
4.22 The CEO of the FR also reported to the Authority in November 2006 that the 
Department of Finance, following contacts with industry bodies regarding their 
concerns, requested that the Financial Regulator not proceed with the consultation 
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  For details see FR (2007a, pp. 76-77).   The Directors‘ Compliance Statements were part of the FR‘s 
Strategic Plan for 2007-2009 (FR, 2006b, p. 19), but was missing from the comparable table in the 
Strategic Plan for 2008-2010 (FR, 2007b, pp. 32-33). 
53
  FR (2006e, paragraph 3.1). 
54
  Financial Services Ireland, Irish Insurance Federation, Professional Insurance Brokers Association, 
Irish Brokers Association, and the Irish Association of Investment Managers. 
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process on the implementation of this requirement without engaging in further 
discussion with the Department.   The Authority was also informed in December 2006 
that the Minister for Finance felt that it was important to assess the competitiveness 
issue.  
4.23 Following a discussion with the Department of Finance it was agreed by the FR not to 
implement the provision as set out in the Central Bank Act, 1997 and to examine the 
requirement for compliance statements from financial service providers in the context of 
the project to consolidate and modernise financial services legislation.   The FR noted 
publicly that informal feedback had raised a number of concerns including:   
a)  the provision contained in the Central Bank Act, 1997 was 
inconsistent with the Company Law Review Group recommendations;  
b)  the implementation of the provision would damage competitiveness; 
and,  
c)  the application of the provision was not consistent with a principles-
based approach.  
4.24 However, the Authority could have considered adopting or adapting the revised 
proposals for Directors‘ Compliance Statements put forward in the Report of the 
Company Law Review Group.
55
   These proposals were designed to ―avoid excessive 
and costly over-regulation‖ that might damage competitiveness. Thus, the FR declined 
to make use of the discretion provided to it by legislation to enhance its principles-based 
approach to regulation in a way that might have achieved a better balance between the 
regulator and the firm. 
4.25 More broadly, the point here is not really about whether Directors‘ Compliance 
Statements should have been introduced and if so what their content should have been.  
These are matters on which there can be reasonable disagreement. Rather it is to 
illustrate how an important FR initiative to codify its principles in one respect ran into 
the sand as the organisation deferred to industry pressure.  
 - Fit and Proper requirements  
4.26 In the 2005 Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service‘s (―Joint Committee‖) 
Interim Report on the Policy of Commercial Banks concerning Customer Charges and 
                                                          
55  Following representations by businesses questioning the appropriateness, efficacy and proportionality 
of Section 45 of the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act, 2003, the Company Law Review Group 
was created, which included a representative of the FR.   See Company Law Review Group (2005, p. 5, 
pp. 139-144) for details.  
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Interest Rates concern is expressed ―at the number of incidents in recent years in which 
banks have failed to comply with acceptable standards of behaviour with respect to 
prudential consumer and fiscal obligations.‖56   One of the recommendations of the 
Joint Committee was that the Financial Regulator‘s proposals with respect to fitness and 
propriety be adopted. 
4.27 The fitness requirement meant that the ―person appointed as a Director or Manager has 
the necessary qualifications and experience to perform the duties of that position;‖ 
propriety ―requires that a person is honest, fair and ethical.‖57   While fit and proper 
requirements already existed these varied by type of financial institution and in any 
event needed updating and modernising.   Thus the Financial Regulator undertook to 
modernise the fit and proper requirements for Directors and Managers.   Two 
consultation papers were issued (IFSRA, 2005a;  FR, 2006c) before the new fit and 
proper requirements were issued effective 1 January 2007.
58
 
4.28 The updating and modernisation of the fit and proper requirements were related to 
various inquiries that had been conducted earlier:  
―There has been a renewed emphasis on firms‘ good corporate governance 
and risk management both domestically and internationally in response to 
developments in recent years, including the outcome of domestic inquiries 
and tribunals and international financial scandals.   Regulators have been 
reviewing and updating requirements in relation to corporate governance.   
Given the importance of the directors and managers of firms in that 
endeavour, it is timely to review and update fit and proper standards and 
procedures.‖59 
It should be noted, however, that these fit and proper requirements do not apply to 
existing Directors and Managers, except when persons change their position.
60
  
4.29 The FR did succeed in implementing a standardised approach to fitness and probity 
applications.   This initiative did not, however, extend to placing the fitness and probity 
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  Dáil Eireann, Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service (2005, p. 9).  
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  FR (2008a, p. 1).  
58
  See, FR (2007a, pp. 73-74) and FR (2008a; 2008b) for details of the questionnaire that has to be 
completed by those persons wishing to become a Director or Manager and an elaboration of the 
requirements, respectively. 
59
  IFSRA (2005a, paragraph 3.3.2). 
60
  Provisions in the Building Societies Act, 1989, as amended, give the power to the FR to remove a 
Director of a building society for not being a fit and proper person.   See, for example, Section 17 of the 
Building Societies Act, 1989, as amended.   This discussion is based on an internal FR memo dated 22 
January 2004 prepared by the Regulatory Enforcement Department to the Prudential Director, titled, 
―Powers under the Building Societies Act, 1989 (as amended) (‗the Act‘).‖ There was no similar explicit 
power with respect to banks. 
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reviews conducted by the FR on a statutory basis for all firms.   This has now been 
proposed in the Central Bank Reform Bill, 2010. 
 - Corporate Governance Code 
4.30 At the core of principles-based regulation is sound corporate governance, defined by the 
OECD as:  
―... a set of relationships between a company‘s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders.   Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining these objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined, good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for 
the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of 
the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, 
thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently.‖61  
Drawing on international best practice the FR prepared in 2005, a Corporate 
Governance Guidelines for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings consultation 
paper.  
4.31 This paper was intended to update and modernise the approach of the CB‘s 1995 
Licensing and Supervision Requirements and Standards for Credit Institutions (CB, 
1995), in relation to corporate governance and to apply that approach both to banks and 
insurance companies. The importance of the governance paper was set out in the 
relevant Board Paper considered by the Authority on 25 May 2005: 
―This paper is being issued at this time because of the significant 
developments in the area of corporate governance in recent years and to 
provide a required standard of corporate governance that is consistently 
applied to all credit institutions.   It is also a key milestone in achieving the 
Financial Regulator‘s second high-level goal, as outlined in the Strategic 
Plan 2004-2006.   It states, ‗it is our task to ensure that at board and senior 
management level in each financial service provider, high-level 
requirements are in place which clearly outline the way business should 
be conducted and managed.‘‖62 
The recommendation was to proceed to consultation for a period of six months.  
4.32 Before issuing the consultation paper for general comment, the FR decided to conduct a 
pre-consultation exercise.   Twelve credit institutions were asked for their views.   The 
results of this informal consultation exercise were presented to the Authority on 15 
September 2005.   The relevant Board Paper noted that International Financial Services 
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  As quoted in FR (2006d, pp. 5-6). 
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  IFRSA (2005b, p. 2).   Emphasis in the original. 
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Centre (IFSC) based credit institutions had a more favourable view than domestic credit 
institutions.   It recommended that the consultation paper be revised to take into account 
comments received and that a ―final amended document ... will be submitted to the 
Board in advance of formal consultation.‖63  
4.33 The Authority decided on 15 September 2005 to ―delay the formal issuing of the 
consultation paper.‖   There was further pre-consultation with representative bodies for 
insurance and banking in late 2006.
64
   There is no paper presented to the Authority 
concerning the final disposition of the Corporate Governance Code.   However, an 
executive decision was taken in early 2007 to delay the corporate governance code for 
credit institutions due to the development of organisational requirements arising from 
recent EU-wide discussions that might have needed to have been incorporated into any 
guidelines.   In contrast a consultation paper was released on corporate governance for 
reinsurance,
65
 also following a period of pre-consultation, and a final paper issued dated 
December 2007 set out ―how Corporate Governance will be dealt with in practice 
between individual reinsurance undertakings and the Financial Regulator‖ (FR, 2007c, 
p. 2).
66
  
 - Limited success 
4.34 Two important elements of the architecture of principles-based regulation were not 
implemented despite strong initial support from both the Authority and the senior staff 
of the FR.   One of the reasons why one of the three initiatives was abandoned related to 
competiveness concerns.   While such concerns were part of the mandate of the 
Authority, they were given too much weight in the decision not to proceed with the 
introduction of these key features. 
Section 4:  Enforcement 
4.35 An essential part of any regulatory regime is an enforcement strategy to ensure 
compliance with the principles rules, regulations and codes.   There would appear to be 
no a priori universally applicable enforcement strategy consistent with principles-based 
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  The Authority was informed of this in the Chief Executive‘s Report.   In a letter dated 22 December 
2006 one of these representative bodies called for a ―fundamental rethink in the approach taken in the 
paper.‖  
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regulation.   The UK Financial Services Authority, for example, in considering 
enforcement envisaged that breaches of principles would lead to it aggressively pursuing 
cases.
67
   Two broad approaches to enforcement are considered:  a continuation of the 
strategy inherited by the FR from the CB;  and an alternative more hard-headed 
aggressive approach.   The underlying assumptions implicit in each of these models are 
reviewed before assessing the enforcement model that was actually selected by the FR.  
  - The status quo:  Walk softly and carry no stick  
4.36 The option inherited by the FR saw enforcement largely as a problem solving exercise 
between the FR and the bank or building society.   Concerns would be identified in 
relation to a credit institution via a variety of channels such as an inspection report, a 
request by the Financial Regulator that institution commission an external review to 
examine specific issues, or as a result of an auditor‘s annual management letter.   An 
action plan would be drawn up to address the breaches of the principles, codes, 
regulations and/or rules.   Typically at some point the credit institution would assure the 
FR that the action plan had been implemented in full.   Given the mutual trust that 
underpins principles-based regulation these assurances would normally be accepted.   If 
concerns of a similar or identical nature re-emerged, a similar approach would be 
followed.  
4.37 The above process would normally involve many meetings, exchange of letters and 
discussions to resolve issues and arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome.   Banks and 
building societies were seen as important institutions deserving appropriate respect and 
threats of action by the FR in the absence of compliance were not typically part of the 
process.   It was felt that there was a danger that court cases might be lost, while 
attaching conditions to licenses and similar measures might attract unseemly adverse 
publicity and discourage promotion of the Irish financial sector.   It was considered 
much better to resolve regulatory issues through voluntary compliance and discussion.  
4.38 Underlying this model of enforcement was the view that those running the banks and 
building societies were honourable persons striving to do their best to comply with the 
principles set out in Box 4.1 above as well as the various rules, codes and regulations.   
The latter were extensive and technical in nature and often quite difficult to understand.   
Thus almost of necessity breaches would occur, perhaps on more than one occasion.   
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Nevertheless, it was assumed that those in charge of institutions would, after careful 
consideration, do their best to comply.  
 - An alternative model:  Walk softly but carry a big stick 
4.39 In contrast, the second option would have been much more robust, intrusive and hard 
headed.   Specifically, it would have entailed clear procedures for escalation, including a 
greater willingness to use sanctions available to the Financial Regulator in order to 
ensure prompt responses leading to compliance.   These elements would have been 
made publicly known to all institutions from the outset.   There would be a preparedness 
to take court cases and test the limitations of the law so as to identify areas where 
legislative change might have been required.  
4.40 This model assumes that rational actors will carefully consider the consequences of their 
actions in terms of likely regulatory actions and sanctions by the FR as well as the 
probability of their occurrence.   If the perceived probability of sanctions – especially 
escalating sanctions – is considered low, regulated credit institutions may not pay a great 
deal of attention to ensuring compliance. 
4.41 Supporters of a more aggressive approach can point to considerable evidence to support 
the view that lax enforcement of financial regulation leads to adverse consequences.   
Instances of unethical behaviour by banks and building societies prior to 2003 was 
referred to above, while other examples can be cited.
68
 In addition there was evidence on 
the files of BSD that suggested instances of persistent breaches of codes, regulations and 
principles occurred.
69
   Although in some instances the unethical behaviour is concerned 
with consumer (e.g., overcharging) rather than micro-prudential issues, the behaviour 
nevertheless reflects a willingness to evade appropriate procedures.  
 - Which enforcement strategy? 
4.42 When a new agency is created it is important that it quickly establishes its credibility 
and reputation as an enforcer.   This creates expectations as to how the rules, codes, 
regulations and principles will be enforced which will, in turn, influence behaviour.   If 
                                                          
68
  The leading banks in Ireland were investigated by the European Commission over concerns that a 
cartel existed in relation to cash exchange charges for euro-zone currencies.   Proceedings were ended 
against Ulster Bank after it changed its tariffs for exchanging euro-zone currencies in May 2001.   Under 
Irish competition law such behaviour constitutes a criminal offence.   For further details see European 
commission (2000, 2001). 
69
  See Chapter 5 below. 
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the regulated firm anticipates prompt regulatory action if it infringes a principle, code, 
rule or regulation and also that the action will increase in severity if it is repeated, the 
regulated firms will strive to minimise such infractions. 
4.43 There are numerous examples of new institutions creating a reputation and thus 
influencing expectations and behaviour.   When the European Central Bank was created 
it rapidly established its credibility and reputation for fighting inflation in setting interest 
rates.   When the Financial Service Ombudsman office was created in 2004 it took a 
number of court cases to determine the limits of the legislation.   Finally, the 
Competition Authority, enforcing a consolidated modernised competition legislation 
passed in 2002, recruited two leading US antitrust experts as board members and 
introduced innovations such as the Cartel Immunity Programme, under which cartelists 
were granted immunity from prosecution in return for providing evidence against fellow 
cartelists.  
4.44 Although the enforcement strategy of the Authority was inherited from the CB, the FR 
took some largely unsuccessful steps towards developing a more robust approach and 
thus change the model of enforcement.   After consideration, the FR issued statutory 
guidelines on Administrative Sanctions, in October 2005.
70
   For legal reasons this 
power to sanction could only be applied to events that took place subsequent to August 
2004 and included:  monetary penalties not exceeding €5,000,000 for a corporate and an 
unincorporated body and €500,000 for an individual; and a direction disqualifying a 
person from being concerned in the management of a regulated financial service 
provider.
71
  
4.45 The FR described the significance of the new tool of administrative sanctions as follows:  
―It is important to note that ... they [the Administrative Sanctions] are 
additional and more finely tuned than earlier ‗nuclear‘ options which were 
previously available to us.   These ranged from the ability to refuse an 
application for authorisation from a prospective financial service provider or 
revoke/suspend its authorisation to the power to direct it to undertake or to 
refrain from particular tasks.‖ (FR, 2006b, p. 12).  
4.46 The frequency of use of administrative sanctions powers, once the powers, guidelines, 
training and procedures had been put in place in 2004-05 was as follows:  2006: 2;  
                                                          
70
  For details see FR (2005a; 2005b).   The issuance of the Administrative Sanctions Guidelines followed 
an earlier consultation exercise (FR, 2006g). 
71
  The list of sanctions is set out in FR (2005b, p. 15). 
58 
 
2007: 5; 2008: 10; and 2009: 9.   This pattern indicates a very slow build-up of 
administrative sanctions cases.
72
   Furthermore, training programmes which had been 
run in 2005-06 were not run again or further developed.   Also, the kind of cases brought 
through the administrative sanctions process predominantly involved intermediaries and 
related to failures of internal controls in small firms and breaches of the Consumer 
Code.   Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, there were no sanctions imposed on credit 
institutions and none that might be said to have reflected significant prudential concerns.   
Overall, while the Financial Regulator had the capacity to make use of its administrative 
sanctions powers, the experience also suggests a reluctance to apply those powers in 
relation to its key micro-prudential functions.   
 Box 4.2:  Moral Suasion, Principles-Based Regulation of a Persistent Problem  
 
The FR‘s approach to principles-based regulation relied on the integrity and competence 
of the Boards and senior management of regulated entities.   It also relied on ensuring that 
these entities have the appropriate compliance systems and controls in place as well as a 
robust internal audit function.  
In the case of one persistently problematic firm – call it Bank A – significant concerns 
existed within the CB and subsequently the FR about the effectiveness and strength of the 
Board and governance structures within the organisation.   Moreover, serious deficiencies 
in systems and controls, and failings in the bank‘s internal audit unit function, were 
routinely identified from at least the year 2000 onwards.  
The model of supervision applied placed considerable reliance on the Board of Bank A‘s 
fiduciary duties to its shareholders.   The FR relied on the assurances provided by the 
Board and senior management of Bank A and in a general sense it can be said that these 
assurances proved to be insufficient to ensure sound governance.   Nevertheless, the FR 
persisted with a principles-based approach to the regulation of this institution and the soft 
moral suasion means of enforcement (although at one point a condition was imposed on 
its license relating to a governance issue), when it was clear for a number of years that it 
did not meet the basic requirements of a firm appropriate to this form of regulation.  
It should be noted that attempts were made to move beyond moral suasion in relation to 
dealing with Bank A.   In one instance prosecution of Bank A was given detailed 
consideration but other less intrusive prudential measures were taken.   Ultimately, 
however, these proved to be ineffective.    
 
Source:  FR files 
 
4.47 There is other evidence that the FR was reluctant to use its regulatory powers to address 
serial governance failures by one credit institution (Box 4.2).   Furthermore, in internal 
communications between the Chair and CEO of the FR in mid-2006 the question of 
what could be done to address the general problem of an acceleration in the growth of 
                                                          
72
 There were, in addition two settlements under the separate market abuse administrative sanctions 
scheme. 
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mortgage lending and credit growth was raised.   There were doubts that the principles-
based approach combined with moral suasion would be able to solve these problems.   
Nevertheless, the FR and the Authority did not appear willing to consider employing 
more effective forms of intervention to resolve the problem.  
4.48 Nevertheless, in a number of instances, action was taken by the FR in relation to some 
banks. An instructive example, illustrating how such instances tended to follow 
representations and/or publicity falls just outside the review period. Thus, an agreed 
sanction of €50,000 was imposed on INBS with effect from 7 October 2008 after the 
circulation of an inappropriate email (FR, 2008c).   The public announcement by the FR 
was quite opaque as to the facts.   However, these were in the public domain, including 
extracts from the email.   The offending email had been sent by a person in INBS shortly 
after the State Guarantee was announced in late September 2008 canvassing business on 
the basis of the guarantee.   The email was referred to the FR by the Minister for Finance 
who said such behaviour would not be tolerated.   The Taoiseach stated that the 
behaviour was unacceptable and that he expected the FR to take whatever action would 
be necessary to prevent a repetition of the behaviour. 
Section 5:  Conclusions 
4.49 The philosophy of regulation employed by the Financial Regulator was inherited from 
the past practice at the Central Bank.   It relied on the deferential view that, as long as 
there was a good governance structure, decisions of the people actually running the 
banks could normally be trusted to keep the banks safe and sound, and their decisions 
did not need to be second-guessed.   Voluntary compliance was the preferred 
enforcement strategy.   Several attempts were made by the FR to strengthen this 
regulatory approach so that it became more robust and intrusive, but these had little 
impact.  Two of what the FR regarded as key elements of the governance architecture of 
principles-based regulation – Directors‘ Compliance Statements and the Corporate 
Governance Code – were not put in place.73   An Administrative Sanctions Procedure 
was instituted but there was a reluctance to apply these powers in relation to micro-
prudential functions.   The Principles for Financial Service Providers – presented in Box 
                                                          
73
 A Corporate Governance Code consultation paper was released in April 2010.   For details see CBFSAI 
(2010).   In the opening paragraph the following is stated: ―It is now widely recognised that one of the 
causes of the international financial crisis was inadequate oversight of credit institutions and insurance 
companies. ... Enhanced corporate governance requirements will improve the long-term sustainability of 
financial firms.‖  
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4.1 – were never incorporated into a Code which would have facilitated enforcement of 
these Principles via application of the Administrative Sanctions Procedure.  These 
shortcomings might have been compensated for to a significant extent if the FR‘s 
enforcement strategy had not relied mainly on moral suasion, which given some earlier 
experiences, was in turn based on unduly positive assumptions concerning the behaviour 
of financial service providers.  
4.50 While consistent with the espoused regulatory philosophy, the reluctance to take 
decisive action can also be characterised as displaying both deference and diffidence to 
the regulated entities.  These characteristics are brought out clearly also when it comes 
to looking at the way in which individual institutions were dealt with, which is the topic 
of the next Chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5:  MICRO-PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION  
 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
5.1 The previous Chapter discussed the regulatory philosophy and its implementation at the 
level of the system as a whole, in terms of codification and enforcement.   This chapter 
looks at some of the practical implementation aspects.   Section 2 discusses the 
availability and deployment of staff resources involved in supervision.   Section 3 
describes the main elements of regulatory and supervisory processes and procedures in 
relation to credit institutions.   The sources of information to identify risks are described 
and the methods of investigation presented.   Section 4 reviews supervision in practice, 
drawing upon the detailed supervision files of credit institutions.   In particular, this 
section documents how the characteristics noted in Chapter 4 were reflected in the 
actual engagement with the regulated entities:  the inconclusive nature of this 
engagement;  the reluctance to take steps that would ―rock the boat‖;  and the failure to 
recognise in time that the quantitative scale of the risks being assumed by credit 
institutions placed their survival in jeopardy and that when the feared property price 
collapse was starting to become a reality two of them were inexorably on the road to 
insolvency.   Some conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
Section 2:  Staff Resources  
5.2 This section considers first, the resources devoted to micro-prudential supervision and 
the growth in the number and asset base of regulated credit institutions and second, how 
these resources were allocated among institutions. 
 - Resources devoted to micro-prudential supervision 
5.3 There was a gradual increase in the number of positions approved for the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD), from 38.5 posts in 2000 to 56.5 in 2008, with a parallel 
increase in the number of persons actually employed over the same period (Table 5.1).   
The vacancy rate, although it fluctuated, rarely fell below 9 per cent; in only one year 
(2002) were there no vacancies.  
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Table 5.1 Banking Supervision Department, Resources, Number of Persons, 
Approved, Actual and Vacancy Rates, 2000-2008  
Year Approved 
(Number of Persons ) 
Actual 
(Number of 
persons) 
Vacancy 
(Number of 
persons) 
Vacancy Rate
a 
(%) 
2000 38.5 32.5 6.0 15.6 
2001 39.5 35.5 4.0 10.1 
2002 42.5 42.5 0.0 0.0 
2003 49.5 44.5 5.0 10.1 
2004 51.5 46.0 5.5 10.7 
2005 51.5 45.5 6.0 11.6 
2006 53.5 50.5 3.0 5.6 
2007 53.5 48.5 5.0 9.3 
2008 56.5 48.0 8.5 15.0 
Source:  Based on annual BSD organisational charts 
a
 Defined as Vacancy/Approved 
 
5.4 While Prudential Supervision accounts for an increasing share of overall resource 
allocation within the FR over the period 2004-08, the proportion allocated to Banking 
Supervision declines somewhat from 15 per cent to 13 per cent (Table 5.2);  this reflects 
the stronger growth of prudential resources applied to other responsibilities such as 
insurance (which had just been transferred from the Department of Enterprise Trade & 
Employment) and reinsurance (as it was made subject to regulation for the first time).   
Moreover, within BSD, key staff were diverted into activities such as the 
implementation in Ireland of the many new and technically demanding international 
requirements introduced over the period and participation in various EU and ECB 
groups.   For example, from 2005 five persons, or 11 per cent of BSD resources, needed 
to be reallocated to deal with the implementation of Basel II and EU affairs.
74,75   
In 
addition there was a significant retraining burden on all BSD staff arising from the 
introduction of the CRD and work on the development of ―Pillar I‖ approaches in 
relation to each credit institution. This had an impact on all of the department‘s work. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74
 This factor was also cited in the FSA (2008, pp. 2-3) examination of the failure of regulatory 
supervision in Northern Rock. 
75
  Based on the BSD organisational chart for 2005.   There were two vacancies. 
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Table 5.2:  Financial Regulator, Prudential Supervision and Banking Supervision 
Department Resources, Number of Persons, Actual, 2004-2008  
Year Financial Regulator 
(Number of Persons ) 
Prudential Supervision  
(Number of persons and % of 
Financial Regulator) 
Banking Supervision 
(Number of persons and % 
of Financial Regulator) 
2004 298.5 167.5 (56%) 46 (15%) 
2005 318 182.5 (57%) 45.5 (14%) 
2006 329 197 (60%) 50.5 (15%) 
2007 343.5 210 (61%) 48.5 (14%) 
2008 369 228.5 (62%) 48 (13%) 
Source:  Based on annual BSD organisational charts 
 
5.5 Apart from volume issues, there were concerns about the skill mix of BSD resources.   
The supervision teams were led by middle management and lacked some of the 
specialised expertise needed. Indeed a diversity of different technical skills and 
disciplines is involved.   Where it existed, this skills gap will have reinforced the 
tendency to diffidence in engaging with the regulated entities.   Inspections generally 
involved substantial contact with senior management of the regulated entity, who had 
access to a wide range of specialist experts.   There were difficulties recruiting and 
retaining persons with the required expertise, mainly reflecting salary competition in the 
market and the constraints on what the FR could offer in terms of salary. 
 - The scale of the credit institutions sector 
5.6 The total number of credit institutions subject to regulation by BSD remained largely 
unchanged, from 80 in 2003 to 82 in 2008 (Table 5.3).   In contrast, total assets rose 
threefold between 2003 and 2008 suggesting some increase in the need for regulation. 
Table 5.3:  Regulated Credit Institutions, Number and Total Assets, 2000-2008  
Year Total number
a 
Total assets
b  (€ million) 
2000 81   355,340 
2001 88   422,107 
2002 85   474,629 
2003 80   575,168 
2004 80   722,545 
2005 78   941,907 
2006 78 1,178,127 
2007 81 1,337,356 
2008 82 1,412,197 
Source:  Statistics Department, Central Bank. 
a  The number of credit institutions refers to end-year. 
b  Assets refer to end-year aggregate balance sheet data, covering resident offices of credit institutions operating in 
Ireland. Resident offices refer to offices or branches in Ireland.   This excludes, for instance, branches or subsidiaries 
(e.g., AIB branches or subsidiaries outside of the Republic of Ireland).   Total assets are presented in nominal terms. 
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 - Allocation of supervision resources 
5.7 BSD had to make choices as to how to assign responsibility for the 80 or so institutions 
within its remit, especially in view of the increasing need in the face of relatively static 
resources. BSD resources were concentrated on the domestic Irish institutions.   For 
example, in 2005: 
 a three person team was responsible for Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish 
Bank;  
 a two person team76 was responsible for the AIB group and Irish Life and 
Permanent (IL&P);  
 a three person team77 was responsible for eight credit institutions and a 
branch, including INBS and EBS;  and, 
 a three person team was responsible for nine credit institutions and two 
branches, which included Ulster Bank.  
To these resources need to be added those made available by a team of four persons that 
conducted prudential inspections across several institutions.
78
 
5.8 In May 2005 the FR adopted a formal risk-based framework whereby ―a single cohesive 
approach across all sectors of activity is applied‖79.   The system evaluated risk using 
such factors as supervisory complexity, corporate governance, business and reputational 
risk and so on, based on regular statistical reports provided by credit institutions on their 
activities and financial condition.
80
   The risk-based framework was used to draw up a 
schedule of on-site inspections.   It concluded that a small number of rather large 
institutions should be inspected on-site once a year, with a one-every-two-years 
schedule for the next tier of institutions and the remainder to be inspected on a longer 
rotation depending on available resources. 
5.9 It is generally felt now that the total number of supervisory staff allocated to the 
supervision of the 80-odd credit institutions was inadequate. To be sure, the regulatory 
approach being adopted was not an intrusive one, and as such need not call for a lot of 
resources.   
                                                          
76
  It should have been three but there was a vacancy. 
77
  It should have been four but there was a vacancy. 
78
  Prior to 2005 these inspections were conducted by the team assigned to a particular credit institution, 
but from 2005 this function was performed by a separate team, but relying, of course, on the instructions 
of the team responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the credit institution. 
79
  FR (2006g, p. 67).  
80
 For details see ibid., p. 67.   Successive reports of the C&AG (1999, 2007, 2009) have urged 
improvements in this methodology.   Mazars (2009, p. 67) noted that the risk model was in place for the 
purposes of prudential supervision. 
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5.10 It should be noted that bank supervisors are required to carry out numerous detailed 
approval functions, for example, vetting proposed subordinate debt issues to ensure that 
they comply with the criteria to qualify them as capital instruments. This is an important 
prudential function, but it doesn‘t help identify ongoing risks in the operations of the 
banks.
81
  
5.11 Indeed, a simple international comparison presented by the UK FSA in their 2006 
Annual Report and reproduced by the C&AG in their 2007 report suggested that the 
resources devoted to regulation in Ireland may have been, if anything, above some 
larger EU countries albeit below some non-EU jurisdictions.
82,83   
However, there are 
significant economies of scale involved in regulation, bearing in mind the considerable 
amount of policy development and regulatory design work that was under way, much of 
it related to introduction and application of the highly complex CRD procedure for 
determining the minimum required capital for a bank (this work is needed no matter 
how few banks there are). So a small economy will tend to have a disproportionately 
high regulatory cost, especially if the regulatory task includes (as it does in Ireland) a 
large financial services export business entailing the regulation of some 15,000 entities 
of all types. 
5.12 Overall in 2009, the ratio of employment in the FR to employment in the financial 
intermediation sector in Ireland was compared to several other EU countries and 
Australia with the conclusion that, ―[O]verall, the Financial Regulator would appear to 
be broadly in line with the comparator countries in terms of resources at its disposal.‖84 
5.13 The way in which resources were deployed may have led to an under-resourcing of the 
micro-prudential banking function.   The FR was somewhat different from other 
financial regulators given its role in promoting the Irish financial services sector.   
Mazars (2009, p. 48) observes that the FR in Ireland devotes considerable resources to: 
                                                          
81
 Another task is vetting banks‘ internal risk models with a view to having them approved for the 
purpose of calculating CRD minimum capital requirements.  Such approval would entitle regulated firms 
to operate with less of a capital buffer and as such was prized by such firms. 
82
 Thus, in 2005, the resource costs devoted to regulation (per € million of assets valuation) was €14 in 
Ireland compared with:  France, €13;  Germany, €7, and the UK, €10.   This compares with much higher 
numbers for:  Hong Kong, €26, Singapore, €28, and the US, €177. (Based on C&AG, 2007, Table 6.4, p. 
65). 
83
 In a subsequent study, that considers all financial service providers rather than just banks and building 
societies, for similar sized countries, Ireland is about average for the ratio of financial regulator 
employees to financial service sector employees.   On another indicator – cost per billion of assets 
regulated as compared to the international average Ireland was below the average.   The study used 16 
peer regulators, but no data is revealed about individual regulators.   For details see Mazars (2009, p. 45).  
84
  EIU (2009, p. 86).   Other comparative indicators were also used in coming to this conclusion. 
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 ―Meet and greet‖ activities for new or prospective regulated 
entities
85,86
;
 
 
 Advice to accountants, legal firms and other professional advisors; 
 Participation in external committees/groups;  and, 
 Responding to requests for information from third parties. 
Mazars also draws attention in this context to ―the specific mandate of the Financial 
Regulator under High Level Goal 4 ‗We will facilitate innovation and 
competitiveness‘ which is not as apparent elsewhere‖, which was introduced in the 
Strategic Plan for 2007-2009 (FR, 2006b, p. 26).   Qualitatively, therefore, there was a 
drain  impossible to quantify  in the direction of ancillary activities which was more 
marked than in other comparable institutions reflecting the broader mandate of the CB 
and FR.
87
 
5.14 The financial crisis has made it clear, though, both in Ireland and elsewhere, that 
effective bank supervision simply cannot be performed with the thin staffing that was 
applied to frontline operations of the FR.
88
    
Section 3:  Supervision and Regulatory Processes and Procedures 
5.15 As set forth in various Annual Reports the FR‘s approach to micro-prudential 
supervision had flow and stock elements.
89
   The flow aspect involves the authorisation 
of new entrants.   Under this process ―[O]nly those financial service providers and 
persons who can demonstrate that they will be in a position to meet our regulatory 
standards will receive authorisation to provide financial services.‖90   This included, for 
example, the Fit and Proper Requirements discussed in Chapter 4.  
                                                          
85
  Although there were few new authorisations for credit institutions, there were substantial increases in 
other categories of regulated financial institutions.   For example, the number of collective investment 
funds approved in 2004 was 525;  in 2007, 1,082.   For further details, see the FR Annual Reports.  
86
   It appears that the meet and greet approach predates the creation of the FR. 
87
  To the extent that prudential regulators in other countries had a more robust enforcement policy such 
as that described in Chapter 4 and had Directors‘ Compliance Statements and Governance Codes in place, 
they would have made more effective use of whatever resources were available.   In other words, 
resources have to be seen as part of a wider set of parameters that are likely to determine a prudential 
regulator‘s performance.   It is not clear that more resources combined with the moral suasion approach of 
the FR would necessarily have led to much more effective prudential supervision. 
88
  In the post-financial crisis world, combined with the failure of prudential regulation in Ireland, there is 
an emerging consensus for more intrusive prudential regulation and a greater readiness to impose 
regulatory sanctions.   Such a regulatory regime requires more resources than the system in Ireland during 
the period reviewed by this Report. 
89
  See also C&AG (1999, 2007, 2009) reports on the CB and FR. 
90
 FR (2005c, p. 57). 
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5.16 The stock element consisted of an ―active monitoring process‖ of authorised entities 
aimed at ensuring that they ―do not create unacceptable risks to the financial system or 
to the safety of deposits.‖91   The fact that the number of credit institutions remained 
fairly constant combined with the small number of new entrants, meant that most 
resources were devoted to ongoing supervision, although this included development 
work on the CRD and other legislative changes.   Management resources within the 
department were also quite regularly diverted from day-to-day supervisory tasks to deal 
with policy development work and work related to the Committee of European Bank 
Supervisors (CEBS).  
5.17 Problems – both governance and financial  were identified via several mechanisms: 
 Returns from banks and building societies.   These could be weekly, 
monthly, quarterly or annual returns where these refer to audited 
accounts.   The higher the perceived risk the higher the frequency of 
returns. In 2005, there were 598 monthly returns for banks and building 
societies, 495 quarterly, 49 annual and 198 weekly.
92
 
 On-site inspections/reviews sought to ―assess whether financial service 
providers are in compliance with our ongoing supervisory standards and 
requirements.‖93   These on-site inspections were of four types:  general 
in nature with respect to a bank or building society;  specific in nature 
relating to a particular area in a given credit institution;  themed 
inspections covering a particular issue – e.g., mortgage credit – across a 
sample of the credit institution sector;  and unscheduled inspections of a 
particular institution.   The number of on-site inspections increased from 
8 in 2005 to 25 in 2008. 
 Review meetings conducted with banks and building societies.   These 
meetings which increased from 39 in 2005 to 113 in 2008, were of ―a 
more general nature and cover broad compliance issues and any matters 
outstanding from the most recent inspection.‖ (FR, 2007a, p. 71)  
5.18 Information also came to BSD via the annual audit report and management letters.   The 
latter, which by law must be sent to the FR, are issued by the external auditors ―when 
they identify issues giving rise to concerns about the effectiveness of internal controls or 
other governance issues‖ (C&AG, 2007, p. 40).   In some instances the FR would ask 
the institution to commission (and pay for) an external audit on a particular issue.  
                                                          
91
  Ibid, p. 57. 
92
  FR (2006g, Table 3.5, p. 66). 
93
  FR (2005c, p. 64). 
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Section 4:  Supervision and Regulation in Practice 
5.19 Two aspects of supervision and regulation in practice are considered.   First, what were 
the governance and prudential issues and problems revealed by the on-site inspections 
and other supervisory interventions.   Second, given the FR‘s suite of regulatory tools in 
terms of sanctions and discretionary prudential action, what were the options selected 
by the FR. 
 - What were the governance and prudential issues? 
5.20 Based on a reading of the inspection reports and the follow-up correspondence for a 
sample of inspections over the period a number of conclusions can be drawn: 
 consistent with the underlying regulatory philosophy, most of the focus 
of the inspections was on procedural aspects, namely, compliance with 
governance rules and procedures;  and, 
 the inspections did qualitatively identify a wide range of risks including 
those related to concentrations of lending on property, and the difficulty 
of evaluating the long-term recoverability of property-related loans; 
Irrespective of the relevant aspects of provisioning of loans, the potentially very large 
loan-losses that would threaten insolvency in several institutions were not foreseen in 
the supervision documentation even as far as late 2008.   Even the detection of serious 
deficiencies in loan appraisal and approval procedures of the major banks did not seem 
to trigger alarm.  
5.21 Supervisors also saw that although banks may have had good written internal lending 
policies, in some cases exceptions were very frequent.  At one bank in the mid 2000s 
fully 35 per cent of development property credits approved represented exceptions to 
policy.   Two-thirds of these exceeded an 80 per cent LTV ceiling – some exceeding 
100 per cent LTV;  six of this bank‘s top 20 exposures had LTV in excess of 80 per cent 
at that date. 
5.22 Box 5.1 draws on the record of inspection reports on three credit institutions in the 
period 2005-07 and which focused on the theme of credit or commercial lending.   It 
illustrates some of the types of issues that were identified as of High, Medium and Low 
priority.   Read in retrospect, it seems that the inspectors were looking for patterns of 
management practice and operational performance that might have presented a risk to 
the institution, but were not attempting to form an impression of whether the reported 
accounts including, for example, the provisioning of loans, was sufficient.   Overall, 
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supervision was focused on procedural aspects of how the bankers did their job, and did 
not seek to second-guess the business models
94
 of the banks, by, for example, 
requesting additional provisioning or capital buffers against increasingly risky loans.  
 Box 5.1:  Credit Inspections of Selected Credit Institutions, 2005 to 2007  
 
Credit or commercial lending-focused inspections of three large banks in 2005-07 throw 
light on the kinds of issues identified in relevant inspections and give a flavour of the 
interaction between inspectors and the banks being inspected.   All three of the banks 
subsequently encountered difficulties. 
An inspection in May-June 2007 on Commercial Property Lending at Bank A found that 
exceptions to the credit policy accounted for 28 per cent of approved credits.   
Nevertheless the inspectors reported no High Priority findings (they did, however, report 
15 Medium Priority findings).   Responding to inspectors‘ questions about exposure to 
development property in light of the downturn in Irish property market, Bank A 
management remarked:  ―The number of customers that this bank backs for unzoned land 
is very small and they are very high Net Worth Individuals, e.g., [Messrs X and Y] who 
have years of development experience. [Bank A] have full recourse to the borrowers.‖   
Unfortunately, concentration risk ―was not reviewed as part of this inspection‖ – though 
this would, in a sense, prove to be the Achilles Heel of the banking system‘s loan 
portfolio.   Still, discussing the rapid growth of credit, the inspectors rightly noted that 
―while such growth has not had an adverse effect on the overall credit quality of the loan 
book, as evidenced by the impaired element of the loan book as at March 2007 which 
stood at 0.49 per cent (June 2006 0.56 per cent), the robustness of the loan book may not 
become evident until such time as there is an economic downturn.‖   This regulatory 
awareness that current impairment percentages were not a reliable indication of loan book 
quality does not always seem to have translated, though, into the necessary alertness to the 
need for precautionary action at the top of the organisation.  
Not all inspections led to agreed conclusions.   Bank B management rejected the three 
High Priority findings which were reported in the Commercial Property Lending 
inspection of April-May 2006.   These related to:  some exceptions to the credit policy just 
being noted on file and not sufficiently reported up the line to more senior decision 
makers;  the formal credit policy not being sufficiently prescriptive;  and limitations on the 
ability of the bank‘s management information system to report certain categories of 
summary information such as the total number of interest-only loans in effect.   The 
management sought to refute each point at the concluding meeting of the inspection. 
An inspection of credit risk management at Bank C took place in July 2005 (following 
concerns expressed in a previous inspection in November 2004).   It made four High 
Priority findings relating to:  (i) the lack of an overall defined credit policy;  (ii) the large 
and imprecise risk appetite;  (iii) reliance on implicit indirect guarantees for public sector 
entities or utilities; and (iv) insufficient Board oversight (no follow up on Board requests 
for presentations).   There were also 13 Medium Priority findings, such as:  the lack of a 
provisioning policy; no procedures for identifying and dealing with problem credits;  the 
credit committee being pro-forma (approvals mainly happen between the weekly meetings 
and the chair had attended only 5 of 26 meetings);  lack of independence of the credit risk 
unit review;  and unclear credit appraisal/approval procedures.   To a degree, this report 
would seem to show the principles-based approach at its best, identifying inadequate 
structures and procedures with some degree of forensic precision. 
 
Source:  FR files 
                                                          
94
  These models can be characterised as:  relying to a considerable extent on wholesale funding;  a heavy 
emphasis on the property related sectors;  and a reliance on a small number of large clients. 
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5.23 An even more revealing illustration comes from the multi-bank inspection carried out 
late in 2007, by which stage concern was growing about the large lending to property 
developers.   Given that the portfolio being examined was eventually purchased by 
NAMA at a large discount, it is clear from the elements mentioned in Box 5.2 that the 
system was not set up in such a way as to detect even serious portfolio weakness, let 
alone quantify it.  
 
Box 5.2:  The 5 x 5 Big Developer Exposures Inspection, 2007 
 
  
In December 2007, evidently reflecting a belated heightening of concern about large 
commercial property lending exposures, the FR embarked on a special multi-institution 
inspection to look at the handling by five banks of five large exposures.   Complacently, 
―all institutions confirmed to the inspectors that they have no concerns with the current or 
future repayment capacity of any of the borrowers included in the inspection to which they 
are exposed.‖ This optimism subsequently proved in all cases to have been mistaken. 
The inspection nevertheless identified two ―High Priority findings‖, both related only to a 
single institution.   In line with the usual house supervisory style, these related to process 
rather than specific exposure issues.   Thus, the inspectors noted (p. 11):  ―it appears that 
there is no comprehensive review of Group exposures conducted on an annual basis. 
Rather reviews concentrate on an ongoing high-level review of exposures and do not 
appear to involve a review of documentation such as Audited Financial Statements, Cash 
Flow Statements etc.‖   And, ―The inspectors were advised that certain valuation updates 
are based on ‘management estimates‗.   However, such estimates (which may be 
performed by the [identified senior management officer]) do not appear to be recorded.‖   
It is clear that the inspectors have detected a deeply flawed process, which should have 
caused great alarm. 
Turning to what the inspectors classed as ―Medium Priority findings‖(M), several show 
how much trust the banks were placing in the unverified assertions of their borrowers with 
regard to their personal wealth, and how inaccurate some of the information being used by 
the banks was.   Thus, consider the following :  
M1:  ―The inspectors noted that institutions have been unable to obtain a Net Worth 
Statement from [Mr. X], as he is unwilling to disclose such details in writing.   In addition, 
the statements provided by [Mr. Y and Mr. Z] have not been certified by a third party‖. 
M2:  ―The inspectors noted that some estimates provided to the inspectors as to the overall 
indebtedness of Group exposures appeared to differ significantly from data available to the 
inspectors, e.g., [Bank A] advised that they believed the [Z] connection indebtedness to 
[Bank B] to be circa [€P00m], whereas the data provided by [Bank B] advise that the debt 
is currently circa [€1 billion more].   While such differences may arise because 
assessments are based on information obtained at different times, nevertheless the 
inspectors would question the manner in which institutions appear to be assessing Group 
Indebtedness as evidenced by the following:  
(a) [Bank A] reviews the overall indebtedness to all credit institutions of [Mr. 
X] through discussions with [Mr. X] and his senior management team.   
However, no record is maintained of such discussions and as a result the 
inspectors were unable to obtain evidence that indebtedness had been 
reviewed. 
(b) [Bank A] does not review the overall indebtedness to all credit institutions of 
[Mr. X] and the [Z] Connection, as [Bank A] focuses only on its own 
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exposures and related security in these cases. 
(c) The overall indebtedness of [Mr. Y] to all credit institutions is reviewed by 
[Bank A] through a review of his Net Worth Statement.   On the basis that 
this statement is not certified by a third party, the inspectors would question 
whether this document should be the only source for assessing overall 
indebtedness used by the bank.‖ 
M10:  Inspectors expressed concern about the adequacy of Bank D‘s understanding of its 
exposure to Z and W based on minutes of its credit committee: 
―Chair echoed the Committee Members views, stating that whilst he 
acknowledged that the team had an understanding of each of the 
individual projects we were engaged with, the group as a whole was a 
much more complex entity by its very nature.   Consequently, chair said 
that the opaqueness in the Bank‘s understanding of the wider group and 
our limited executive contact with [Mr Z], was extremely disappointing 
and reiterated that there is a clear need to escalate the level of 
understanding‖. In addition, the minutes also noted that ―the bank lacked a 
real understanding of the wider group liquidity, and we were unable to 
explain the inherent structural risk‖. 
The [Bank D] Credit Committee meeting on 26 September 2007 stated – 
―Chair noted that the bank was not in a position where it had a full 
understanding of [Exposure W]‘s liquidity‖.   ―It was thus strongly 
emphasised that the bank needed information as to how [W] will generate 
cash and what its wider strategy is, as well as gaining further insight into 
its local strategy in relation to the build-up of assets around [identified UK 
location]‖.   The minutes also noted that ―the bank was now heavily 
exposed to this group and uncertain at this stage whether [an amount in 
excess of €500 million] was the right number to be basing our appetite‖. 
M16:  ―The inspectors were advised that the calculation by [Bank E] of [Mr. X]‘s net 
worth included [an amount in excess of €100 million] which represents working capital 
facilities provided by the bank.   It was not clear to the inspectors how such debt increases 
[Mr. X]‘s net equity.‖ 
Despite this catalogue of banking deficiencies, the full implications of the obvious lesson – 
that loan appraisal had been wholly inadequate and personal guarantees could not to be 
relied upon – does not appear to have been taken on board by the regulatory system.   
Certainly, the implication that the solvency of all of the banks could be at risk given the 
declining value of collateral that must have already have been clearly in prospect was not 
one that was understood by the Authority.   An indication that the participants in the 
exercise seem to have remained fairly relaxed about the findings is given by the 
perfunctory – or at least brief – character of the post-inspection close-out meetings (20 to 
30 minutes).   At this rate, how much regard can the banks have had for the inspectors?  
Source:  FR files 
 
5.24 Quantitative analysis needs to be at the heart of off-site supervision of financial firms, 
as it draws mainly on their financial accounts.   In this regard a 2005 change in the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reduced the degree to which 
expected but not yet incurred loan losses could be provisioned.  It had the effect of 
understating expected losses and potentially reducing the transparency of accounts as an 
indicator of future regulatory problems. For example, the gap between provisions and 
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expected losses would tend to grow at the beginning of an economic slowdown. There 
is little indication to be found in the FR files of supervisory awareness of the degree to 
which provisions could prove to be inadequate in the event of a significant downturn.   
Thus, still in 2008, satisfactory payment performance of loans was still being taken as a 
reassuring indicator, when falling property prices were already under way.   The 
absence in the files of systematic quantitative analysis of loan migration patterns or 
other forward looking quantitative measures of likely problems seems to reflect a lack 
of awareness of this and other shortcomings in financial accounts as indicators of 
solvency risks. 
- What enforcement and prudential action was taken?  
5.25 In principle, the FR had a wide range of tools to address regulatory and prudential 
concerns, including:  administrative sanctions;  revocation or suspension or attaching 
conditions to the authorisation of a credit institution;  removal of a director or chief 
executive officer;  direction to a credit institution to undertake or to refrain from 
particular tasks and increased capital requirements. Prudential and regulatory actions 
that are more systematic in nature, such as raising capital charges across all banks in 
respect of certain risks are discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.26 An examination of the record of enforcement and follow-up action suggests the 
following features: 
(i) A pattern of engagement between the FR and a credit institution of 
identifying a problem, negotiations on an action plan to resolve the 
situation and then receiving assurance that the plan had been 
implemented; 
(ii) In some credit institutions a persistent pattern of breaches of regulations 
and failure to implement in full action plans; 
(iii) Little or no escalation in terms of the type of action in response to 
compliance failures.   Indeed, there rarely seems to have been any 
consideration given to what options for action;  and, 
(iv) Accommodation of (ii) through the view that there would be some 
alternative strategy to deal with the situation – but not an escalation – 
such as a new action plan.  
However, for most identified prudential concerns these powers, whether to require 
action by issuing an enforceable direction or the power to penalise inaction by 
administrative sanction, were not exercised for reasons set out in Chapter 4.  
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5.27 Three cases are instructive: 
Case (i)  
One firm did attract serious and persistent concern following repeated inspections 
over the years.   Indeed, as early as August 2000, a CB official wrote of this firm 
(in a detailed report recommending tough action) that there were ―failings at every 
level
95
 in the organisation from the Chief Executive and Board to staff on the 
ground,‖ including ―poor compliance culture and awareness in the organisation,‖ 
and that ―significant underwriting limits have been assigned to individuals with 
limited experience‖.   Checking the concerns expressed in the memorandum 
against the nine principles that the FR later indicated that it expected financial 
firms to abide by (Box 4.1), suggests that the institution was even at that stage in 
breach of each of them.  
For the following eight years, the CB and then the FR engaged in repeated 
correspondence with this bank, seeking to correct, in particular, what were seen as 
severe governance deficiencies.   The pattern was consistent.   A specific problem 
would be identified, some corrective action would be undertaken, and assurances 
would be given as to compliance.   However, soon afterwards the same or a 
similar problem would come to light and the cycle would continue.   On each 
occasion it was hoped that the promised action would fix the main problems, but 
the remedial measures, to the extent they were implemented at all, proved 
insufficient or abortive.   Even where there is evidence of individuals within the 
FR
96
 advocating formal enforcement actions, this did not turn out to be the course 
settled on.   Although this was an egregious case, the protracted engagement 
approach to dealing with a series of serious issues was by no means atypical. 
The regulatory measures taken and the hoped-for governance reform, reflected the 
Financial Regulator‘s long-standing concerns with the independence and 
effectiveness of the Board of that institution.   As an alternative to taking direct 
regulatory action, for example by imposing a condition on the institution‘s 
license, limiting its growth unless the Board or senior management was 
strengthened, or the concentration of power and responsibility was addressed, the 
Financial Regulator relied on measures which had limited effect or were outside 
the control of the FR. 
Case (ii) 
Even the interaction with a better-regarded institution could display a similar 
pattern of engagement, though with respect to less serious issues.   The file on 
another firm also shows a lack of urgency.   Prudential matters raised – in some 
cases repeatedly – with this firm included:  rapid growth in the loan portfolio, 
leading to large exposures to property, building, construction and residential 
mortgages; timeliness, completeness and accuracy of returns;  problems with the 
IT infrastructure; some regulatory breaches in relation to liquidity and sectoral 
concentration. 
On matters on which Bank A did not agree, correspondence was batted backwards 
and forwards in what appears to be a quite leisurely manner.   It often took several 
months for a letter to be issued and at least as long for a response to arrive.   
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  Emphasis in original. 
96
  It would have been know within the FR that intrusive demands from line staff could be and were set 
aside after representations were made to senior regulators. 
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Correspondence could continue for over a year.   In most cases the institution was 
asked to investigate issues themselves and to report back to the Financial 
Regulator; there is no evidence of any escalation or consideration of stronger 
actions, such as sanctions.   Indeed, some matters raised by the inspections of this 
bank (growth of the loan book, breaches of sectoral limits) were let pass:  there 
does not appear to have been any correspondence from the Financial Regulator 
formally requiring the institution to take corrective action. 
Case (iii) 
Nevertheless, the FR did take some noteworthy action in relation to one case, 
where a bank was required to increase its minimum capital adequacy ratio, from 9 
to 11 per cent over a period of years. It is important to acknowledge this action, 
which could not, for legal reasons, be publicly revealed at the time. 
 
5.28 Some promising courses of action failed to deliver:    
 A key appointment at one credit institution, which responded to a 
regulatory call for management strengthening, lasted just a year before 
the appointee resigned, in the absence of the sought-for governance 
improvements.    
 A hoped-for change in firm ownership, likewise envisaged as a means 
of improving governance in one instance, failed to materialise.    
5.29 Given the disastrous state of its loan portfolio as subsequently revealed, it is natural to 
wonder what the on-site inspectors thought of Anglo Irish Bank.   Without breaching 
confidentiality it can be said that the inspection teams did comment on governance 
issues, including instances of non-compliance with internally approved policies.   They 
also commented on, among other matters, the extent of reliance on personal guarantees 
in the loan book, the high percentage of interest-only loans and some aspects of the loan 
approval process.   However, the severity of these problems was not deemed to be such 
as to warrant being High Priority.   Indeed, it was not until the last of the Anglo 
inspections within the timeframe of this Report (the one on stress-testing, dated April 
2008)  that High Priority issues were identified. 
5.30 An overall impression, not strongly contradicted in interviews, is that the seeming lack 
of a credible threat of action by the Financial Regulator reduced the urgency of dealing 
with issues (by all parties).   In addition to the small number of inspectors (at most, 
middle management), the limited banking experience and skills gap that also often 
characterises bank supervision in other countries may have been a factor at work in 
reducing the effectiveness of the engagement with a large team of experienced and 
specialised staff within the credit institutions.  
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Section 5:  Conclusions 
5.31 Only a small number of persons was allocated to supervise leading credit institutions. 
Given the considerable asymmetry in expertise and seniority between the staff of the FR 
and the regulated institutions, this is likely to have hampered effective supervision.   
5.32 Examination of a sample of the inspection records and correspondence reveals a pattern 
of inconclusive engagement with regulated entities on prudential matters, and lack of 
decisive follow-through.   In one key case where the regulator identified weaknesses 
requiring corrective action, a protracted and somewhat inconclusive correspondence 
extended over many years.   In the end, the identified problems had not been corrected 
before the crisis.   By not adhering to time-bound deadlines for escalation, the FR 
allowed some important matters to drift.   Given this model of engagement, decisive 
corrective action that might have prevented the deterioration of the situation was 
unlikely ever to have been imposed.   The Financial Regulator‘s appetite for legal risk 
was very limited; this meant in practice that the regulated entities got the benefit of the 
doubt – at least with regard to prudential issues;  no Administrative Sanctions were ever 
imposed before 2008 on a credit institution in relation to a prudential matter.   It also 
reduced the chance of obtaining through legislation any further powers necessary given 
that doubt about the adequacy of legal powers was not tested in court.  
5.33 Although inspectors did identify many of the key governance and procedural 
weaknesses in a qualitative way, the process-based regulatory model they were adhering 
to was not designed to provide a quantitative or graduated indication of the magnitude 
of the risks to solvency and the likelihood that they would materialise.   Thus the 
weakest bank was given a relatively favourable assessment until close to the edge of the 
cliff, thereby helping to shape the incorrect assessment by many key policy makers at 
the time that the liquidity problems the bank was experiencing in late 2008 reflected 
worldwide market failures and not an underlying lack of solvency. 
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CHAPTER 6:  MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REPORT PROCESS  
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
6.1 Macro-prudential regulation during 2004-08 was carried out mainly within the 
framework of Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) published annually by the CBFSAI
97
.   
These reports derived from the CBFSAI‘s mandate to contribute to the overall stability 
of the Irish financial system as required by the CBFSAI Act, 2003 and also from the 
mandate of the European System of Central Banks which requires the European Central 
Bank and National Central Banks to contribute to financial stability in the euro area.   
Their central purpose was ―to analyse and assess the overall health of the financial 
system‖ (CBFSAI, 2004, p. 5) 
6.2 Following a summary of the key messages of the reports, various aspects of the FSR 
process are reviewed below, namely: 
 the procedures followed in their preparation; 
 the identification of issues;  
 the analytical content of the reports;  and  
 the views of other external observers.  
An overall assessment, which also addresses other factors influencing the process, 
concludes. 
Section 2:  The Key Messages 
6.3 The Governor‘s Foreword to each FSR contained the overall conclusions followed by a 
Summary which reflected the more comprehensive discussion in the main body of the 
text.   The key messages of each report are indicated below;  overall, they provided a 
consistent signal throughout the period that the Irish banking system was in a good state 
of health and, despite the presence of various downside risks, was well placed to cope 
with possible adverse shocks.  
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 Interim Financial Stability reports were prepared for internal CBFSAI usage on a six monthly basis.   
The review in this Chapter is based largely on the annual published version.   Prior to 2004, financial 
stability reports had also been prepared and were contained in the Annual Reports of the Central Bank.   
However, from 2004 onwards, in line with procedures followed in other euro area Member States, this 
work was published as a separate document. 
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 - 2004 
―Our central expectation, based on our assessment of the risks facing both 
the household and non-financial corporate sectors, as well as the current 
shock absorption capacity of the banking system, is that it is unlikely that 
the current good health of the banking system will be compromised over the 
medium-term horizon.   This central expectation does not preclude the 
possibility of adverse developments which, if they should materialise, would 
have serious adverse consequences for households, corporates, and banks 
......   Nevertheless, the system could absorb a modest fall in house prices 
even if it were to coincide with a modest increase in defaults.‖ (CBFSAI, 
2004, p. 12). 
 - 2005 
 ―The central expectation, based on an assessment of the risks facing both 
the household and corporate sectors, as well as the current shock absorption 
capacity of the banking system, is that the current health of the banking 
system leaves it reasonably well placed to withstand pressures from 
potential adverse developments in the short to medium term.   However, 
there are a number of vulnerabilities, in the medium term, particularly from 
the very high rate of credit growth.‖ (CBFSAI, 2005, p. 7). 
 - 2006 
―The overall assessment ..... is that financial stability risks may be seen to 
have increased since the Financial Stability Report 2005.... 
The overall picture at present is that strong credit growth, high indebtedness 
levels, associated repayment burdens and house prices pose continuing 
issues for the banking system.   While the central expectation remains that 
the current shock-absorption capacity of the banking system leaves it well 
placed to withstand pressures from possible adverse economic and sectoral 
developments, nevertheless, these signs of a further build up in 
vulnerabilities are a cause for concern.‖ (CBFSAI, 2006, p. 7). 
 - 2007 
―The overall assessment is that financial stability risks have on balance 
increased since the CBFSAI‘s Financial Stability Report 2006.... 
However, the central expectation, based on an assessment of the risks facing 
both the household and non-financial corporate sectors, the health of the 
banking sector and the results of recent in-house stress testing is that, 
notwithstanding the international financial market turbulence, the Irish 
banking system continues to be well placed to withstand adverse economic 
and sectoral developments in the short to medium term.‖ (CBFSAI, 2007, p. 
11).  
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Section 3:  Procedures Followed 
6.4 As noted in the Foreword to the 2004 FSR, from the outset, the FSRs were viewed as a 
joint product of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. 
―There is the closest cooperation between the Bank and the FSR [i.e., the 
Financial Regulator] on matters related to financial stability ....   The 
Financial Stability Report is the fruit of this cooperation.‖ (CBFSAI 2004, 
p. 5) 
As described in Chapter 3, overall cooperation between the Central Bank and the 
Financial Regulator was underpinned by a 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
agreed between the two entities.   In particular, the MoU delineated the respective roles 
of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator in the area of financial stability, as well 
as aspects regarding data and information exchange, crisis management, and 
consultation on policy changes regarding financial stability matters.   Of note in the 
context of the FSR process (and of prudential regulation more generally), the Central 
Bank‘s responsibilities included ―overview of the domestic financial system as a whole‖ 
and ―analysis of the micro-prudential  where appropriate  as well as macro-prudential 
health of the financial sector.‖   Those of the Financial Regulator included the 
―prudential supervision of banks‖ and ―providing advice, information and assistance in 
relation to the Bank‘s functions to the Bank‘s Board and the Governor‖ (CBFSAI, 
2003). 
6.5 An initial draft of the FSR was first circulated to the joint Financial Stability Committee 
(FSC – see Chapter 3) chaired by the Director General of the Bank and including senior 
staff of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator.
98
   Subsequently the draft was 
reviewed by a special joint meeting of the CBFSAI Board and the Authority before 
finalisation and publication. 
6.6 In practical terms, prior to mid-2005, the initial preparatory work and drafting of the 
FSR was undertaken by a working group comprising staff from both the Central Bank 
and the Financial Regulator.   However, at that point, reflecting resource constraints and 
growing work pressures (principally relating to Basel II implementation, discussed in 
Chapter 5), Financial Regulator staff hitherto involved were reassigned to other duties.   
From then on, while the FSC and joint CBFSAI Board/Authority discussions continued 
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  Most of the agenda of the FSC related to the FSR process, including preparatory and follow up work.   
The role of the FSC in addressing ―crisis management‖ issues is dealt with in Chapter 8.  
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to reflect FR input, most of the preparatory work and essentially all of the report 
drafting were undertaken by Central Bank staff.   Regulator-maintained data on 
individual financial entities continued to be accessible to Central Bank staff;  however, 
the relatively ―raw‖ nature of these data as well as the constrained availability of FR 
staff to assist in their interpretation, appear to have inhibited the extensive usage of the 
data in report preparation. 
Section 4:  Identification of Issues 
6.7 Successive FSRs sought to present a reasonably comprehensive current assessment of 
and outlook for, the domestic banking system.
99
   Against the background of the 
domestic and international situation and short term prospects, the reports discussed key 
financial indebtedness indicators for the household and non financial corporate sectors, 
including those relating to property.   From the banking side, credit to these sectors was 
reviewed, together with an assessment of the current financial health of the banking 
sector, as reflected in indicators such as asset quality, profitability, solvency, liquidity 
and credit ratings;  the funding structure of banks, in particular their growing reliance on 
sources other than retail deposits was also addressed, especially in later years.   
Considerable attention was paid to the evolution and prospects for residential house 
prices (discussed in more detail below) as well as (to a somewhat lesser extent) 
movements in commercial property prices.
100
 
6.8 Overall, the coverage of issues identified in FSR reports seem broadly appropriate, with, 
however, two qualifications.   First, indicators were presented in aggregate form using 
simple (or, in the case of stress tests (see below), weighted) averages.   While, for 
confidentiality and/or market sensitivity reasons, it would not have been possible for the 
reports to refer explicitly to individual institutions, in the case of key indicators such as 
growth in balance sheets and outstanding credit, consideration could have been given to 
conveying a fuller sense of the corresponding distribution among entities.   Even if, for 
example, average capital ratios for the banking system appeared satisfactory, merely 
presenting the average could have masked the presence of one or more firms that were 
seriously undercapitalised.   Greater attention to this issue would have conveyed a 
heightened awareness of the possibility that emerging problems in potentially more 
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  The coverage included those banks whose business is primarily domestically oriented and excluded 
entities who tended to conduct their main business internationally.  
100
  Reports also regularly included a set of ―Financial Soundness Indicators‖ developed by the IMF. 
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―vulnerable than average‖ entities in the tail of the distribution (even if these were small 
in number) might, via ―contagion effects‖, quickly spread to others, especially given the 
widespread reliance of the Irish banks on external wholesale funding.   As a rule, 
financial stability issues arise from the tail of the distribution, not from the averages.
101
 
6.9 Second, more could have been done to expand the analysis to discuss some harder to 
quantify risk factors.   For instance, there are well known inherent risks associated with 
the exceptionally rapid balance sheet growth (e.g., difficulties in maintaining 
appropriate monitoring and control procedures) that was being experienced by certain 
institutions.   A related risk was that in a lending environment characterised by 
unprecedented growth, competition among lenders  especially from newer/smaller 
players  would lead to an overall relaxation of lending standards.   Although there were 
no warning signals coming from the institutions‘ accountants/auditors, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some of these elements were starting to occur.   These potentially 
very important aspects were scarcely addressed. 
Section 5:  Analytic Content 
6.10 The benign ―central scenarios‖ of successive FSRs were accompanied by concerns  
expressed to different degrees over time  regarding variables such as property prices, 
private-sector indebtedness vis-a-vis the financial system and (especially in later 
periods) the institutions‘ funding structures.   These concerns notwithstanding, the 
assessments remained sanguine and were underpinned by several elements, notably, 
contemporaneous indicators of the financial system, analytical work relating to the 
property sector per se and its possible impact on financial stability and the results of 
financial ―stress tests‖. 
 - Current financial indicators of the financial system 
6.11 The results reported for standard ―health indicators‖ (such as liquidity, solvency, 
profitability) were, without exception, all positive and, where relevant, complied with 
the corresponding regulatory ratio, in some cases by a considerable margin.   While this 
was a source of some comfort, their static nature could not have allowed significant 
conclusions to be drawn as regards vulnerability.   Arguably, the observed behaviour of 
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  Neglect of distributional issues was far from total.   For example, the distribution of housing 
affordability measures across households is shown in the 2007 Report (Box B, p.27) and the percentage 
of stressed households of different types is in Box F of the same report. 
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some variables (capital and profitability as yet unaffected by potential loan losses yet to 
come, plentiful liquidity prior to a sudden change in market sentiment due to increased 
information that may become available only with a lag) would not have been 
inconsistent with phenomena observed in the middle to late stages of a credit-fuelled 
asset bubble.   While the FSRs were careful not to overemphasise the significance of 
these current indicators, an explicit disclaimer concerning their inherent shortcomings 
would have been appropriate.  
 - Background analytical work  
6.12 During this period Central Bank economist staff undertook considerable research into 
property market and related financial stability issues, the results of which were reported 
in successive FSRs
102
.   The main message of these studies was consistent from the 
2004 FSR onwards which stated (CBFSAI 2004, p. 10) that  
―the risk of a substantial fall in residential property prices .... is the risk that 
poses the greatest potential threat to the health of the financial system...a 
sizeable correction in prices would be devastating for those households who 
would be unable to ride out any such fall in house prices.......The most 
significant losses for the banking system would arise from those borrowers 
who have only recently taken out mortgages.‖.  
It noted that according to an IMF assessment ―large house price increases which are 
sustained over a number of years tend to be followed by fairly steep falls in prices‖ and 
that ―never has an increase in residential property prices occurred of a magnitude 
similar to that which has already occurred in Irish house prices over the past decade 
without a subsequent large correction in prices‖.   However, reassuring qualifications 
followed – the banks had adequate capacity to absorb a modest fall in house prices and, 
the seemingly inevitable fall-back in prices related to evidence from 1980s and the 
1990s and might no longer be true in the 2000s.   Nevertheless, a disaster scenario had 
already been sketched out. 
6.13 The 2004 FSR highlighted the fact that price-rental ratios were already suggesting 
overvaluation – of between 55 and 63 per cent.   Most independent authors were also 
beginning to find it hard to explain house prices on the basis of the fundamentals of 
supply and demand.   However, the FSR presented an econometric analysis based on 
McQuinn (2004), which suggested that there was no bubble – at least through end-2002.   
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  These were included in ―themed‖ sections of the main body of the reports, as well as in a series of 
signed papers to which the usual disclaimer applied.  
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The model is complex and does not readily allow identification of the fundamental 
equilibrium price of housing.   In particular, the inclusion of the average size of 
mortgage loan as one of the explanatory variables implies that a price boom driven by 
credit expansion is being treated as a ―fundamental‖ phenomenon and not a bubble.   
Nevertheless the 2004 FSR reported this model as indicating a ―failure to uncover 
conclusive evidence of overvaluation‖. The model was re-estimated for subsequent 
FSRs with similar conclusions.  However, average loan size is not a fundamental factor, 
and indeed could be the driver of overvaluation.
103,104
  
6.14 The range of house price overvaluation indicated by various analytic models is 
summarised in Table 6.1.   As the years progressed, the weight of econometric evidence 
that house prices were overvalued grew, although the supply and demand model 
mentioned in the previous paragraph continued to indicate that actual house prices had 
not diverged significantly from their fundamental values.   However, the price-rental 
ratio (P/e) continued to show increasing indications of overvaluation.   Between 2003Q4 
and 2006Q2 the extent of possible misalignment varied between 55 per cent (for new 
houses) and 73 per cent (second hand houses), using the average of the historical price-
rental ratios experienced during 1980-1995.   Recognising that this fairly crude method 
did not take into account the sensitivity of the price rental ratio to assumptions as to the 
rate of interest, a second method (―PV-adjusted‖) was employed based on an estimation 
of the equilibrium price-rental ratio and assumptions regarding the equilibrium rate of 
interest.   The results of this approach suggested possible overvaluations in the range of 
6 per cent (2003Q4) to 45 per cent (2006Q2).   Finally, the results of a staff model 
(McQuinn and O‘Reilly, 2006), which related house prices to income and (nonlinearly) 
to the real interest rate, pointed to increasing overvaluation emerging from late-2004 
onwards, reaching about 15 per cent by end-2005. 
 
 
                                                          
103
  It is not clear to what extent this potential problem may have affected the results presented in 
subsequent reports; furthermore, in later years, other variables such as income and immigration may have 
also become endogenous to a significant extent, given that economic growth – and the increase in the 
immigrant labour force – was increasingly being driven by the construction sector and domestic 
consumption, the latter fuelled by Government expenditure stemming from property sector-related fiscal 
receipts.  
104
 Actually, simpler models, exploiting the relatively close correlation between house prices and nominal 
GDP would also have displayed a reasonably good fit to the data to end-2002. 
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Table 6.1: Financial Stability Reports:  Indicators of House Price Overvaluation from 
Various Models, 2003-2007 (in per cent) 
Time period P/e
a
 PV 
(adjusted)
b 
 Fundamentals 
model
c
 
McQuinn/O‘Reillyd 
     (Assumed  
interest 
rate) 
  
2003 Q4/2004Q1 55 (N) – 63 (S)  6 – 29 4.0 - .. 
2004 Q1 .. 11 – 35 6.0   
2005 Q2 64 (N) – 70 (S) 11 – 35 3.1 - .. 
2005 Q4 .. ..   15 
2006 Q2 67 (N) – 73 (S) 14 – 39 4.1 - .. 
  20 – 45 6.0   
2007 Q2 .. ..   33 
Source:  CBFSAI, Financial Stability Reports, 2003 to 2006. 
a
   A long-run average P/e (price-earnings) ratio for housing was calculated using 1980 to 1995 data and 
applied to actual rental income to yield an estimate of ―sustainable‖ house prices.   The divergence 
between the latter series and actual prices indicates the degree of possible misalignment for new (N) and 
second hand (S) houses, respectively. 
b
  A regression relationship using historical data was derived between the P/e ratio and the rate of interest.   
The difference between the actual P/e ratio and this average estimated relationship is indicative of 
overvaluation for various assumed levels of the interest rate.   The upper bound of the range is the 
maximum indicated misalignment;   the lower bound is the estimated misalignment that is statistically 
significant. 
c
   Based on the model of McQuinn (2004) described in detail in Section III of the 2004 FSR.   The model 
was estimated using 1980Q1 to 2002Q4 data. The results indicate essentially zero misalignment 
throughout the period. 
d 
  Based on McQuinn and O‘Reilly (2006).   The result shown for 2005Q4 was reported in FSR 2006;   
however, the calculation for 2007Q2 is taken from an unpublished internal CBFSAI staff note dated April 
2008. 
 
6.15 It should be noted that the different estimates provided are the central estimates from 
alternative models and do not reflect the full range of uncertainty involved.   In other 
words, depending on the exact values of the parameters of the model the worst outcome 
could be considerably worse than the central estimate. 
6.16 The above results were presented in successive FSRs up to and including that for 2006.   
By contrast, the 2007 FSR is notable for the absence of any updating of the calculations 
reported earlier.   In particular, there was no update of the McQuinn-O‘Reilly (2006) 
model.   However, an internal staff updating of this model undertaken in April 2008 
(after publication of the 2007 FSR) indicated that house price overvaluation was 
estimated to have reached almost 35 per cent by mid-2007.  
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6.17 By this stage, the FSR was including commentary casting a doubt on the warnings of 
outside commentators
105
.   In an article published in the ESRI Quarterly Commentary in 
the summer of 2007, and which had been circulated in draft in February of that year, 
Morgan Kelly argued that, based on the OECD experience that saw most real house 
price surges being followed by a sharp fall back, real house prices in Ireland could be 
expected to fall by 50 per cent.   He also noted that while for most economies house 
building accounted for only five per cent of GDP the figure for Ireland was currently 15 
per cent (Kelly 2007a).   Although it was not all that far from the scenario painted in the 
2004 FSR, Kelly‘s presentation was couched in what was considered by many to be 
alarmist language and admittedly did not contain an in depth econometric analysis of 
the Irish situation.
106
   But, rather than acknowledging the red flag raised, his paper 
elicited what now appears as a somewhat defensive response.   The 2007 FSR 
questioned the relevance of the Kelly analysis (Box C, p. 30) as well as the conclusions 
of somewhat similar studies by the IMF (2003) and OECD (2006a).   It was observed 
correctly that replicating these analyses in terms of nominal (as opposed to real) house 
prices would not show the same ―reversal to the mean‖ tendency.   However, this 
conclusion stems from the inclusion in the sample of countries which have typically 
experienced high general inflation rates;  since this is clearly not the case in the euro 
area the distinction provides little comfort.
107
  
6.18 Overall, while the FSR noted the recent fall that had occurred in house prices, 
quantitative analytical evidence was not provided in support of the key conclusion, 
namely, that so far as residential property was concerned ―the central scenario is, 
therefore, for a soft landing‖ (CBFSAI 2007, p. 17).   The likelihood that the drop that 
had started to take place might be the precursor of a considerably larger fall to come  
given the possible extent of overvaluation  was not mentioned. 
                                                          
105
 Earlier (in 2005), the Economic and Social Research Institute had included in its Medium Term 
Review, a scenario under which Irish house prices would fall by one-third in 2007 (ESRI, 2005). 
106
  In a later newspaper article that appeared a week before the run on Northern Rock in September 2007, 
Kelly observed that ―If a crash occurs, or even if already nervous overseas bond holders cut off liquidity 
to Irish banks … it will be very costly to fix, dwarfing the bail-out of AIB in the 1980s.‖ (Kelly, 2007b) 
107
  Apart from looking at nominal prices, the box also noted the important additional fundamental factors 
typically determining house prices (but did not cite the thorough work of Murphy (2005), which had 
looked closely at demand and supply factors and found a considerable over-valuation even as of 2004).   
The box also observes, that ―past international experience may not be an accurate guide to future 
developments in house prices because the international macroeconomic environment is now somewhat 
different‖, i.e., the ―Great Moderation‖ of reduced international macroeconomic volatility could be 
expected to continue.  
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6.19 Prior to 2006-07, the commercial property market did not attract a great deal of 
attention and does not appear to have been a source of major concern.
108
   However, 
work undertaken by Woods (2007)  and summarised in the 2007 FSR  noted the 
worrying growth in price/earnings (rent) ratios;  this phenomenon could not be 
explained by readily identifiable underlying factors, thus implying a possible significant 
overvaluation.
109
   A related earlier paper (Kearns and Woods, 2006) concluded that 
there was evidence of a strong positive correlation (in Ireland and abroad) between 
prices in different segments of the property market and that less weight should be 
placed on the mitigating factor of collateral in assessing the risks to the banking sector 
from the property market.   This important finding, which raised the probability that a 
crash in some segments of the market might become quickly associated with a fall 
elsewhere, irrespective of the geographical location and type of property concerned, was 
noted in CBFSAI (2006, p. 50).   In this context, the continued rise in commercial 
property prices into the third quarter of 2007, even though residential house prices had 
turned sharply down at least six months before, became an even more worrying 
exposure. 
6.20 Despite the overall resource constraints present, it would have clearly been desirable for 
more intensive efforts to have been devoted earlier to analysing the possible evolution 
of commercial property prices.   This is especially the case since evidence from 
elsewhere suggests that the bursting of a property bubble in this sector can have a 
considerably more severe adverse financial impact than in the case of the residential 
market.
110
   Also, in this context, priority would probably need to have been given to 
obtaining  via the Financial Regulator  more comprehensive information from the 
financial institutions regarding property related lending, including cross exposures as 
well as exposures associated with speculative equity investments;  problems in this area 
appear to have continued unresolved throughout the period reviewed
111
. 
                                                          
108
  FSR 2005 (p. 12), after noting that commercial property lending is the largest component [of credit to 
the corporate sector] concludes that ―there appears to be no substantial short to medium term risks to 
financial stability arising from the corporate sector‖.   While FSR 2006 (p.12) states that ―the commercial 
property market performed strongly across all sectors‖ it notes low and falling yields for new housing 
investors and as well as a growing shortfall between associated rental income and mortgage payments 
which had increased fourfold, to 29 per cent, by 2006.  
109
  Indeed the reported ratios might well have understated the cause for concern to the extent that rents 
themselves were probably significantly excessive at the time. 
110
  See Woods (2007) for an extensive discussion of this phenomenon, including a description of 
property sector price movements in Sweden and the UK.  
111
  Commercial property price data were, however, available as noted in Woods (2007, p. 82), although 
their reliability at times was called into question. 
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 - Stress tests  
6.21 The above analysis was devoted mainly to attempts to forecast the most likely outcome.   
Of course, market participants and regulators need to conduct risk management by 
mitigating, hedging and holding buffers so that even relatively unlikely events can be 
absorbed.   The purpose of the financial stress tests was to explore explicitly such 
adverse scenarios.   Beginning in 1999, the CBFSAI undertook two types of stress tests:  
(i) ―bottom up‖ tests whereby banks were asked to analyse the effects of a more 
―pessimistic‖ macroeconomic scenario on their standard financial indicators;  and (ii) 
―top down‖ tests not involving the banks, whereby staff calculated the effects of 
imposed macroeconomic or other parameter changes on banks‘ positions. 
Table 6.2:  Financial Stability Reports:  “Bottom-Up” Stress Testing, 2004 - 2006 
Macroeconomic Scenarios 2003 - 2008, B – Baseline;  S – Shock Scenario 
 
 2004 stress testab  2006 stress testac 
 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
 B S  B S  B S  B S  B S  B S 
Economic activity  
(% change) 
                 
 Real GDP  1.75 1.23  3.5 -2.51  5.3 -2.75  4.8   3.2  5.2 -0.3  4.7 -4.8 
 Export 
volume 
-2.25 -3.22  5.75 -6.20  7.5 -6.74  4.8   3.2  5.7 -3.9  5.6 -7.5 
Unemployment 
 (% of labour force) 
 4.75  5.04  5.25  7.82  5.25  9.77  4.3   4.5  4.3  6.6  4.3  9.7 
House price 
inflation 
14.0 12.0  5.0 -2.0  4.7 -8.00  7.0 -13.0  6.3 -8.7  6.1  1.1 
Source:   CBFSAI, Financial Stability Reports, 2004 and 2006 
a
 Refers to ―Shock Scenario I‖ in both sets of stress tests. The exercise also included analysis of 
alternative shock scenarios, the assumptions and associated results of which, however, did not differ 
greatly from those of the first scenario reported here. 
b
 Mawdsley, McGuire and O‘Donnell (2004). 
c
 Kearns, McGuire, McKiernan and Smyth (2006). 
 
 
6.22 The main assumptions underlying the two “bottom up” tests conducted in 2004 and 
2006 are summarised in Table 6.2.   Broadly speaking, the scenarios involved a 
cumulative decline of real GDP of 2 to 4 per cent during the three year period into the 
future;  relative to the baseline assumption of continued positive growth the difference 
was of course much larger.   Unemployment would roughly double, from around 4 per 
cent at the outset to almost 10 per cent by the end of the three years, compared with 
virtually no change in the baseline.   The divergence in house price movements was 
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more marked;  in the 2004 exercise, prices were assumed to rise cumulatively by only 2 
per cent relative to the baseline increase of 24 per cent, while in the 2006 test, the 
baseline assumed continued cumulative growth of 20 per cent compared to a scenario 
assumption of a 20 per cent decline.
112
  
6.23 The results of the exercises for both periods were very similar.   Despite an expected 
significant slowdown in asset and loan growth under the shock scenarios and an 
accompanying increased provisioning requirement due to deteriorating asset quality, 
profitability remained robust (no institution experienced losses) and solvency and 
liquidity indicators remained comfortable.  
6.24 The “top down” methodology (Kearns, 2004) estimated the likely level of provisioning 
required under the same macroeconomic ―shock scenario‖ employed for the ―bottom 
up‖ test;  the financial implications for banks were very similar.   Subsequently Kearns 
(2006) followed the approach of calculating the impact of a worsening of non-
performing asset (NPA) and loss-given-default (LGD) rates on banks‘ financial 
positions;  the 2007 FSR contained an update.   The results for both exercises did not 
differ significantly.   Using aggregate data, the weighted (by total asset size) average 
capital ratio fell below the regulatory minimum of 8 per cent only when the LGD rate is 
50 per cent or higher and when the NPA rate exceeded 5 per cent (i.e., a six fold 
increase over then current levels).   The appropriateness of the rates chosen was not 
assessed in the report. 
6.25 Some of the well known limitations of these types of stress tests were explicitly 
recognised in the FSRs and appropriate ―health warnings‖ provided (especially in the 
detailed background papers).   In particular the ―bottom up‖ tests relied on the banks‘ 
own judgements as regards the impact of shocks on their loan portfolios, including the 
extent of realisable collateral in a sharp downturn.   While there were some discussions 
between CB and the banks‘ analysts, it was not possible for CB staff to assess 
independently the appropriateness of the models used, which differed significantly in 
                                                          
112
  There is the question as to whether the scenarios that were chosen were sufficiently severe.   Any 
given external shock to the economy would lead to knock-on effects through the worsening of overall 
financial weaknesses, depressed private demand and fiscal difficulties, leading to further downward 
pressure on the property market.   How banks‘ behaviour might react in such an environment and the 
consequent further macroeconomic and financial impact, is not captured.   Moreover, macroeconomic 
models are generally built on the basis of log-linear relationships; for example, doubling the size of a 
shock will generate a proportionate increase in its effect.   In reality, however, in a situation of 
considerable stress, the effect might well increase more than proportionately. 
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sophistication and rigor across banks.
113
   In fact, none of the banks had reliable models, 
tested and calibrated on Irish data, which could credibly predict loan losses in different 
scenarios.  
6.26 The issue of whether the scenarios represented a sufficient ―turning up of the switches‖ 
also deserves attention.   In the case of the ―bottom up‖ exercises, the domestic shock 
scenarios were derived from considering ―extreme downside risks‖ in the world 
economy (CBFSAI 2006, p. 114);  in the case of the 2004 exercise, based on historical 
behaviour, these were chosen to reflect a probability of ―between one in a hundred and 
one in a thousand of actually occurring‖ (CBFSAI 2006, p. 106)114.   A useful 
complementary approach could have been to apply a significantly more severe 
macroeconomic scenario to capture, for example, sharper property price falls directly.  
6.27 Finally, the presentation of aggregate weighted average results, in particular those of the 
―top down‖ approach, masked differential impacts across individual institutions.   The 
2006 FSR did indicate that at least one institution‘s capital ratio fell below the 
regulatory minimum when NPAs more than doubled and the assumed LGD was higher 
than 25 per cent.   However, the more comprehensive data provided to the subsequent 
Roundtable Discussions with banks in late 2006 (which were not published or referred 
to in the FSR) revealed a more worrying picture;  thus, assuming an NPA ratio of just 
over 5 per cent, one third of the twelve banks covered fell below the regulatory 
minimum with a 50 per cent LGD, while this number rose to 9 (representing 88 per cent 
of total banking sector assets) assuming a 75 per cent LGD.   The corresponding 
exercise described in the 2007 FSR did not contain any references to distributional 
issues.   As already indicated, more coverage of such distributional aspects should and 
could have been presented in FSRs without compromising the confidentiality of 
individual institutions‘ data.  
                                                          
113
  For example an internal FR report noted in 2008 that one bank did not have a defined stress testing 
framework supported by either formal processes or documentation.   The bank did not employ an 
economist and their stress tests did not reference economic data such as GDP, interest rates or 
unemployment; bank representatives argue that the latter may not be as necessary in the bank‘s case given 
that they occupied the most profitable economic sector.   While the bank did conduct what was referred to 
as ―ad-hoc stress tests‖ these appeared to assess the impact of actual events (e.g., the impact of the 
smoking ban on the pub trade) rather than severe but plausible events.  
114
  The shocks in question referred to a 20 per cent appreciation of the euro, a 6 per cent decline in world 
trade and a 20 per cent fall in equity prices.   The biases in using Gaussian distributions to infer tail 
probabilities for asset price developments were not mentioned. 
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Section 6:  The Views of Outside Observers 
6.28 FSRs were prepared ―in house‖ by the Financial Stability Department (FSD), without 
structured involvement vis-a-vis, for example, the academic economist 
community.
115,116
 Also, on one occasion, in 2005, prior to drafting the FSR staff met 
with representatives of financial institutions to elicit their broad views (normally, such 
an exchange occurred after FSR publication  see Chapter 7).   The views of other 
external observers, principally the IMF and the OECD, while not discussed per se in the 
FSRs, played a significant role in helping to shape the consensus that emerged.   
Outside of official organisations, many economists were beginning to raise concerns 
from the early 2000s.   By no later than 2003-04 a majority, but not universal, view was 
that prices had overshot the equilibrium and would inevitably fall.   Most, though not 
all, studies foresaw a downturn in property prices triggering recessionary pressures.
117
  
6.29 The assessments of the IMF did point to some of the risks present in the Irish economy, 
in particular to the financial system, with reference to banks‘ exposure to an overheated 
property sector and increased reliance on wholesale funding.   However, without 
exception, the overall judgements of the IMF staff were reasonably reassuring from 
2004 onwards
118
.   Thus the 2005 Article IV report concluded that ―while banking 
system profitability and capitalisation are strong vulnerabilities exist....‖ (IMF, 2005, p. 
24).   A year later the overall message given was similar.   In reviewing the housing 
market, the 2006 Article IV Report carries the same message, noting the continued 
strong capital position of banks and observing that ―even a substantial withdrawal of 
private sector deposits would not exhaust the stock of liquid assets at any major lender, 
given banks‘ ample liquidity‖ (IMF 2006a, p. 10). In the following year, the conclusion 
remained generally reassuring, but with continued cautions. 
6.30 Regarding the property market in particular (a subject discussed extensively from 2005 
onwards), it was noted that ―staff analysis suggests that not all of the increase in house 
                                                          
115
  However, on a number of occasions, outside economists (for example, Alan Ahearne, whose views on 
the property market were less sanguine than those contained in FSRs) were invited to make presentations 
within the CBFSAI.  
116
  Internally, there was significant scope for ensuring more structured coordination between FSD staff 
and other CB economist staff as regards both (a) the setting of research priorities relating to financial 
stability issues; and (b) the appropriate presentation of research results within an overall FSR context.  
117
 ―All we can hope to do is identify whether a country is within or outside a ‗zone of vulnerability‘, 
where a crisis equilibrium could arise if confidence were to falter.   So is Ireland in such a zone.   I think 
that the answer must be yes.   Certainly the rate of credit expansion – the classic indicator which I am just 
one of many to have employed in the past – is a waving red flag at present.‖ (Honohan, 2004). 
118
 The 2003 Article IV Report was somewhat more cautious.  
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prices over the past several years can be attributed to fundamentals...‖ (IMF, 2005, p. 5).   
In 2006, concerns were noted that ―house prices are now becoming overvalued...[while] 
the central expectation is for an orderly slowing in the housing market...a sharp 
correction cannot be ruled out‖ (IMF, 2006, p. 6). By the time of the August 2007 
Article IV consultation, the risks of a property price fall had become more apparent, and 
the staff described the kind of downward financial and economic spiral that could 
develop.   It also commented that cross country comparisons ―suggests that sharp 
increases in house prices are followed by sharp declines about 40 per cent of the time‖ 
(IMF, 2007, p. 9).   Overall, it appears that the IMF assessments were somewhat more 
cautious in tone than those of the FSRs.   Nevertheless, the IMF did not demur from the 
latter‘s conclusions that banks could cope quite satisfactorily with quite substantial 
property price falls.  
6.31 In addition to the regular Article IV Reports, the IMF carried out two specific reviews 
of Ireland‘s financial sector stability framework (including financial regulation) in the 
context of its Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) programme.   The first was 
conducted in 2000 and an update involved a team visiting Dublin for two weeks in 
March, 2006.  Their Report was published in August of that year. 
 
Box 6.1:  Main Findings of the 2006 IMF FSAP Team 
 
  
The Irish financial sector has continued to perform well since its participation in the 
Financial Sector Agreement Programme in 2000. Financial soundness and market 
indicators are generally very strong. 
 
The outlook for the financial system is positive. That said, there are several macro-risks 
and challenges facing the authorities. As the housing market has boomed, household debt 
to GDP ratios have continued to rise, raising some concerns about credit risks. Further, a 
significant slowdown in economic growth, while seen as highly unlikely in the near term, 
would have adverse consequences for banks‘ non-performing loans. Stress tests confirm, 
however, that the major financial institutions have adequate capital buffers to cover a 
range of shocks. 
 
Good progress has been achieved in strengthening the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, in line with the recommendations of the 2000 FSAP. The strategy of creating 
a unified approach to risk with common elements across different sectors where 
appropriate, but differentiated where necessary, is being put into practice well. 
Improvements could nonetheless be made to enhance some aspects of supervision, 
especially as regards supervision of insurance and reinsurance. 
 
 
Source:  IMF (2006b). 
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6.32 Bearing in mind how late in the boom this was carried out, the conclusions of this 
update were strikingly positive (Box 6.1).   Anyone concerned about the health of the 
banking sector would have been reassured to read the first paragraph:  ―Financial 
institution profitability and capitalisation are currently very strong, with Irish banking 
sector profits amongst the highest in western Europe.   Reflecting their good 
performance, the major Irish banks receive upper medium to high-grade ratings from 
the international ratings agencies.‖ (IMF, 2006b p. 5). 
6.33 The main recommendations of the FSAP team (Box 6.2) focused on upgrading staff 
numbers and skills, with the stress-testing exercise selected for special mention.   
However, allaying any possible concerns on this score, the team remarked reassuringly 
that ―reflecting the general robustness of the financial system and the supervisory 
framework, these recommendations are primarily for further enhancements rather than 
reflecting a need to address fundamental weaknesses.‖ (ibid p. 6). 
6.34 As far as risks to the banking system were concerned, in addition to the credit risks 
mentioned as one of the ―main findings‖, liquidity risk was noted, but downplayed:  ―a 
growing share of banks‘ funding has been from other financial institutions, including 
from off-shore;  heavy reliance on wholesale funding potentially increases liquidity risk. 
As shown ... however, the off-shore funding is diversified.‖ (ibid p. 11). 
6.35 The purpose of the FSAP mission was not merely to look at current risks, but also to 
assess the overall quality of the institutional framework for financial sector stability 
policy including micro-prudential supervision and regulation.  The FSAP team‘s 
assessment of the new integrated supervisory framework was positive; it noted that 
―notwithstanding the higher profile of the IFSRA‘s consumer protection activities, there 
have also been significant achievements in the prudential framework‖, and that ―it has 
created an organisational structure and a consistent corporate culture that are likely to 
enhance financial stability.‖ (ibid p. 24).  So far as the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for 
Effective Bank Supervision were concerned, the assessment found ―a high degree of 
observance of the BCPs.   The main challenge was seen as ensuring continuation of 
existing very high standards.‖ (ibid p. 28). 
6.36 All in all, the 2006 FSAP Report would have had a significant dissuasive effect on 
concerns that might otherwise have been raised about prudential supervision and the 
risks to financial stability.  This was especially the case since only a few CBFSAI Board 
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or Authority members were raising such concerns with any vigour.   In hindsight such 
an unwarrantedly favourable report by an authoritative international body was clearly 
unhelpful.  
 
Box 6.2:  Ireland:  FSAP Recommendations 
 
 Financial Stability Framework/Stress Testing 
1. Medium term 
 Continue to upgrade the CBFSAI‘s stress testing framework. 
 Conduct coordinated bottom up stress testing exercises at least once every two 
years and investigate the potential for upgrading the templates used for bottom up 
stress tests, taking advantage of the richer models that banks are developing in 
preparation for Basel II. 
 Consider extending the tests to the banks‘ foreign exposures, given the sizeable 
cross-border linkages of domestic credit institutions. 
Regulatory Framework 
1. Ongoing 
 Continue to develop the necessary expertise and ensure adequate staff resources 
for supervising an increasingly sophisticated financial system, especially taking 
into account ongoing regulatory developments (Basel II, Solvency II and the 
regulation of reinsurance). 
2. Short term 
 Enhance the current scope and intensity of the on-site supervisory program, in 
particular to strengthen the assessment of the risk management and corporate 
governance practices of insurers. 
 Implement enhanced public disclosures by insurers, in line with the best practices 
established by the IAIS to allow for effective market discipline. 
 Consider upgrading the position of the Prudential Director as regards IFSRA 
Board membership, on par with the Consumer Director. 
 Strengthen monitoring of credit risk transfer activities by financial institutions. 
3. Medium term 
 Have a full reassessment of the IAIS Core Principles undertaken, once sufficient 
time has passed so that transposition of the EU Reinsurance Directive can be 
effectively assessed. 
 
Source:  IMF (2006b). 
 
6.37 Although earlier reports had raised warning flags, by 2006, the views expressed in 
OECD Reports had also become reasonably sanguine, observing that although ―house 
prices have risen faster than in any other OECD country‖ and ―may have overshot 
fundamentals to some extent...this does not imply that they will fall significantly.   A 
soft landing is the most likely scenario but a hard landing cannot be ruled out‖.   The 
report noted two alternative scenarios:  first, that the housing boom would not run out of 
steam of its own accord, leading to serious overvaluation and imbalances throughout the 
economy; the second would involve a sharp fall in house prices, either because they 
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were more overvalued than appeared or due to a negative shock, with a large adverse 
impact on activity and the budget.
119
 Their 2008 assessment was broadly similar.   
While ―the exceptional rise in property values in recent years was largely driven by 
higher income and demographics [it] did appear to have overshot the sustainable level... 
[However] Irish banks are well capitalised and profitable and should have considerable 
shock-absorption capacity. ... [The CBFSAI] has clearly identified the major 
vulnerabilities and taken action to mitigate them‖ (OECD, 2008, pp. 41, 8, 51). 
Section 7:  Conclusions 
6.38 The CBFSAI‘s Financial Stability Reports throughout this period were broadly similar 
in approach to those undertaken by central banks elsewhere
120
.   The reports presented 
the standard ―health indicators‖ of the financial system accompanied by analysis of 
some of the underlying factors at play, as well as the results of various stress tests.   
Risks were highlighted.   However, the key message was that these risks  to the extent 
it was believed that they might materialise  were manageable and not a major cause for 
concern.  
6.39 The coverage of the FSRs was broadly appropriate in terms of the aggregate indicators 
of the banking system.   However, the analysis underlying the published conclusions did 
not focus sufficiently on the concern that exceptionally fast balance sheet and loan 
growth in one or more entities would, via competition, lead to a general lowering of 
lending standards and end up posing a real risk for the system as a whole.   More 
generally, discussion of the ―qualitative‖ aspects of banks‘ loan activities was absent not 
only from the FSR itself but also from the deliberations of the Financial Stability 
Committee, the appropriate forum for reviewing micro-prudential aspects with a 
potential systemic impact. 
6.40 The FSRs contained considerable analytical work addressing many of the relevant 
issues.   Various models and calculations regarding the outlook for residential house 
prices were presented; these suggested a wide range of possible overvaluations during 
2004-06, ranging from 55 to 73 per cent to zero (the CBFSAI‘s ―fundamental factors‖ 
                                                          
119
  (OECD 2006b, pp. 8, 16) The report also recommended the phasing out of the strong bias towards 
housing that was embedded in the tax system. 
120
 See Wilkinson, Spong and Christensson (2010) for a review of cross-country experiences with FSRs, 
with a particular focus on those undertaken by the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain.   
It notes that while the FSRs were generally successful in identifying the risks that played important roles 
in the crisis, they underestimated its severity.  
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approach).   The 2007 FSR, by contrast, did not include these calculations;  in 
particular, an update of an earlier staff model (the results of which had been published 
in the 2006 FSR) which would have indicated a possible overvaluation of about 35 per 
cent as of mid 2007 were not considered.   The central conclusion of the 2007 FSR 
regarding a likely ―soft landing‖ for the housing market does not appear to have been 
based on specific quantitative evidence or analysis. 
6.41 The 2007 FSR contained, for the first time, an analysis of the commercial property 
market which suggested the possibility of significant overvaluation.   Clearly, priority 
should have been given to devoting greater efforts at an earlier stage to this topic, 
especially in view of evidence elsewhere that a bursting of a property bubble in this 
sector can have a more serious adverse financial effect than in the case of residential 
housing. 
6.42 The stress tests that were conducted followed international practice and the standard 
qualifications as to their interpretation were presented.   However, it is clear that the 
shocks involved, while thought to be ―extreme‖ at the time, did not in fact capture the 
scale of what could and did happen.   This was true of both the adverse international and 
domestic macro scenarios and the assumed deterioration in the quality of banks‘ loan 
portfolios.  
6.43 The FSRs from at least 2004 onwards could be interpreted as not dissenting from – at 
least implicitly – the view of many outside commentators that property prices were 
more than likely in excess of their equilibrium level.   The question is why these 
commentators nevertheless tended to be either agnostic or vaguely reassuring on the 
potential implications for financial stability.   Implicitly it seems to have been assumed 
that lenders had protected themselves against loan losses through sufficiently low loan-
to-value ratios (sufficiently high co-financing), or assurance of other sources of income 
to service loans.   However, only the CBFSAI could have had access to the information 
that could confirm the true situation, whether through regulatory inspections or the 
bottom-up stress test exercises.   But the approach used by the Financial Regulator did 
not yield the information needed and the implementation of the stress tests did not seek 
to verify or assess such aspects as loan-to-value ratios for development property 
lending.   In the event, the implicit assumption that either the banks, or the Financial 
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Regulator had ensured sufficient buffers against whatever fall in property prices might 
occur proved to be misplaced.  
6.44 The overall optimistic conclusions of successive FSRs thus reflected, in part, an overly 
sanguine interpretation of the prospects for the property market and an underestimation 
of the risks faced by the financial system; these weaknesses were also present to a large 
extent in the assessments of outside observers such as the IMF and the OECD.   In 
particular, the unwarrantedly favourable FSAP Update Report by the IMF in 2006 – 
offering a financial system stability assessment – was unhelpful.    
6.45 At the same time, however, many participants  at all levels  in the FSR drafting 
process have indicated that the highly ―nuanced‖ messages conveyed reflected an 
institutional desire at senior levels in the organisation to adopt a very cautious approach.   
In particular, there was a concern that the results of some of the analytical work might 
be described by the media as the CBFSAI conveying a ―bearish‖ view of the property 
market and/or a less than sanguine view of the state of the financial system.   This 
message was conveyed to staff working on FSR matters and, given the CBFSAI‘s 
hierarchical culture, was clearly a factor inhibiting staff presentation of alternative 
analyses and assessments.   While this underlying feature was present in the preparation 
of all FSRs, it emerged most prominently in the case of the 2007 FSR, the message of 
which, arguably, could be characterised as reflecting a ―triumph of hope over reality‖121. 
6.46 The emphasis on adopting a cautious, conservative tone reflected several interrelated 
concerns.   In earlier years, it was felt, given the diverse analytical findings described 
above, that the evidence favouring significant house price overvaluation was not 
sufficiently clear cut.   Thus, assigning greater weight to the downside risks could have 
left the CBFSAI open to the criticism of acting precipitously and, possibly, causing 
housing market instability.   This concern was heightened by the ―crying wolf‖ problem 
 the Central Bank had warned in the preceding decade of a possible housing market 
collapse which had not, in fact, occurred.   As one moved through 2006 and 2007, 
although the likelihood of a ―non-soft landing‖ was increasing significantly, a 
reluctance to emphasise the risks predominated, less the CBFSAI be accused of 
                                                          
121
 This aspect is reflected in several references in the Minutes of FSC meetings throughout the period.   
As one example, it was decided in 2006 to exclude from the main text of the report data and references to 
a likely 15 per cent house price overvaluation that was contained in a themed research paper.  
96 
 
precipitating a crisis.   In a sense, the earlier desire ―not to rock the boat‖ was overtaken 
by a fear of ―frightening the horses‖.  
6.47 It can be argued that by 2007 the remedial options open to the CBFSAI had become 
fairly limited  at that point the ―die was largely cast‖.   Nevertheless, a better balance 
could have been struck in preparing both the market  and policy makers  for the 
strong likelihood that a major problem had developed, something that the reassuring 
message of the 2007 FSR failed to do.   In particular, a strong message could have been 
conveyed to banks that a strengthening of their capital position was essential to help 
weather the likely storms ahead.   With respect to earlier years, however, the argument 
in favour of a cautious assessment is not convincing.   Uncertainty will always be 
present and reliance on rigorous statistical evidence is a luxury one cannot always 
afford.   Waiting until more clear-cut evidence becomes available runs the clear risk that 
by then it may be too late to take effective offsetting action.   An unduly passive 
approach may also create ―moral hazard‖ by providing comfort to market participants 
and implicitly encouraging, or not discouraging sufficiently, continued risky borrowing 
and lending behaviour. 
6.48 It was also felt that the adoption of a more ―bearish‖ public posture by the CBFSAI in 
the face of growing risks would have been in the face of most prevailing public opinion 
which believed  or wanted to believe  that the property market in which so many at 
all income levels had invested would not suffer a severe crash.   This sentiment was in 
turn reflected in the views expressed by many politicians  across the political spectrum 
 throughout the period.   ―Swimming against the tide‖ by the CBFSAI thus would have 
required a particularly strong sense of the independent role of a central bank in being 
prepared to ―spoil the party‖ and a willingness to withstand possible strong adverse 
public reaction. 
6.49 In any event, the FSRs did not end up conveying an appropriately forceful message that 
could have served as a springboard for strong remedial action.   Some have suggested 
that even if they had done so, this might not have helped greatly, since there were 
doubts regarding the CBFSAI‘s ability to take meaningful and effective action.   This 
question is addressed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7:  MACRO-PRUDENTIAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
7.1 This Chapter assesses the options available to the CBFSAI to take remedial action with 
a view to lessening the risks to financial stability described in successive FSRs.   
Section 2 reviews a number of specific options that were either employed or might have 
been employed, specifically, moral suasion, increasing capital requirements in respect 
of property-related lending sectoral credit limitations, limitations or prohibitions on 
certain lending instruments such as 100 per cent LTV mortgages and increased 
provisioning for impaired loans.   Section 3 discusses three issues that surfaced 
frequently during CBFSAI consideration of possible options:  the effects such measures 
might have had on the competitive position of Irish regulated financial institutions; the 
fear that more robust regulation might make Ireland less attractive for international 
financial investment; and the view that some forms of intervention might run counter to 
the FR‘s ―principles-based‖ philosophy of regulation.   Conclusions are provided in 
Section 4. 
Section 2:  Instruments – Options and Choices 
7.2 The powers of the CBFSAI to impose tougher requirements on credit institutions in 
order to choke off the boom appear to have been quite extensive.   Nevertheless, internal 
papers show that four categories of measures were recognised by FR staff as available.   
These included:  (i) direct controls on lending (including the prohibition of high LTV, 
or interest only, or very long maturity mortgages);  (ii) increased capital requirements;  
(iii) sectoral limits – there was already a schedule of these, which had fallen into disuse, 
reflecting the probably correct perception that they were too easily evaded;  and (iv) 
moral suasion.   The latter was the tool most favoured in the Board Paper presented to 
the Authority in September 2006 (especially as being thought to be consistent with the 
principles-based approach), even though the Board Paper acknowledged that it might be 
of limited direct effect.   This paper had been prepared at the request of the Chair, who 
was increasingly concerned about the continued expansion of credit to the property 
market.
122
   In practice, only (ii) and (iv) were used in the period under review. 
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  See Section 4 of Chapter 4 above for further details.  
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 - Moral suasion 
7.3 The concept of moral suasion consists of the central bank/regulatory authority 
exercising their powers of persuasion – either publicly or privately – to convince 
financial institutions to modify their behaviour in some desired fashion.   Since it does 
not involve direct interference in an institution‘s lending or other activities it is often 
considered the most desirable form of intervention, at least as a first step.   At the same 
time, it is recognised that in many circumstances, unless accompanied by a credible 
threat of more forceful action, moral suasion by itself may not have the desired effect. 
7.4 During the period reviewed, as discussed in Chapter 6, successive FSRs expressed 
concerns publicly regarding the risks to financial stability posed by evolving trends in 
institutions‘ lending aggregates.   Press conferences and public speeches by the 
Governor echoed these concerns.   Nevertheless, these pronouncements stopped short of 
actually calling on credit institutions to modify their behaviour or indicating that the 
CBFSAI would consider taking specific steps should they fail to do so.  
7.5 However, as a follow up to publication of the FSRs, starting in 2004 ―Roundtable 
Discussions” were held annually between CBFSAI officials and senior representatives 
of the major lending institutions to exchange views on the analysis and messages 
contained in the Financial Stability Reports.
123
   In parallel, the Governor held meetings 
on a number of occasions with the Chief Executive Officers of credit institutions. 
7.6 Detailed written records are not available of what transpired during these discussions 
and meetings.
124
   However, based on participants‘ recollections, it appears that the 
institutions‘ representatives generally speaking took a more sanguine view of the 
situation and outlook and tended to downplay whatever worries were expressed in the 
FSRs.   It has been suggested by some that the CBFSAI, in these private gatherings, 
expressed stronger concerns than those conveyed in the public messages of the FSRs.   
This suggestion has been emphatically refuted by representatives of the institutions 
                                                          
123
  CBFSAI participation was normally headed by the Director General and included the CEO of the FR 
as well as staff involved in the preparation of the FSRs.   The credit institutions were typically represented 
by their Head of Lending (or the equivalent) and Chief Economist.  
124
  In the case of some of the Roundtable Discussions a short summary of the ―Conclusions‖ is available.   
However, these tended to echo the main conclusions of the FSRs themselves and did not convey a flavour 
of any differing points of view that may have been expressed by participants.   The CBFSAI Board 
minutes do not record the meetings of the Governor with the credit institutions.  
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present.   In any event, there is no evidence that the CBFSAI‘s concerns – such as they 
were – were taken heed of to any major extent subsequently. 
7.7 Apart from informal meetings, moral suasion in many instances can take the form of 
letters from the Governor – which may or may not be confidential – to heads of 
financial institutions drawing their attention explicitly to the views of the authorities.   
In the years prior to 2002 the CB employed this practice frequently;
125
  several of these 
communications are notable by the unambiguous and direct ―tone‖ of the messages 
conveyed.
126
   In reviewing why this practice ceased after November 2002 one reason 
that has been suggested is that under the new CBFSAI structure it was the responsibility 
of the Financial Regulator, rather than the Central Bank, to issue such a letter or letters. 
On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 3, according to the 2003 MoU, the Central 
Bank‘s responsibilities included ―analysis of the micro-prudential – where appropriate – 
as well as the macro-prudential health of the financial sector.‖   In any event, to the 
extent that ambiguity might have been present on this score, a simple expedient would 
have been to send a letter signed jointly by the Governor and the Regulator. 
7.8 Annual pre-budget letters expressing views on fiscal matters were sent by the 
CBFSAI Board to the Minister for Finance.   These letters regularly highlighted the 
issue of house price inflation and the size of the construction sector, particularly in the 
letters of 30 September 2003 – ―The level of house prices along with continuing high 
rates of increase in prices pose macroeconomic as well as financial stability risks,‖ and 
12 October 2004 – ―There remains a risk, however, in that the current rate of housing 
output is, on some estimates very much higher – not far off twice – the underlying 
demand for housing.‖   In the latter letter the Governor states that:  ―Fiscal policy could 
also play a role in smoothing the adjustment of demand for property by limiting its more 
speculative components.   In this regard, it would seem appropriate, for example, to 
                                                          
125
  Such letters were sent by the Governor at least annually and in 1999, 2000, and 2001 twice a year.   
The letters commenced in June 1997.  
126
  For example, in a letter dated 4 February 1998, ―The Central Bank has repeatedly advised all credit 
institutions of the critical importance of maintaining the traditional standards in lending for house 
purchase.   There is evidence that these traditional standards are being breached and that loans up to 100 
per cent of the property value are available.   The Central Bank considers this to be inadvisable.‖   On 27 
July 1998 the Governor wrote: ―... it is abundantly clear from previous experience that, if standards are 
relaxed during a period of prosperity, there will be a price to pay later in terms of excessive bad loans.‖   
On 7 March 2000, ―There is a distinct possibility that the continuing large-scale surge in credit may fuel 
the economy to the point where overheating and its damaging consequences might become unavoidable.   
... I am writing to request you ensure personally that your organisation is fully conscious of the potentially 
damaging economic and social consequences and the damage to your own institution and credit 
institutions in general, if reasonable restraint is not exercised at all times.‖  
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allow no further extensions to the termination date of mid-2006 for the range of tax 
driven incentive schemes for housing.‖   However, as regards risks to financial stability, 
there is no evidence that any messages different from those contained in the FSRs and 
related public statements were conveyed. 
 - Increased capital requirements:  Risk weighting of residential mortgages 
7.9 The FR was not passive in responding to the renewed system-wide expansion of 
property-related credit.   From at least mid-2005 the idea of a capital surcharge on the 
riskier property-related loans came to the fore.   Internal documentation pointed to a 
recognition of:  (i) the unprecedented demand for housing credit;  (ii) the IMF opinion 
that Irish property prices were overvalued by more than in other countries;  (iii) high 
household debt/income ratios by international standards;  (iv) increasing competition 
between lenders resulting in lowering of credit standards, notably the spread of 100 per 
cent mortgages;  (v) the move to IFRS provisioning standards which reduced the 
general provisioning available in the banking sector to protect against increased 
defaults;  and (vi) the prospect of slower property price growth.   An internal memo of 
August 2005
127
 proposed what now seems a very modest increase in capital 
requirements for new high LTV mortgages (above 80 per cent LTV).
128
   (It proposed a 
sliding scale which, by progressively increasing the ―risk-weighting‖ of mortgages from 
50 to 60 per cent depending on the LTV rate resulted in a 2.4 per cent Tier 1 capital 
requirement for 100 per cent mortgages, compared with 2 per cent before). 
7.10 There was some delay before this proposal was brought to the Authority, reflecting 
hesitation as to its advisability, despite the imposition – as noted in the documentation – 
of more stringent national requirements by the regulatory authorities in Australia, 
Canada and Germany.   The proposal was finally approved by the Authority at end-
March 2006 and became effective 1 May 2006 (i.e., Box 7.1).   Interestingly, in this 
case there was only a short period of prior consultation with mortgage providers.   
Indeed, the Consultative Industry Panel expressed ―surprise‖ that there was no advance 
notification to it.
129
 
                                                          
127
  The memo, ―Risk Weighting of Residential Mortgages.‖ was from the Head of Banking Supervision 
to the Prudential Director, 12 August 2005.  
128
  The internal document proposing the measure also includes newspaper cuttings highlighting public 
concern about lending standards, including articles by David McWilliams and Richard Curran.   
Somewhat surprisingly, it does not make any reference to the FSR. 
129
  New requirements for credit loss provisioning, including requirements for credit risk management 
were introduced in October 2005.   The purpose of these requirements was to ensure that credit 
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Box 7.1   Increasing the Risk Weightings for Residential Mortgages 
The FR increased the risk weighting of residential mortgages for calculating capital requirements in 
May 2006 and following the implementing of the CRD in 2007 applied risk weightings for various 
mortgage types that were in excess of EU minimums.   The graph below sets out the level of core 
capital a credit institution would have to set aside assuming it was providing a mortgage for the 
purchase of a property valued at €100,000.   The graph caters for the rules applying to different types 
of mortgages at different times, and different loan-to-value ratios. 
 
*Assumes a core capital requirement of 4 per cent 
An alternative way of examining the impact of the FR‘s approach to the risk weighting attributed to 
residential mortgages is to look at the effective risk weightings as they applied to various loan-to-
value ratios.   This is addressed in the chart below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
institutions managed their credit risk appropriately and that appropriate levels of provisions were made 
for impairments and uncollectable amounts written off.   The rules included not only qualitative 
requirements on credit risk management and impairment provisioning, but also quantitative criteria and 
reporting guidelines for impairment provisioning. 
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 - The EU Capital Requirements Directive 
7.11 A few months later, in the context of the application of the new EU Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD), the FR added speculative property development loans 
to the class of loans attracting a higher capital ratio.   The CRD, which was 
implemented on 1 January 2007 and became fully effective on 1 January 2008, 
introduced a new capital adequacy regime for banks, based on the Basel 2 framework.   
As the FR‘s Annual Report 2008 put it:  
―The Directive gives supervisors some flexibility through national 
discretions to tailor the capital requirements to reflect their national 
circumstances.   We used these discretions to introduce a more stringent 
capital regime than the Directive, aimed at supporting the measures already 
introduced here in respect of property transactions....The Directive allowed 
us to decide that exposures, associated with particularly high risks such as 
investments in venture capital firms and private equity investments, be 
assigned a risk weight of 150 per cent.   We applied this discretion [inter 
alia] to speculative commercial real estate, as we determined it to be a high-
risk category.   We were the only regulator in the EU to use this provision in 
relation to commercial real estate.‖ (FR, 2009a, pp. 11-12).  
These measures were applied only to credit institutions regulated by the FR.  
7.12 Before introducing the CRD measures, the FR issued a consultation paper (FR, 2006j) 
and received a number of responses including one from an industry representative body 
which expressed its strong belief ―that the proposal to introduce a 150 per cent 
weighting to speculative commercial lending [was] unwarranted,‖ noting its expectation 
that recent interest rate increases would ―deliver a more effective cooling of the 
property market‖.   The FR held its ground, though, and following the required 
consultation with the Governor (who expressed his full agreement with the measures in 
a letter dated 22 December 2006)
130
 introduced the measures as planned. 
7.13 The capital surcharge measures introduced in 2006-7 show what could have been done, 
albeit much earlier.   By the end of 2006 the residential property market had peaked, and 
few big speculative property deals were concluded after mid-2007, well before the 
effective date of the capital surcharge affecting them.   Furthermore, the measures were 
in reality also rather modest in their likely impact. It was too little too late. 
7.14 Even the 150 per cent weighting on speculative property lending only increased the Tier 
1 capital requirement on such lending from 4 to 6 per cent.   After being watered down 
                                                          
130
  The Governor‘s agreement was needed because the proposed measures had implications for financial 
stability.   For details of these arrangements between the FR and the Governor see Chapter 3 above. 
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already by the start of 2007,
131
 the retail residential mortgage weighting only increased 
the Tier 1 capital requirement on a 100 per cent LTV loan from 2 to 2.25 per cent
132
. 
7.15 It is also apparent that despite the extensive expertise available among Central Bank 
staff that could have been made available to assist the Financial Regulator‘s staff in 
quantifying the estimated impact of the measures outlined above this analysis was not 
undertaken.   Such work, involving analysis of valuation techniques, rising property 
prices and appropriate LTV ratios for banks would have formed the basis for a more 
informed assessment and could have set the stage for more aggressive intervention.   
(See Box 7.2 for a more detailed discussion.) 
7.16 There appears to have been a consensus among Financial Regulator and Central Bank 
staff that the capital requirements measures – which in addition to being very modest in 
size only came into effect close to the tail end of the boom – were viewed as a ―shot 
across the bows‖ of the credit institutions, rather than an attempt to try to make high 
LTV transactions prohibitively costly.   This is also reflected in the minutes of the 
Authority meeting for February 2006 when, in discussing the risk weighting of 
residential mortgages, reference is made to the fact that ―the proposed change is not 
designed to interfere in the operation of the market or to reduce the level of mortgage 
lending, but to signal the determination of the Financial Regulator to ensure that there is 
appropriate capital provision.‖   In this sense, they might more accurately be regarded as 
being in the realm of the moral suasion approach referred to earlier.
133
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131
  Having been recalibrated in line with the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), the schedule 
adopted was the same as that envisaged in mid-2005.   However, the CRD, which was introduced to 
Ireland from the beginning of 2007, actually lowered the basic international requirement for residential 
mortgages from a risk-weight of 50 per cent to one of 35 per cent.   At that point the new Irish sliding 
scale was amended, with the effect of actually lowering the Tier 1 capital requirement again somewhat for 
retail residential mortgages.   To go further would have represented a national ―super-equivalence‖, i.e., 
tougher requirement, which, in the FR staff‘s opinion could ―be challenged by the industry on those 
grounds‖. 
132
  For non-owner occupied residential mortgages, a higher requirement was imposed, namely more than 
doubling of the basic CRD requirement.   For non-owner-occupied, non-retail mortgages, the ratio was 
almost trebled.  
133
  Given their easy access to wholesale funding throughout the period, institutions would have had little 
difficulty obtaining the additional funding needed to meet the requirement at an unchanged cost.   
However, their profitability per unit of borrowing would have declined, albeit very marginally, compared 
to the situation prevailing prior to the measure. 
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Box 7.2:  Was 150 per cent Risk Weighting For Speculative Property Enough? 
 
 
If property that was backing loans to developers was correctly valued when the loans were 
issued, how has it happened that the same property is now being valued (sometimes by the 
same valuers) at much lower prices – often a half or less than the original value?   This 
question is sometimes asked in a way that suggests that bankers could not have reasonably 
anticipated their current difficulties. 
However, a simple example shows how valuers might have been fully consistent in 
reflecting current market prices both before and after the crash;  the problem the banks are 
faced with is due to their not making sufficient provision (at the time the loan was granted) 
for the uncertainty of the future price of the property, and in particular not either requiring 
the developer to put up more of their own money or setting aside enough capital 
themselves against the risks being taken. 
The following very simple example illustrates the point. Suppose the future can be either 
good (boom conditions, property worth €120m with probability 0.75) or bad (bust 
conditions, property worth only €50 million with probability 0.25).   In other words, the 
odds are 3 to 1 against the boom ending in the coming year.   Such a scenario would 
rationalise a current market price of around €100 million – indeed, the expected value of 
the property next year is €102.5 million. 
                                                                                                Future 
                                                                                                                        Boom 
                   Now                Probability=0.75                                                continues 
  
 
  
                                          Probability=0.25                                                   Bust 
                                                                                                                     happens 
 
The bank would, however, be foolish to lend the full amount.   If the bust comes, the 
developer will fail and the bank will only get €50 million back;  and if the boom 
continues, the banks will only get its money back with interest, not otherwise sharing in 
the upside of the property value. 
Even if the bank lends only €70 million at 9 per cent interest, its expected rate of return 
can readily be calculated as -0.4 per cent.   And, if the bust conditions materialise, it will 
have lost over 30 per cent of its outlay.   The needed capital cushion for such a loan would 
therefore be of the order of 30 per cent.   Alas, such calculations are all too similar to what 
has been observed in many cases.   And with such a high proportion of the balance sheet 
of the banks tied up in the same kind of business, the simultaneous bust affecting most of 
the property collateral resulted in catastrophe. 
Of course in normal times the range of likely price movements would not be so high, and 
prudent bankers would diversify their business broadly.   But in the late stages of a 
correlated property boom such as experienced in Ireland, the above example would not 
have seemed farfetched to analysts.   Thus, increasing the risk-weighting to just 150 per 
cent only lifted Tier 1 requirements from 4 to 6 per cent on such lending;  to achieve 
adequate protection, the risk-weighting should have been of the order of 750 per cent. 
This calculation does not take account of cross-collateral arrangements and lending on the 
basis of a second lien.   In the above example, a second lien loan of €20 million with, say, 
15 per cent interest (to take account of the weaker security) would yield an expected rate 
of return to the bank of  minus 13.8 per cent, and should have been backed 100 per cent 
with the bank‘s equity capital – equivalent to a 2500 per cent risk weighting.  
 
 
€100m 
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€50m
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- Other possible quantitative actions 
7.17 An additional possible measure that could have been considered was the banning of 
mortgages with an LTV exceeding a certain prudent level.   Such a measure would have 
been out of tune with the overall regulatory approach adopted, and with the main 
currents of international practice of the time – though some countries had such 
restrictions.   However, rather than giving a strong warning signal on this issue, at the 
time of the 2006 decision, the discussions at the CBFSAI Board and the Authority 
emphasised that care should be taken to avoid any misunderstanding that the move was 
a ban on 100 per cent mortgages. 
7.18 There appears to have been little serious thought given to the idea of setting binding or 
even non-binding limitations on credit extended specifically to the property sectors 
which had been expanding at truly unprecedented rates.   Sectoral limits had in earlier 
years prior to the adoption of the euro formed a significant part of the arsenal of 
instruments used by the Central Bank.   While of course these were no longer relevant 
as monetary policy instruments in the context of Ireland‘s membership in the eurozone, 
their reactivation and use for prudential reasons would not have required any additional 
powers being given to the FR/CB.  Rules of this kind were actually in effect, but not 
enforced. Specifically, there was a long-standing ceiling (200 per cent of own funds) 
which was supposed to be applied to loans to any one economic sector (various classes 
of property loan were treated as different sectors, so the overall property ceiling was 
higher). This requirement seems to have become a bit of a dead letter, with violations 
being noted but not acted upon. Albeit old-fashioned, this kind of rule would, if 
enforced, have been quite effective in slowing the bubble.  It is fair to acknowledge, 
however, that experience shows that quantitative credit limits can be circumvented 
fairly easily.  
7.19 Alternatively, a ceiling could have been placed on the rate of growth of credit extended 
by one or more institutions, especially those experiencing dangerously high growth.   
This would have been a major departure from the moral suasion approach to 
enforcement and would not sit comfortably with market-oriented policy in normal 
times.   But with the protracted and record-breaking run of house price appreciation and 
credit expansion, crude measures such as this could have been justified and could have 
been very effective in stopping the bubble in its tracks.   Certainly the rate of growth of 
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Anglo Irish Bank – the fastest in the market – should certainly have been the trigger for 
much more intense scrutiny of its business than it received, including giving 
consideration to the possibility of restraining its growth directly. 
7.20 Another relevant action could have related to loan loss provisioning for impaired or 
problem loans.   Under the Basel Core Principles supervisors should, for example, 
assess ―whether the classification of the credits and assets and the provisioning is 
adequate for prudential purposes.   If provisions are deemed to be inadequate, the 
supervisor has the power to require additional provisions or to impose other remedial 
measures.‖  
7.21 In contrast to the imposition of higher capital requirements for risky lending – which 
would cover against unexpected losses – the purpose of provisions is to take account of 
what is likely to occur in respect of loans expected to suffer losses.   The changes to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS39) of 2005 were interpreted to limit 
the degree to which specific provisions could be taken in respect of loans where no 
impairment had occurred. But provisions could be taken if there was any objective 
evidence of impairment.  In later stages of the boom, when the relevant property 
markets had already began to turn down, regulators could have required more 
provisions to be taken, thereby inducing the banks to consolidate their capital, for 
example by limiting dividends, or by issuing new capital. 
7.22 Finally, it might be suggested that liquid reserve requirements should have been higher, 
or that ceilings should have been imposed on banks‘ loan-to-deposit ratios.  While the 
first of these approached might not have had much impact, the second could have had a 
decisive and early effect in restraining the bubble before it really got under way. Of 
course by the same token it would have been vigorously resisted.  Such measures are 
now likely to be adopted internationally, though discussion of them in this context 
smacks to some extent of hindsight. 
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Section 3:  Concerns 
7.23 During this period, apart from a possible overall reluctance to swim against the tide of 
public opinion and/or to contribute or to be seen to contribute to market disorder 
(discussed in Chapter 6) three specific (and to some extent interrelated) concerns appear 
to have militated against more decisive and aggressive intervention.   These were voiced 
frequently by external interest groups (most notably by representatives of the credit 
institutions themselves) and were reflected – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly 
– in internal discussions within the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator.   There 
would also certainly have been a consumer backlash against regulatory action which 
made products such as 100 per cent mortgages less available, given their increasing 
importance, particularly for first time buyers (Honohan, 2009, Figure 8, p. 216).  
7.24 The first worry was that stronger regulatory action would adversely affect the 
competitiveness of credit institutions regulated by the FR, i.e., those operating either on 
a consolidated or subsidiary basis.   The FR did not regulate branches of foreign credit 
institutions;  moreover, institutions could switch from subsidiary to branch status, 
although this was not necessarily an altogether costless exercise.   It was therefore 
argued that if the FR imposed more onerous regulations on institutions under its remit, 
they would be faced with a competitive disadvantage and risk losing market share to 
other institutions that operated on a branch basis in the State or marketed services into 
the State on a cross-border basis.  
7.25 While this issue cannot be dismissed, its merits were overstated considerably.   First, 
key elements underlying the argument were not addressed in any systematic manner, 
including:  the relative importance and market power of existing Irish-regulated 
institutions;  the ease or otherwise of entry of other institutions;  the potential loss in 
competitiveness facing ―home‖ institutions;  and finally, the possibility of exploring 
with other national regulators a ―coordinated‖ regulatory response.   The only reference 
in a Board Paper to the issue concerns the impact of the introduction of the risk 
weighting of residential mortgages;  the competitiveness aspect is discounted on a 
number of grounds including the fact that ―Irish licensed institutions account for almost 
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the entirety of mortgage lending in Ireland.‖134   Irish regulated credit institutions 
between 2000 and 2008 comprised in excess of 96 per cent of the domestic mortgage 
market.  
7.26 There are also more fundamental problems with this argument.   As noted in Chapter 3, 
while the CBFSAI‘s mandate does include the promotion of the Irish financial services 
industry, it also states that this is subject to promoting financial stability.   Indeed, if, as 
a result of more aggressive intervention, Irish-regulated institutions had ceded some of 
their property lending activities to others, their own situation today could have been 
considerably stronger.   The possible costs of inappropriate lending by others would 
have been the responsibility of the regulator of the other jurisdiction rather than of the 
Irish authorities.   This ―division of labour‖ was clearly set out in the euro area 
arrangements relating to financial supervision.
135
 
7.27 The second concern was that more robust regulation might make Ireland less attractive 
for international financial investment.   A non-intrusive regulatory environment 
                                                          
134
 The full discussion is as follows: ―A further issue to consider is whether a unilateral increase in risk 
weightings by this jurisdiction will put Irish licensed institutions at a competitive disadvantage to 
institutions licensed overseas.   A number of factors suggest that this will not have a material competitive 
impact on domestic banks: 
i) at present, Irish licensed institutions account for almost the entirety of mortgage lending in 
Ireland.   It is considered that the proposed capital increases are unlikely, in themselves, to 
lead to an immediate change in this position.   Pricing of loans and the expenditure 
necessary to develop market presence is considered to be of greater importance to any 
decision to enter the market on a branch or cross border basis; 
ii) although the Irish system currently allows the 50% weighting to apply to the full value of a 
residential mortgage (and in this respect is similar to the UK), a number of other 
jurisdictions only allow this weighting up to a specific LTV.   It is understood that 
Germany, Australia and Canada use cut-offs of 80 per cent, 80 per cent and 75 per cent 
respectively for this standard weight.   Loans above the cut off attract a 100% weighting on 
the full amount of the loans.   The proposals in this paper are less stringent than such 
approaches; and 
iii) Irish licensed banks, which are part of banking groups in other jurisdictions, could be 
considered to be at an advantage as, from a group perspective, Irish residential loans would 
be absorbed into the group‘s balance sheet and be subject to the home State‘s regulator‘s 
rules.   This may place them at an advantage to banks which consolidate in Ireland.   
However, a number of points should be noted here:  
a) the amounts involved will not be material from these groups‘ perspective; 
b) the Home State regulator may apply some rules in this area in a different 
manner to the Financial Regulator already; and 
c) the same rules will apply to all local banks, i.e., there will be a level 
playing field nationally.‖ (FR, 2006k, pp. 9-10). 
135
 It has also been suggested at times that restrictive actions vis-a-vis Irish-regulated institutions would 
not have curtailed the property boom as other institutions would have entered to pick up the slack.   
Abstracting from the practical issues described above, this observation is true but not relevant.   In a 
monetary zone, no individual central bank can do much to control aggregate demand pressures – this is a 
zone wide responsibility.   The key role of national central bank/regulatory authorities is to help safeguard 
the stability of institutions under its remit and thereby contribute to zone-wide financial stability.  
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conducive to promoting the IFSC was considered important by Government.
136
   The 
Department of the Taoiseach took a lead role in coordinating support and the 
development of the international financial services industry. Partly, this was done 
through a consultation mechanism, the Clearing House Group at which senior FR 
representatives as well as industry personnel were present to identify issues of major 
concern to the development of the sector. The Chair and CEO of the FR participated in 
several roadshows to promote the IFSC (e.g., Patterson 2007).  
7.28 The FR and the CB were mandated by legislation to pursue two goals – financial 
stability and promotion of the financial sector – which may well have been in conflict.   
The FR was in a difficult position as the possible adverse effects on discouraging 
inward investment in the IFSC were more immediate and real than what were perceived 
as more distant concerns about financial stability.   While the stability goal was given 
explicit priority, the potential conflict between the two goals complicated policy choice. 
7.29 A third concern was that more aggressive use of some of the instruments discussed 
above could have been criticised as running contrary to the spirit of principles-based 
regulation.   The latter assumed that financial institutions would at the end of the day 
operate in their enlightened self interest and that by and large they should be left to so 
unencumbered by unnecessary, and especially, heavy handed, regulatory intervention.   
However, such an argument is based on an insufficient appreciation of the risk that poor 
judgements by decision makers in institutions will lead not only to costs for themselves 
but also for the wider public given, in many cases, the institutions‘ systemic importance 
and the consequent pressures to ― bail them out‖ to a greater or lesser extent during a 
crisis. 
7.30 As noted in Chapter 4, several key architectural aspects of the principles-based 
approach had not been applied, or applied only partially, in Ireland since 2003.   But 
even if these elements had been fully in place it would not have protected the financial 
system from the potential for misjudgement that led to the financial crisis.   These 
misjudgements – in the form of excessive reliance on a massive expansion in property-
related lending – were probably facilitated by an incentive structure which, to varying 
extents, in the face of aggressive competition, tended to reward volume at the expense 
                                                          
136
  For example, ―A number of factors have underpinned our attractiveness as a location for international 
financial services, including an attractive fiscal and regulatory environment ...‖ (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2006, p. 8).   See also ibid, (pp. 12-13). 
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of quality.   Strong intervention by the authorities to counteract the possibility that 
institutions will not take into sufficient account these potential costs to society (often 
termed ―externalities‖) and therefore will under-price the risks involved is entirely 
consistent with the principles-based regulatory approach. 
7.31 In addition, even absent the above problems in each individual institution, when the 
behaviour of all the banks, taken together is considered, systemic financial stability 
issues may well arise.   The fact that loans to overlapping subgroups of the same set of 
property developers accounted for such a high fraction of credit outstanding from most 
of the credit institutions implied a systemic risk not captured in risk assessments carried 
out for one bank at a time.   This problem also has cross-border dimensions which are 
currently the subject of discussions at international level on improvements in 
information exchange. 
Section 4:  Conclusions 
7.32 Notwithstanding the relatively sanguine message conveyed by successive FSRs, the 
Central Bank/Financial Regulator could and should have used to a much greater extent 
the array of instruments available so as to effect a change in institutions‘ behaviour and 
thereby reduce substantially the emerging risks to financial stability. Although 
Roundtable Discussions were held between CBFSAI staff and representatives of credit 
institutions following the publication of FSRs and the Governor met with CEOs on 
several occasions, there is no evidence that any stronger warning messages were 
conveyed during these contacts.   Neither was the avenue of writing to the institutions – 
a practice that had been followed in earlier years – accompanied by a concerted 
campaign, perhaps in cooperation with the Government, explored.   In sum, the moral 
suasion approach appeared to have been entirely ineffective in terms of inducing any 
significant change in institutions‘ lending behaviour. 
7.33 The authorities did implement, after considerable internal debate, increases in capital 
requirements applied to various categories of property-related lending.   However, no 
analysis was undertaken as to what, if any, quantitative impact these measures might 
have and, even at the time of their introduction, it appears there was a strong element of 
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symbolism involved.   In any event, it is widely acknowledged that the actions were too 
little and taken far too late.
137
 
7.34 Other options were in principle available.   These included prohibitions on certain types 
of lending products, for example, 100 per cent LTV mortgages and/or quantitative 
limitations on lending to the property sector, including increased provisioning.   While 
recognising that such measures would have been out of tune with the principles-based 
approach and with the then prevailing international regulatory fashion (as well as, in the 
case of sectoral lending limits, subject to evasion) they needed to have been given 
serious consideration, especially since the other approaches appeared to be having little 
or no impact. 
7.35 The reluctance to employ more aggressive intervention seems to have reflected not only 
a concern that consumers would react adversely if products such as 100 per cent 
mortgages became less available but also to a significant extent fears as to the possible 
adverse impact on the competitive position of domestic institutions vis-a-vis their 
counterparts that were operating – or might start to operate – in Ireland.   Excessive 
weight was given to this aspect, probably in light of lobbying objections from 
institutions who feared a diminution in their market share.   In the first place, no 
quantitative analysis was undertaken that supported this concern.   More fundamentally, 
while part of the CBFSAI‘s mandate was to promote the growth of the Irish financial 
sector, the legislation clearly specified that this was conditional upon the CBFSAI 
acting to promote the stability of the Irish financial sector.   The latter objective, in line 
with policy throughout the euro zone, was paramount and should have been recognised 
as such. 
7.36 Finally, the suggestion that stronger intervention would not have been consistent with 
the general approach of principles-based regulation is not convincing.   Even if all the 
architectural (especially governance) elements underlying the principles based approach 
had been fully in place – which they were not – financial institutions, in Ireland as 
elsewhere, are prone to significant misjudgements, especially in the presence of an 
incentive system which can tend to favour short term returns over longer term risk 
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  In the case of the FR, the Chair of the Authority stated, ―with the benefit of hindsight, our measures 
were insufficient given the severity of the recession that has emerged.   However, it is arguable whether 
any regulator acting in an economy focused on growth and fostering competition, could have materially 
mitigated the property bubble.‖.  (FR, 2009a, p. 4) 
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avoidance considerations.   Even in the absence of the above concerns the concentration 
of overlapping risk in the property development sector was likely to have entailed 
significant systemic financial stability risks.   In a world where mistakes may end up 
costing society – and the taxpayer – dearly, regulatory intervention to ensure a more 
appropriate pricing of risk, as well as being necessary, is entirely consistent with the 
principles-based approach.  
7.37 Overall, the view that the CBFSAI did nothing to try to slow the boom is not consistent 
with the facts.   But its actions, which were tentative and timid, were implemented too 
late and were wholly inadequate to alter behaviour.   Procedures were not in place to 
escalate action when the intended results – when they were clearly specified – were not 
achieved within a set timescale.   Neither side of the organisation ever fully resolved the 
tension between the need to stop excesses and the fear that too sharp an intervention 
would send the economy into an avoidable tailspin.   Despite the CB‘s primary 
responsibility for financial stability, it was, in fact, the FR side, and not the CB, which 
took the most concrete action to intervene via the system wide capital requirement 
surcharges.   But, while the measures were not easy for the FR to implement given the 
circumstances and timing, they were always destined to have little more than a token 
effect at best.   True, the CBFSAI‘s passivity was not out of line with what happened 
elsewhere (in the US and UK, for example), but the extent of Irish exposure to the 
property sector development and the associated reliance on international wholesale 
funding was on an almost unmatched scale which required much stronger intervention.  
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CHAPTER 8:  CRISIS MANAGEMENT – AUGUST 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2008 
 
Section 1:  Introduction 
8.1 After wholesale markets for liquidity started to dry up in August 2007, and especially 
following the collapse of Northern Rock the following month, the CBFSAI‘s attention 
began to focus on the liquidity pressures being encountered by the Irish banks and on 
making preparations for a possible further deterioration in their funding situation.   
Central banking and regulatory policy in the period between then and the end of 
September 2008 is considered in this chapter, which is divided into three main parts. 
8.2 Section 2 reviews policy actions and planning during this period.   Strengths and some 
shortcomings of crisis preparations are noted.   Section 3 focuses on the events of 
September 2008 as the crisis came to a head, accelerated by the near-paralysis of the 
international market for short-term liquidity after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
(Annex 3), and subsequent events.   The discussions leading up to and on the night of 
29/30 September are described in this context.   Section 4 takes a broader perspective on 
the guarantee decision, placing it in the context of crisis containment actions taken 
around that time.   It considers whether the guarantee was a reasonable policy response 
under the prevailing circumstances.   Some conclusions follow. 
Section 2:  Contingency Preparations 
8.3 Given the scale of their net international position, the Irish banks were all highly 
exposed to the disruption in the international market for short-term bank funding from 
early August 2007 onwards.   At first the most conspicuously affected banks worldwide 
were those who had specialised in buying and re-packaging US mortgage loans, funded 
through short-term borrowing.   The reluctance of wholesale lenders to provide liquidity 
to these banks (or to the special purpose vehicles which they had created to hold the 
mortgage-backed securities), reflected: a re-assessment of the likely repayment 
performance of the underlying mortgages;  a realisation that the ratings that had been 
assigned to the mortgage-backed securities were unreliable and systematically biased 
towards over-optimism;  and uncertainty as to where the worst losses would occur, 
given the complexity of the packaging and re-packaging involved.   Some of the most 
conspicuously exposed institutions were rescued from collapse early on, including the 
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German bank Landesbank Sachsen, which had conducted this type of operation, mainly 
through its Dublin offices.  
8.4 Although the main Irish banks had not been much involved in US mortgage-backed 
securities, they were highly dependent on wholesale funding.   The fact that their 
portfolio was so heavily oriented towards property and that Irish property prices were 
falling also helped explain why they began to find it harder and harder to attract longer-
term funding.   But there was also a general world-wide retreat from lending into any 
type of risk that could not be easily assessed, and the Irish banks suffered. 
8.5 As 2008 progressed, liquidity difficulties deepened, especially around mid-March, when 
the investment bank Bear Stearns was rescued by the US authorities.   The share prices 
of Irish banks also continued to drift lower, a matter which should not in itself be a 
matter of concern to the Central Bank or Financial Regulator except when, as is 
nowadays often the case, a share price weakening is taken as a signal by wholesale 
depositors to withhold their funds.  
8.6 Among the actions taken to enhance preparedness were:  (i) enhanced cooperation 
between the CBFSAI and the Department of Finance, via the Domestic Standing Group 
(DSG) including a crisis simulation exercise;  (ii) the preparation of a crisis 
management manual, including specific institutional issues that arose in light of the 
Northern Rock collapse
138
 and preparation for the possible use of emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA);  (iii) enhanced monitoring of liquidity flows;  and (iv) advance 
consideration of some practical issues relating to crisis resolution options.   These are 
reviewed in turn.  
 - Domestic Standing Group 
8.7 It is important in any country to have good communication channels between the main 
public agencies dealing with financial sector matters, namely, the Central Bank, the 
Financial Regulator and the Department of Finance.   Schematically, the FR is the body 
with the best knowledge of the condition of each of the banks;  the Central Bank can 
form a policy view with regard to the broad financial stability consequences of any 
given action and is best placed to decide on and implement decisions on the provision of 
liquidity in the form of short-term loans;  while only the Government (represented by 
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 The Northern Rock collapse seems to have greatly influenced the Irish authorities thinking about crisis 
preparedness and is discussed in Section 4. 
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Department of Finance officials) can decide on covering underlying losses via taxpayer 
support.  
8.8 In 2006, in line with new EU-wide procedures,139 an inter-agency financial committee, 
the Domestic Standing Group, was established to deal, inter alia, with crisis 
management issues.   The DSG comprises the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator 
and the Department of Finance; a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties 
entered into force in July 2007.   The DSG is intended as a framework to help manage 
financial stability issues, including potential systemic crises.   The chair was to be 
rotated among the three parties on an annual basis.   It could meet at various levels.   
Typically at the early stage, envisaged participants would have included the Assistant 
Director General, Economics (Central Bank), the Prudential Director (Financial 
Regulator), and an Assistant Secretary (Department of Finance).   From mid-2008 the 
group has also met as needed at the level of Governor, CEO (FR) and Secretary General 
or Second Secretary (Department of Finance).   In addition, during this period, the 
NTMA participated.   At the outset, the work program of the DSG included: 
 exchanging information on market and regulatory issues;  
 overseeing the updating of the crisis management manuals of the CB, 
FR and Department of Finance; 
 participating in crisis simulation exercises; 
 developing principles for the resolution of financial crises, taking 
account of work being done at the EU level; 
 policy and procedural issues relating to deposit insurance;  and 
 examining the impact of company law provisions on insolvency in 
crisis situations.  
 - The Crisis Management Manual (also known as the Black Book) 
8.9 The Black Book (prepared initially in 2001) in its original form included: 
 the principles under which the Central Bank would operate during a 
crisis;  
                                                          
139
  In recent years, under the auspices of ECOFIN, there has been an increasing focus on developing co-
operation between the relevant authorities in order to help manage cross-border crisis-related issues 
within the EU.   In 2003 an MoU was agreed between all banking supervisors and central banks in the 
EU.   A tripartite MoU involving ministries of finance as well as supervisors and central banks, followed 
in 2005.   A number of European-wide crisis simulation exercises were conducted involving central 
banks, supervisors and ministries of finance.   These were based on the potential consequences of an 
assumed failure of only one institution and did not address the possibility of a crisis affecting several 
institutions simultaneously.   Therefore they turned out to be not particularly useful in the Irish crisis 
situation. 
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 operational procedures and terms and conditions for ELA; 
 legal issues relating to insolvency laws and state aid to industry;  and  
 information and logistic issues such as arrangements for contacting the 
responsible persons in a crisis.  
 
8.10 Following the experience of the UK authorities, close attention had been given to 
provision, if necessary, of ELA by the Central Bank.   In the Eurosystem, this form of 
financial assistance may be used in the case of a solvent but illiquid credit institution 
which does not have sufficient collateral with the required characteristics for use in 
normal ECB lending operations.   Such assistance can only be given on the basis of 
adequate alternative collateral and the associated credit risk is assumed by the national 
central bank and not the Eurosystem as a whole.   The assistance is provided at a 
penalty rate of interest and is envisaged to be used only in an emergency and for a very 
short period.   Following extensive work on the legal documentation and decision-
making powers involved, the detailed procedures were presented
140
 to the CBFSAI 
Board in November 2007 which approved the delegation of powers to the Governor 
with respect to the granting of ELA. 
8.11 Aside from ELA, although a large amount of resources had been devoted to preparation 
of the crisis management manual, it was not employed to any significant extent during 
the actual crisis.   This was due to the fact that the procedures outlined were excessively 
cumbersome, and sought to involve too many officials of the Central Bank and 
Financial Regulator at a time when rapid decision making was at a premium.  
 - Monitoring of liquidity flows  
8.12 A Liquidity Group chaired by the Deputy Director General of the CB was established in 
early 2008 to obtain and disseminate information on liquidity developments from the 
main credit institutions and to identify any potential problems at an early stage.   The 
group met at least weekly and shared data on the sources and maturity structure of 
funding, the bidding behaviour in Eurosystem operations which provided some idea of 
the liquidity needs of institutions participating in ECB refinancing operations, the use of 
collateral, fulfilment of the minimum reserve requirements of the ECB, interbank 
transactions and the likely observance of prudential liquidity ratios.   While this exercise 
proved to be a valuable tool in helping to establish a ―real time‖ picture of liquidity 
                                                          
 
140
  CBFSAI Board Paper No 151 of 2007,  Liquidity Management Procedures. 
117 
 
developments during the turmoil, a comprehensive, daily picture of the actual liquidity 
flows had not been put in place before early 2009.   During 2008, the liquidity situation 
deteriorated, as reflected in the unprecedented recourse to financing from the European 
Central Bank which rose from a monthly average of around €6 billion in September 
2007 to €20 billion in September 2008 (Chart 8.1). 
Chart 8.1:  Refinancing Operations by the ECB for the Covered Institutions – 
January 2007 to December 2008 
 
 - Crisis containment options 
8.13 A paper entitled Crisis Resolution Options141 was discussed by the DSG in mid-2008.   
It reviewed the possible procedures and potential pitfalls involved in dealing with a 
troubled bank or building society.   Two main crisis options were considered, namely 
assisted private sector acquisition and nationalisation (other possibilities briefly 
considered in an earlier draft included use of ELA, alternative mechanisms for 
providing liquidity, for example by investing (against collateral) some of the liquid 
assets of the NTMA, and a blanket guarantee).   However, the paper offered little detail 
about implementation of the various options including that of the issuance of a 
guarantee (for example, it did not address the question of possible inclusion of 
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  Crisis Resolution Options, 11 June 2008: Financial Stability Department and Banking Supervision 
Department, CBFSAI.  
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subordinated debt)
142
.   The note concluded with a series of recommendations requiring 
additional legislative work, including on nationalisation and resolution regimes.   In the 
event, work was not pursued further at this stage and the paper‘s content appears to have 
been quickly overtaken by events. 
8.14 In the case of private sector acquisition, the paper favoured, for operational reasons, 
implementing such a decision during a weekend.   It sketched out the main steps that 
might be involved, including the possibility of temporary funding, perhaps via ELA.   
The paper argued that the alternative option of temporary nationalisation
143
 should be 
considered only when all private sector solutions were exhausted.   In this case, 
shareholders would not be bailed out and creditors and uninsured depositors should 
expect losses.   Given the lack of a banking resolution framework, there was concern 
that simply announcing a nationalisation might not stop a run on the bank.   Important 
elements that might be considered included a guarantee to prevent a run on the bank 
(although no details of such a guarantee were provided
144
), a trigger point for action by 
the authorities and provisions that would be necessary to avoid the immediate payment 
of a troubled institution‘s debt securities.  
 - Assessment of preparations prior to the crisis peaking 
8.15 While considerable effort was thus devoted to preparing for a liquidity crisis, this period 
was also noteworthy for the unravelling of the Quinn-Anglo CFD affair, which was not 
ultimately resolved in a satisfactory manner.
145
   This appears to have represented a 
major preoccupation for the Authority at a crucial time.   It should be emphasised that 
because of the information gap discussed in previous chapters which acted as a blinker, 
at no point in this period was it thought by the authorities that any of the banks were 
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  As mentioned below, a more detailed discussion of options was prepared for the Department of 
Finance by Merrill Lynch – who had been engaged as consultants by the NTMA/Department of Finance 
in early September – on the weekend before the guarantee. 
143
  It was not made explicit why this would solve the problem.   (If the assumption was that government 
ownership was, by itself, a sufficient assurance to lenders, then this would not have been borne out by a 
comparison with the US, where very many insolvent banks have been taken under the control of the FDIC 
without all lenders being made whole.) 
144
  A later note, undated but understood to have been prepared in the last days of September, drew on the 
June paper.  It added a small but significant detail on the guarantee, specifically envisaging that such a 
guarantee would cover both senior and subordinated debt. 
145
  As this matter is the subject of separate investigations, and does not centrally affect the conclusions of 
this report, it is not considered further here. 
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facing imminent underlying solvency risks.
146
   This had the consequence that no 
attempt was made to urge the banks to raise – or even conserve – capital.147  
Section 3:  The Policy Discussions of September 2008  
8.16 The publication of a very adverse rating agency report on INBS148 on 5 September 2008 
heralded the final stage of the run-up to the guarantee.   More frequent and higher level 
meetings between the agencies represented in the DSG (with the NTMA), took place 
imbued with a growing sense of urgency.
149
   The Department of Finance took a clear 
leading role at this stage (with the CBFSAI playing a less central role than might have 
been expected),
 
commissioning consultants and advancing preparations for legislation to 
nationalise a bank and/or a building society and to provide an extensive guarantee of 
banking liabilities.   The diminishing access of banks to liquidity was now an urgent 
focus of attention.   While the INBS story had heightened concern, it was generally 
understood that it was Anglo Irish Bank that was most vulnerable on a week-to-week 
basis, depending in particular on how much of its maturing deposits would be rolled-
over.   Consultants were engaged to scrutinise the condition of INBS and Anglo. 
8.17 As the discussions regarding procedures for crisis containment started to unfold, early 
on a clear consensus view emerged that no Irish bank should be allowed to fail, in the 
sense of having to close its doors and not repaying depositors and other lenders.   This 
strong view departed from the textbook view that only systemically important 
institutions should be candidates for such protective treatment.   (See below for a further 
discussion of systemic importance.)   But it was shared without reservation by all the 
                                                          
146
  Even executive directors of Anglo Irish Bank seem to have had no inkling of the problems to come if 
we are to judge from the fact that three of them acquired and held sizeable blocks of shares in the Bank 
close to the peak of its share price in 2007. 
147
  Indeed, during the first nine months of 2008, Anglo paid out €0.14 billion in dividends, Bank of 
Ireland €0.39 billion, and AIB €0.72 billion – of which €0.27 billion was paid out as late as 26 September  
2008, four days before the guarantee. 
148
  A report by Reuters on 5 September indicated that, following a credit downgrading by Fitch, INBS 
had entered talks with its lenders to avoid insolvency.   The report, which was subsequently withdrawn, 
appeared to reflect particular market concern about the widely publicised extent of INBS‘s property 
exposure.   The Authority quickly issued a strong public statement denying the content of the Reuters 
statement.   However, both the CB and the FR recognised that if the liquidity situation were not to 
improve serious thought would need to be given to the possibility of nationalisation using the draft 
contingency legislation prepared beforehand.   In the event, the outflows of certain types of wholesale 
funding ceased over the following weeks and since much of the rest of INBS‘s resources were in the form 
of customer deposits that were considered relatively stable – partly due to the long-held expectation that 
the society would be de-mutualised providing a windfall to members, the liquidity situation became 
manageable.   Thus, the nationalisation option did not resurface for INBS. 
149
  The Governor was convalescing from an operation earlier in the summer and returned to duties only 
in mid-September. 
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key officials involved and, for good or ill, simplified the decision making process.   By 
late September, it would have also reflected the broader reaction at European level to 
what was considered to be an ill-judged policy decision on the part of the US authorities 
not to save Lehman Brothers. 
8.18 A detailed review of the ensuing discussions is hampered by the absence of an extensive 
written record of what transpired.
150
   Although the minutes of meetings of the CBFSAI 
Board and the Authority during the period contain references to various options, there is 
an absence of documentation setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of possible 
alternatives and their quantitative implications.   While CBFSAI Board members 
expressed some broad views on possible approaches, no decisions were taken, as the 
solutions would need to be found at Governmental level.   The key discussions took 
place via the very many informal contacts and meetings between senior officials of the 
DSG agencies, the NTMA, and consultants; what follows relies to a very large extent on 
the personal recollections of participants.  
8.19 Throughout this period  up to and including 30 September  as noted above, the clear 
consensus was that the problem was essentially one of liquidity rather than of solvency.   
(See Box 8.1 for a discussion of these concepts.)   While some doubts may have been 
felt or expressed privately, the minutes of the CBFSAI Board and Authority meetings 
do not record any concerns as to possible underlying weaknesses of the various 
institutions which were believed to be suffering the consequences of a world-wide 
―financial tsunami‖.   Thus the comforting reassurances provided to the CBFSAI Board 
and Authority on earlier occasions that there were no fundamental problems were not 
put into question.
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 Only sketchy records appear to have been kept of the intensive round of informal meetings in the days 
and weeks prior to 29 September or of the events of that night itself.   Although recognising the severe 
pressures of rapidly unfolding events, greater transparency with respect to the unprecedented decisions 
being considered and their far reaching implications would have been desirable. 
151
 While many banking observers were becoming increasingly concerned about the long-term prospects 
of Anglo (the institution under most pressure throughout September), given its business model based on 
wholesale funding for on-lending to property development, and some loan losses were clearly in prospect, 
neither the FR staff nor consultants engaged envisaged Anglo being insolvent.  
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Box 8.1:  Liquidity versus Solvency 
 
  
The average maturity of a bank‘s borrowing is typically shorter than the average maturity 
of its assets.   Indeed, this maturity transformation is a valuable function that the financial 
system as a whole performs for society, allowing savers to have ready access to funds, 
while facilitating the financing of productive activities that take a long time to prepare and 
bring to fruition.   A bank manages the risk that too many of its lenders will look for their 
money all at once by holding cash reserves, and by turning to the money markets for 
short-term borrowing.   For fifty years Irish banks had no difficulty in accessing any short-
term funding they needed. Liquidity was thus not a problem.   However, after August 
2007, and especially after the events of mid-September 2008 in the US, the access of 
banks worldwide to short-term borrowing became very constrained because of the 
heightened risk aversion and the uncertainty about the solvency of all financial institutions 
and about the willingness of governments to bail out insolvent banks.    
 
It is in such circumstances that one can speak of a bank being solvent – in the sense that its 
assets will, when they mature, provide more than enough to repay those who have lent to 
the bank – while at the same time being illiquid – in the sense that the bank is unable to 
repay its borrowings immediately and cannot find other lenders who can tide it over.   
Obviously, putting a solvent but illiquid bank into bankruptcy is unnecessarily costly for 
society which is where emergency liquidity assistance (―lender of last resort‖) from the 
central bank arises.   The emergency loans should be made at a penalty rate so that banks 
have an incentive to avoid getting into a situation of illiquidity.   However, the main 
difficulty lies in determining whether the bank really is solvent.   For this, one cannot rely 
on what will all too often be a self-serving and over-optimistic assessment from the 
troubled bank.   Instead, the regulator must have assembled the necessary information and 
analysis to provide the needed advice. 
 
 
 
8.20 Apart from the focus on liquidity issues, discussions were informed by the underlying 
principle  referred to earlier  that no Irish bank would be allowed to fail.   In addition, 
it became apparent from informal contacts that notwithstanding the general turbulence, 
there was at that stage no European-wide effort under way to mount an initiative to help 
distressed institutions.   Thus, each national authority would have to take whatever 
measures might prove necessary to deal with its own situation. 
8.21 September progressed without any respite from the liquidity pressures.   Following 
media coverage, including on a popular radio programme (Liveline on RTE), warning of 
a possible run on the banks, on 20 September the limit under the deposit guarantee 
scheme was raised from €20,000 to €100,000, and the coverage increased from 90 per 
cent to 100 per cent within that limit;  and the Government issued a statement affirming 
its resolve to stand behind the banking system.   While these actions helped forestall 
possible panic on the part of retail depositors they appeared to have little or no effect in 
stemming wholesale deposit withdrawals.  
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8.22 As the liquidity situation continued to deteriorate (especially the shortening of 
maturities), several specific options were discussed.   First, for some time consideration 
had been given to whether legal powers existed to establish a domestic Secured Lending 
Scheme (―SLS‖) drawing on some of the CBFSAI‘s investable financial assets, together 
with contributions from the NTMA and/or the Pension Reserve Fund;  a total of about 
€20 billion was mentioned, with about half of that to come from the CBFSAI.   A 
variant/possible complement to this approach was the issuance of a State bond which 
could be used as ECB-eligible collateral by domestic banks.   Some preparations along 
these lines were made.   However, this approach was seen as having several 
shortcomings:  first, the providing entities would be exposed to potentially serious 
financial risks (in particular the CBFSAI has only a small buffer of capital reserves);  
second, there was no certainty that the sums being spoken of would be sufficient to 
―stem the tide‖;  and third, issues might be raised at the European level as to whether 
this could be construed as the provision of state aid and/or, in the case of some 
components, ELA under another guise.  
8.23 Second, the use of ELA itself was discussed.152   While this would have had to be 
notified to the ECB, and any significant amounts would have required prior agreement 
(strictly speaking:  no objection) by the ECB Governing Council there is no reason to 
believe that this would not have been forthcoming.   However, it was observed that ELA 
was normally intended to be availed of in the case of a single institution facing 
difficulties.   Using ELA to support the entire banking system  which might end up 
being necessary  could, it was thought, have had a major adverse reputational impact 
on the Irish banking system.   More generally there was uncertainty whether use of 
ELA, if publicly disclosed or detected (as would be likely), would boost or detract from 
market confidence.   Finally, as with the SLS option above, the potential open ended 
size of the operations and the associated balance sheet risk for the CBFSAI were seen as 
serious concerns.  
8.24 As the crisis worsened and the unprecedented scale of the problem loomed larger the 
above possibilities were not pursued further.   In the days before 29 September, the 
CBFSAI Board and Authority met on a number of occasions and more far reaching 
                                                          
152
  Provided a bank has eligible collateral, liquidity may be accessed via refinancing operations with the 
ECB.   However, in the absence of ECB-eligible collateral an institution may, as indicated earlier, apply 
for emergency lending assistance from the CBFSAI. 
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options began to surface, in particular the proposal for a comprehensive or blanket State 
Guarantee.   No clear consensus emerged; however, Board members indicated that the 
Governor of the CBFSAI and the Chair and the CEO of the Financial Regulator had 
their full support ahead of what were expected to be intensive discussions with the 
Government.
153
  
8.25 On Sunday, 28 September, it was thought that Anglo would be able to survive the full 
week.   The focus in Dublin that day was on the acute liquidity pressures facing Depfa 
bank, by then an Irish subsidiary of the German bank Hypo RE.   But the weekend‘s 
events in other countries (Annex 3) shook markets.   With Anglo Irish Bank‘s shares 
collapsing on the Monday
154
 – indicating a general loss of market confidence in its 
survival – and its apparent inability to replace further liquidity withdrawals, it became 
clear that Anglo could not survive another day.   Decisive action that evening was 
inevitable and the top officials from the agencies prepared for another round of 
meetings.  
8.26 That afternoon, the two main banks, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (AIB), also 
came to the conclusion that decisive and immediate action by Government was called 
for.   They foresaw otherwise the imminent collapse of Anglo Irish Bank – in effect its 
inability to meet its immediate payment obligations.   Such an event would be 
devastating for all the remaining Irish banks, and result in an accelerated outflow of 
funds which, although neither of them was at that point close to having exhausted its 
eligible collateral, would nevertheless quickly bring them also to the edge.   At their 
coordinated request a meeting with the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance was set 
for later that evening.  
8.27 There followed an all-night sequence of meetings, led by the Taoiseach and the Minister 
for Finance, and involving the Attorney General, and senior officials from the 
Departments of Finance and the Taoiseach and the CBFSAI; senior officials from the 
NTMA were also present for some of the discussions. 
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  On 25 September the last Board meeting of the Central Bank prior to 29 September, the minute 
recorded a request from the Department of Finance that the Governor provide a formal view on the 
situation to the Department of Finance.   In the event, on October 18, the Governor wrote to the Minister 
of Finance indicating his full support for the 29 September decisions. 
154
  The share price closed on Monday at €2.30, compared with €4.28 on the previous Friday. 
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8.28 The main outcome of the meetings is well known: a blanket guarantee but no immediate 
nationalisations.  For present purposes it is appropriate to focus on the views of the 
CBFSAI representatives and the banks on the main issues. 
8.29 The Governor and DG of the Central Bank and Chair and CEO of the FR participated in 
some of the meetings that evening.   Before the meeting they had all, with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm, come to the conclusion that a general guarantee was necessary 
and unavoidable.   The question of nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and an 
associated change in management was also on the table.   Among the reservations 
expressed by CBFSAI participants were fears as to how the market might react to such a 
move, and concerns about the operational risks involved in trying to nationalise mid-
week (i.e., the matter could be deferred to the weekend if it still proved to be necessary). 
8.30 The two banks (each of whom was represented by their Chair and CEO) only 
participated in two meetings with the Taoiseach and Minister. In the first of these they 
indicated that they favoured both an immediate general guarantee (including 
subordinated debt) and the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank (and possibly INBS).   
Their motivation for urging nationalisation was that this would remove these 
institutions‘ negative reputational effect on Irish banking generally.   All concerned 
agreed that the banks did not participate in the subsequent discussion on what action 
should be decided upon.    
8.31 The second meeting involving the banks occurred after the guarantee decision had been 
taken; the banks had been asked earlier whether they could provide an immediate short-
term liquidity facility to Anglo Irish Bank, and (after eliciting what was technically 
feasible with their staffs) they indicated that each of the two banks could speedily make 
a total of €5 billion available for a matter of days, provided it was covered by a 
Government guarantee.   It may be noted that neither of the banks gave any thought to 
involving Anglo representatives in considering their approach. 
8.32 It was also agreed that the CBFSAI would make an amount of up to €3 billion available 
via an asset swap vis-a-vis Anglo Irish Bank, €1 billion of it the following morning. In 
the event, the strong reflow of funds in the following days made the banks‘ special 
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liquidity facility unnecessary and it was not drawn upon;
155
  nor, was the CBFSAI 
funding.   The question of nationalisation also evaporated by the following weekend. 
8.33 Some of the parameters of a guarantee scheme had already been aired in discussions 
over previous days.   These had to be finally decided now.   One issue was the coverage 
of the guarantee.   Apart from exclusion of shareholder funds, the question arose as to 
whether or not to include subordinated debt.   Given that the whole point of 
subordinated debt is to be a form of risk-absorbing capital, and as such is sold as being 
explicitly more risky than senior bonds, it would have been reasonable to argue that 
subordinated debt holders should not be exempt from possible losses;  as far as can be 
determined, no guarantee offered by any other government during the crisis covered 
such risk-bearing liabilities.   The note prepared the previous weekend by the Merrill 
Lynch advisers had explicitly envisaged exclusion of dated subordinated debt from the 
coverage.   The banks might benefit from inclusion, to the extent that their ability to 
issue new subordinated debt in the future would be hampered otherwise.
156
   It was 
apparently also argued that, since many of the subordinated debt bond holders were also 
holders of Government Paper, their exclusion could adversely affect Ireland‘s debt 
rating.   There was also concern that anything short of a comprehensive, simple to 
understand concept might cause confusion when markets opened and undermine the 
effectiveness of the Government‘s action.  CBFSAI representatives did not challenge 
these propositions.   In the event, it was decided to include dated, but not to include 
undated (perpetual) subordinated debt.
157
  
8.34 Two other issues arose (apart from the duration of the guarantee for which the period of 
two years was quickly decided upon as beyond the likely duration of the prevailing 
market pressures).   First, how much should the banks pay for participating in the 
scheme, given that – as had been rightly pointed out by Merrill Lynch in their options 
note – the sovereign credit rating, and hence the cost of borrowing, would likely be 
affected by the contingent liability (estimated at over €400 billion) associated with the 
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  The funds were already placed by the banks with the Central Bank. 
156
  No new money has, however, since been raised through subordinated debt by any Irish bank (although 
there have been a number of debt swaps). 
157
  Some of the dated subordinated debt had clauses permitting (but not obliging) the issuing bank to 
redeem it within the two-year period. In normal times, such debt is almost always repaid at the first 
permissible date, with the result that it would be seen as a sign of weakness for an issuing bank not to do 
so.  There appears to have been some confusion about this issue on the night of 29/30 September, with 
some participants understanding that some or all of the dated subordinated debt would fall due before the 
end of the guarantee (see Annex 4). 
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guarantee.   Second, what conditions (for example, as regards Government having a say 
in bank remuneration) would be associated with the scheme.   While some informal 
discussions with bank representatives on these issues took place on the margins of the 
meetings, both aspects were left to be worked out later in the context of implementing 
legislation to follow shortly. 
8.35 Prior to the announcement early in the morning of 30 September, both the ECB and the 
EU were informed of the Government‘s action.   Some concerns were expressed 
bilaterally as regards the lack of international consultation prior to the Irish decision and 
the effect that it might have on flows of funds internationally.   On the Irish side, 
participants have emphasised that given the very short time available prior to the 
opening of the markets, absolute priority had to be given to finding a solution which 
would ward off the possible imminent collapse of the domestic banking system. 
Section 4:  The Appropriateness of the Guarantee 
8.36 Was the guarantee, backed as it was by the CBFSAI, the most appropriate policy 
response in the circumstances?  Three specific aspects are addressed:  namely, (i) the 
scope of the guarantee; (ii) the treatment of Anglo Irish Bank; and (iii) the extent of 
consultation with partner EU countries. 
8.37 Before considering these issues it is important to recognise that the Irish decision was 
taken, not only in the face of a potentially disastrous situation at the heart of Ireland‘s 
banking system, but against the background of a bewildering sequence of bank failure 
events internationally (Annex 3).   What is striking is the variety of policy measures that 
were employed.   Some financial firms were nationalised in full or in part, some part-
nationalised, some assisted with loans, both long-term and short-term, some were 
intervened with losses imposed on debt holders and large depositors while insured 
depositors were made whole, some were offered a priced guarantee for new borrowings, 
some were bankrupted.   After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, governments 
became increasingly concerned to avoid the collapse of another systemically important 
financial firm, and the interpretation of what was systemically important tended to 
become more lenient, given the fragile nervousness of financial markets.   Even in the 
United States, which had extensive experience of closing banks and imposing losses on 
uninsured depositors and other creditors, and an impressive set of legal powers to do so, 
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policy makers became more cautious and began to rely more on open bank assistance of 
some form (Box 8.2). 
 
Box 8.2:  Recent Bank Closure Policy in the US 
 
 
The experience of the US is often pointed to by advocates of bank closures.   And indeed, 
with its very large number of mostly small banks, the United States has been the main 
laboratory of bank closures over many decades.   The authorities have generally followed 
that classic rule:  a bank that is solvent but illiquid (in the sense explained above) should 
be granted emergency liquidity by the central bank.   But an insolvent bank should be 
intervened and wound up (unless it is systemically important, or unless a lower cost 
solution for the deposit insurance fund can be found).   Then the insured depositors are 
paid from the deposit insurance fund and the other creditors paid out of the proceeds of the 
liquidation in accordance with their priority in law.   Of course, in the United States, the 
very generous ceiling on deposit insurance cover ($250,000) and the large number of 
banks, combined with an efficient system of mortgage brokerage, means that most large 
retail depositors can and do spread their deposits between different insured banks with the 
result that – except in large banks – relatively few individual deposits exceed the covered 
ceiling.   Partly for this reason, it is currently proving cheaper in most cases for the FDIC 
to sell the whole deposit book and part of the assets of a failed bank to a strong 
competitor, rather than simply paying off the insured depositors.  
In dealing with the creditors of insolvent banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) has greater ability to differentiate between the claims of different 
creditors thanks to the fact that there is special resolution legislation in the United States 
for banks giving it such powers to alter the priority of bank creditors in an insolvency. 
Since the end of September 2008, over 200 banks in the US have been closed. Most of 
these were very small – just a few hundred million in assets – but half a dozen were $10 
billion or more.   Despite the energy and experience of the FDIC in monitoring insured 
banks, and its statutory obligation to intervene whenever it becomes aware of the bank‘s 
capital dipping below a certain figure, the FDIC generally incurs a loss on these resolution 
activities.   For the six largest banks, the FDIC incurred an estimated aggregate loss of $15 
billion in paying out on $70 billion of deposits.   Other non-deposit creditors in these 
banks lost out.  
But for larger, systemically important banks, such as Citi, alternative approaches were 
employed, ensuring that creditors of such large banks did not suffer because of the wider 
implications for the functioning of the payments and economic systems and ultimately the 
need to ensure that the banking system could reliably perform the task of transferring 
ownership claims with legal certainty.  
 
 
 
8.38 No other country had introduced a blanket, system-wide, guarantee, though this has 
been a relatively frequent tool in previous systemic crises (Box 8.3).   As such, the Irish 
guarantee caused considerable waves, upped the ante for other governments struggling 
to maintain confidence in their own banking systems, and placed some direct 
competitive funding pressure on banks in the UK, where the liquidity position of some 
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leading banks was much more critical than was known to the Irish authorities at the 
time.  
8.39 The scope of the Irish guarantee was exceptionally broad.158   Not only did it cover all 
deposits, including corporate and even interbank deposits, as well as certain asset- 
backed bonds (―covered bonds‖) and senior debt it also included, as noted already, 
certain subordinated debt.   The inclusion of existing long-term bonds and some 
subordinated debt (which, as part of the capital structure of a bank is intended to act as a 
buffer against losses) was not necessary in order to protect the immediate liquidity 
position. These investments were in effect locked-in. Their inclusion complicated 
eventual loss allocation and resolution options.159   Arguments voiced in favour of this 
decision, namely, that many holders of these instruments were also holders of Irish 
bonds and that a guarantee in respect of them would help banks raise new bonds are 
open to question:  after all, extending a Government guarantee to non-Government 
bonds has the effect of stressing the sovereign to the disadvantage of existing holders of 
Government bonds; besides, new bonds could have been guaranteed separately.   The 
argument for simplicity also is weakened significantly by the fact that an actual dividing 
line between covered and non-covered liabilities was drawn at as least an equally 
arbitrary point; moreover, such instruments were held only by sophisticated investors. 
8.40 Subordinated debt holders have suffered some losses, given the buy backs that have 
occurred at discounted prices.
160
 Nevertheless, the inclusion of existing debt in the 
coverage of the guarantee likely increased the potential share of the total losses borne by 
the State. This eventuality deserved fuller consideration in advance. 
 
 
                                                          
158
 And much broader than that offered by the UK authorities in the case of Northern Rock one year 
earlier, a case which had formed the backdrop to much of the Irish planning (see Box 8.3) 
159
 For example, if the US authorities had decided to impose losses on debt holders in additional major 
banks during 2009, this would have altered the market context by setting a new standard for loss-sharing 
in a way that the guarantee might have made difficult to emulate. 
160
 Losses of €5.1 billion have been realized by subordinated debt holders of the three largest banks to the 
time of writing.   This estimate is not greatly altered if an allowance is made for the use of high coupons 
on some of the debt provided in some of the exchanges.  In the case of Anglo Irish Bank, the realized loss 
is €1.2 billion out of an initial €4.9 billion at end-September 2008.   Applying current market prices to the 
remaining €2.1 billion of nominal sub debt in this bank would entail an unrealized mark-to-market loss of 
approximately €1.2 billion. 
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Box 8.3:  Northern Rock – Similarities and Differences vis-a-vis the Irish Guarantee 
 
  
The experience with Northern Rock seems to have coloured the thinking of many official 
participants in the decisions of end-September 2008.   It is useful to sketch some relevant 
aspects.  
Before the collapse of Northern Rock one year earlier, it is probably fair to say that most 
individual bank depositors in Western Europe assumed that their bank deposits were not 
only perfectly safe, but fully guaranteed by Government.   If the first might not have been 
completely true, the second most certainly was not.
a
   It was only in 1989 that the Irish 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) was introduced, at first covering only £10,000 of the 
first £15,000 of any individual depositor‘s loss.b   (The DGS, which is a permanent 
statutory scheme, now fully covers deposits up to €100,000, following the latest increase 
in coverage announced in mid-September 2008).  
This misapprehension became clear during the Northern Rock bank run of September 
2007. Northern Rock was a Newcastle-upon-Tyne based bank (formerly a building 
society) which had specialised in aggressive mortgage lending financed through short-
term wholesale borrowings channelled through special purpose vehicles.   When its 
wholesale funding dried up, it received emergency liquidity assistance from the Bank of 
England, eventually amounting to £27 billion – a world record at the time.   
Announcement of the provision of ELA triggered a retail depositor panic and long queues 
formed outside Northern Rock branches from 15 September 2007, including in Dublin.    
On 20 September the UK Treasury announced guarantee arrangements – including for 
Irish depositors – which covered existing deposits in Northern Rock (and accounts re-
opened by those who had closed them in the previous week).   The guarantee was to 
remain in place ―during the current instability in the financial markets‖ and was eventually 
withdrawn on 24 May 2010.   Although the trigger for the guarantee was the sight of retail 
depositors queuing, much of the initial liquidity pressure on Northern Rock related to a 
withdrawal of wholesale funding.
c,d
  
Unlike in the case of the Irish guarantee of September 2008, the Northern Rock guarantee 
extended only to existing and renewed wholesale deposits;  and uncollateralised wholesale 
borrowing.   It did not include other debt instruments such as covered bonds, securitised 
loans and subordinated and other hybrid capital instruments.   (See Annex 4 for a 
discussion of the different classes of liabilities of banks involved.) 
The Northern Rock guarantee did not explicitly extend to other banks – at the time no 
general market concerns were present – but it may have been taken as an implied 
guarantee, in that it revealed to the market the reluctance of the UK Government to let a 
medium-size bank (total assets were around £100 billion compared to Euro 100 billion for 
Anglo Irish Bank) fail. 
Although Irish officials often refer back to the Northern Rock experience, the Irish 
guarantee differed in a number of important respects.  
First, it was not preceded by a retail depositor run of any significance;  instead it reflected 
a silent wholesale run, mainly on Anglo Irish Bank (which was facing imminent default on 
its obligations), but on other Irish banks also. 
Second, the Irish guarantee covered not only retail and wholesale deposits and other short-
term borrowing, but also almost all of the bank‘s uncollateralised long-term debt including 
much of the subordinated debt.   Only the undated (perpetual) subordinated debt was not 
covered.   It also applied to existing, as well as new debt, even though holders of long-
term debt maturing outside the guarantee period could not withdraw their funds in this 
period.
e
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Third, and most important, the Irish guarantee was in effect a blanket system-wide 
guarantee (though not in practice covering foreign-controlled banks).   Blanket deposit 
guarantees have been a relatively common feature of systemic banking crises of the past,
f
 
reflecting the concerns of governments that bank depositors will have an unfounded but 
hard-to-dispel fear that known solvency problems at one bank could imply problems at 
others.  
Studies have shown that blanket guarantees have typically been associated with crises that 
resulted in larger fiscal costs which in turn reflected the underlying gravity of the situation 
that called for such a drastic step.   However, there are indications that a regime that is 
prone to introducing a blanket guarantee is also more likely to have been associated with 
less adequate regulation that can result in large banking and fiscal losses. 
___________________________ 
a While the US FDIC was created in 1934;  the first nationwide scheme in Germany dates to 1966, in France 
and the UK to 1980;  and in Italy to 1987 (Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, & Laeven, 2005). 
b Depositors in Irish Trust Bank, which failed in 1976, were ultimately compensated by the Exchequer which 
provided £1.8 million to do so.
 
c Retail and wholesale funding fell by £14 billion and £18 billion respectively in the second half of 2007. 
d 
Northern Rock was taken into temporary public ownership in February 2008. This whole experience focused 
the attention of the UK authorities on the need for a special resolution regime to enable them to deal promptly 
with a failing institution; such legislation was enacted in February 2009.
 
e Except in an event such as liquidation, at which point they would now be covered by the guarantee. 
f 
They were introduced in 15 of 42 recent crises studied (see Laeven and Valencia, 2008) Such guarantees have 
been introduced both in cases where there were existing limited deposit insurance schemes and where there 
was no prior scheme. In most cases the guarantee was introduced after several months of crisis, and many such 
guarantees remained in place for a long period, for example for between 6 and 9 years in the cases of Finland, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand.
 
 
 
8.41 Turning to the question of Anglo Irish Bank, in normal times, policy should not 
exclude the possibility that a small failed bank should be wound-up with losses to 
uninsured creditors. But in times of heightened risk aversion and uncertainty, the failure 
of even a medium-sized bank can have wider confidence implications of such severity 
that a rescue or bailout is the optimal public policy. More generally, a bank that might 
be a candidate for a bailout is generally termed ―systemically important‖ – though it 
does not follow that all systemically important banks should be saved.  Given the 
increasingly tense confidence situation in the weeks after Lehman‘s, the failure of 
almost any bank began to be seen by European policymakers as something to be 
avoided at almost all costs. 
8.42 A question that has been the subject of considerable discussion following the guarantee 
decision is whether the authorities should have allowed a disorderly bankruptcy of 
Anglo Irish Bank or bailed it via the guarantee.  As is confirmed in Box 8.4, which sets 
out current international thinking on what makes a bank systemically important, Anglo 
was clearly systemically important in the prevailing conditions at the end of September 
2008  
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 Box 8.4:  Was Anglo Systemically Important?  
 
A question frequently raised is whether it was correct to consider Anglo Irish Bank to be a 
systemically important bank.   If not, it could be argued that its bankruptcy should be 
tolerated, even if losses were imposed on uninsured depositors and other claimants.   To 
be sure, this bank was the third largest Irish-controlled bank in terms of its total balance 
sheet, and for a time in 2008 even became the largest bank by market capitalisation on the 
Irish Stock Exchange.   But it was far from being a household name, had a branch 
presence in only six cities in Ireland and measured by employment and number of 
borrowers, was outstripped by several other institutions. Inasmuch as it had grown twenty-
fold in a decade, the Irish economy had prospered without much overall contribution from 
it in the 1990s.   It was not central to the payments system or involved in a large range of 
complex money market transactions with other financial market participants.  
Nevertheless, as a recent paper prepared for the G20 clearly recognises, a judgment about 
systemic importance ―is time-varying depending on the economic environment... It must 
also be conditioned by its purpose—whether it will be used for example, to define the 
regulatory perimeter, for calibrating prudential tools including the intensity of oversight, 
or to guide decisions in a crisis.‖ (IMF et al., 2009)   It is the final aspect that is most 
important for the current discussion.  
Three criteria are generally considered according to which a financial institution can be 
viewed as systemically important, namely: size, inter-connectedness, and substitutability.   
The preceding discussion suggests that Anglo Irish Bank would be unlikely to satisfy the 
substitutability criterion (i.e. is there another institution that could perform the same 
functions) and might not even satisfy the size criterion, even at its peak.   But its 
interconnectedness vis-a-vis the Irish banking system changes the story.   Given what was 
happening in the US and European banking markets around that time, the survival of even 
long-established and relatively highly rated banks (such as RBS, HBOS, Lloyds, Bradford 
and Bingley, Washington Mutual, Fortis, Dexia and others) was clearly in question and 
rescue packages of one sort or another had to be put in place to protect their depositors.   
Under these circumstances a default by a €100 billion bank such as Anglo Irish Bank 
would undoubtedly have put funding pressure on the other main Irish banks via contagion, 
given the broad similarities in the type and geography of their property-related lending, 
their common implicit reliance on the backing of the Irish State, and even name confusion. 
In this sense, the systemic importance of Anglo Irish Bank at that time cannot seriously be 
disputed. 
 
 
8.43 There can be little doubt that a disorderly failure of Anglo would, in the absence of any 
other protective action, have had a devastating effect on the remainder of the Irish 
banks.   Given the other banks‘ reliance from day-to-day and week-to-week on the 
willingness of depositors and other lenders not to withdraw their funds, and the 
certainty that those lenders would infer from the failure of Anglo that all the other Irish 
banks might be in a comparable situation, in all likelihood the main banks would have 
run out of cash within days.   They did not have unused collateral eligible for borrowing 
at the ECB‘s facilities in sufficient amounts to meet a run on the scale which would 
have ensued.   Absent Government support or ELA they would have to close their doors 
also, unable to pay out on cheques presented and other payments instructions.   Closure 
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of all, or a large part, of the banking system would have entailed a catastrophic 
immediate and sustained economy-wide disruption involving very significant, albeit 
extremely difficult to quantify, social costs, reflecting in particular the fundamental 
function of the payments system in a modern economy.   These costs would have been 
broad-based in terms of income, employment and destruction of the value of economic 
assets and would have been on top of the recessionary downturn which has actually 
occurred.   Considering the experience of other countries in such circumstances, the 
social and economic costs, if they could be quantified, would surely have run into tens 
of billions of euros.
161
   There would also have been spillover effects vis-a-vis other 
countries.  So either Anglo‘s disorderly bankruptcy had to be avoided, or protective 
measures taken for the rest of the system, or – as was decided – both162.   
8.44 These immediate costs were avoided by the guarantee.   But was the likely deferred cost 
of a guarantee also perceived to be small?   After all, there is a natural tendency, even 
for public servants, to avoid immediate crystallisation of problems even at the cost of 
larger likely subsequent costs.   In this case, though, at the time the authorities did not 
believe that Anglo was heading towards insolvency.   The potential for a major payout 
from the guarantee was not considered large, though no attempt was made at 
quantification.   There were arguments against a blanket guarantee, including one made 
by the Department of Finance‘s advisors Merrill Lynch who observed that the 
assumption of such a large contingent liability would have an adverse effect on the 
borrowing costs for the State.   And there is a moral hazard involved in any such 
                                                          
161
 The indirect costs of the failure of systemically important institutions, triggering a wider systemic 
collapse, are hard to evaluate.   In most historic cases governments have stepped in to prevent disorderly 
bankruptcies, instead absorbing some of the failing banks‘ losses into the fiscal accounts but keeping the 
day-to-day operations of the banks going.   Recent cases where this did not occur include Indonesia in 
1998 and Argentina in 2001.   These economies were already gripped in deep recession when their banks 
failed.   The disorderly bank closures contributed to a deepening of the crisis, but to what extent nobody 
has been able to estimate with any precision.   Of course a comparison with these economies needs to take 
account of the fact that they both operate with much smaller banking systems relative to their economy, 
and that most of their economic structure did not depend on unquestioned reliance on financial contracts.  
The case of Iceland is also relevant (see Box 8.5). 
162
  With the benefit of hindsight, a plausible case can be made for a more complicated policy as perhaps 
offering a lower net cost in the end.   Thus, the whole system except Anglo could have been guaranteed, 
allowing the latter to close, without that implying destruction of the rest of the system.   Given what we 
now know about the extent to which most of the final fiscal costs of the guarantee come from Anglo, on 
the face of it such a course would have offered savings.   It would not, however, have been trouble-free.   
It would have earned harsh criticism from other EU countries as being a ―second Lehmans‖ imposing a 
destabilising spill-over effect on them, would have caused a jump in government borrowing costs and 
would have entailed large and arbitrary costs to Anglo creditors, including other banks, resulting in 
economic disruption and job losses.   Since the decision makers had no inkling of the scale of the looming 
net deficiency in Anglo, this option – with its sizeable risks in an already volatile environment – did not 
seem worth considering.   As such, it is of academic interest only. 
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guarantee, though this argument does not appear to have been made.   Still, given the 
perceived lack of a solvency problem at Anglo (or the other banks) on balance a 
guarantee seems to have been the best approach, not least because no other clear and 
effective medium-term solution appeared available.   This is not to underestimate the 
huge cost to the bailout which has ended up in excess of 15 per cent of GDP. 
 
Box 8.5: Contrasts between Ireland and Iceland 
 
 
The country with the largest banking sector failures relative to the size of the 
economy in the current global financial crisis is Iceland.   Little affected by the US 
subprime market problems, the Icelandic banking system was destroyed by a 
nationally-generated bubble.   
Although it was also a locally-generated bubble that created the problems in the 
Irish banking system, the parallels between the two countries‘ experiences are not 
all that close, as is revealed by the Report of the Investigation Commission in 
Iceland.   
For one thing, the expansion of the Icelandic banking system – where the three 
main banks expanded twenty-fold in seven years – an annual average rate of 
growth of over 50 per cent, far higher than even the growth rate of Ireland‘s fastest 
growing bank Anglo. Furthermore, the losses that have been incurred almost ten 
times those of Ireland when measured relative to each country‘s GDP.   The 
average asset-write-down for the three Iceland banks is estimated at 62 per cent – 
far higher than the write-downs required even for the worst of the Irish banks in 
relation to their NAMA loans.  
The pattern of bank behaviour in Iceland was also different.  Property lending was 
not so central to the Iceland case.   The SIC reported an extraordinary amount of 
self-lending by bank insiders; the largest exposures of Glitnir, Kaupthing Bank and 
Landsbanki were the banks‘ principal owners.   While loans to Directors in one 
Irish bank have been the focus of attention, it was on a much smaller scale.   The 
Icelandic banks took on a sizeable exposure to their own shares, and the shares of 
the other banks, especially during 2007; by mid-2008, own- and cross-exposure 
had reached the level of 70 per cent of core capital; in effect, the banks had 
collectively financed far too high a proportion of their owners‘ equity.   (The CFD-
related transaction in one Irish bank represented a much smaller fraction).   Other 
features lacking in the Irish situation but important to Iceland were the growth in 
investment funds managed by the banks, and the extraordinary late expansion into 
retail franchises in other countries as the Iceland banks attempted to substitute 
wholesale funds with retail deposits.   
Finally, in contrast to the Iceland authorities, the CBFSAI did increase capital 
requirements in an attempt to slow risky lending – albeit by too little. 
 
 
8.45 If ELA had been used to maintain the system to the end of the week it could also have 
allowed the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank to be carried out without operational 
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risk.   Given the true underlying situation of Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, namely that 
they were heading toward loan losses that would more than wipe out their capital, it 
could have turned out to have been quite risky to leave them under unchanged 
ownership.
163
   Furthermore, a better loss-sharing arrangement with providers of capital 
might have been more easily negotiated had one or two banks been dealt with 
separately
164
 from the system.   Still, even given these considerations, it is hard to argue 
that the delay of five months in eventually nationalising Anglo Irish Bank had a major 
financial impact.  
8.46 The sudden introduction of the scheme with hardly any notice to partner EU countries 
presented some issues, given the existence of a single EU banking market.   The Irish 
subsidiaries of foreign banks were only included subsequently (on 9 October) following 
representations.   The guarantee created market and political pressure for the 
introduction of similar schemes across Europe and some dissatisfaction was expressed 
at high political level with the Irish action.   In the event, in the following ten days, six 
other countries165 introduced blanket deposit guarantees – though none of them were as 
extensive as the Irish scheme.   While this is conjectural more prior consultation on 
alternative options might have alleviated the pressures on Ireland without creating the 
tensions prompted by a sudden unilateral action.   After all, an EU-wide response to the 
crisis did eventually emerge in the following week.   It is possible that recourse to ELA 
might have bought some time for such eventualities. 
Section 5:  Conclusions 
8.47 There is no doubt that from mid 2007 onwards Ireland increasingly faced a potentially 
serious financial crisis.   Although the deteriorating international environment was what 
finally set the flames alight elements had been building for some considerable time 
beforehand.   The overly sanguine, even complacent, view presented in the 2007 FSR 
and the resulting ensuing conviction that whatever problems that might arise would only 
be one of a liquidity led to two missed opportunities;  first, to convey a strong message 
                                                          
163
  The looting of insolvent banks by management is extensively documented in the historical literature 
concerning similar events in other countries.   However, there is no reason to believe that this occurred in 
either Anglo or INBS.   Any such risks that may have been considered to exist were mitigated by 
intensified supervision and the appointment of two Directors on each Board by the Government. 
164
   Some of Anglo Irish Bank‘s subordinated debt was bought back by the bank at well below par, 
although the net present value of the savings from these transactions have not been examined for this 
report. 
165
  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.   Other EU countries also 
increased the ceiling on their existing deposit insurance schemes during this period. 
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to the banks that they needed to build up capital urgently to be able to handle 
contingencies, or even to require them to do so;  and second, to undertake 
comprehensive preparatory work to analyse quantitatively policy options available in 
the event the unthinkable might transpire. 
8.48 Although it was not underpinned by specific analysis, the decision early on not to 
countenance the ―failure‖ of any bank simplified subsequent decisions.   This decision 
was not initiated by the CBFSAI, but was consistent with its view.   However, it was an 
oversimplification which short-circuited decisions that deserved closer scrutiny.   Under 
the circumstances of the extraordinary international financial market environment of 
those weeks, it was an understandable position.   But it could not be a permanent policy 
if severe moral hazard was to be avoided.   And it was also conducive to downplaying 
the importance of developing an appropriate legal framework for a special bank 
resolution regime scheme.  
8.49 The ―no failure‖ policy also took the question of optimal loss-sharing off the table.   In 
contrast to most of the interventions by other countries, in which more or less 
complicated risk-sharing mechanisms of one sort or another were introduced, the 
blanket cover offered by the Irish guarantee pre-judged that all losses in any bank 
becoming insolvent during the guarantee period – beyond those absorbed by some of 
the providers of capital – would fall on the State.166   Given the ―no failure‖ policy, a 
guarantee with its costs were inevitable. 
8.50 The inclusion of subordinated debt in the guarantee is not easy to defend against 
criticism.   The arguments that were made in favour of this coverage seem weak: And it 
lacked precedents in other countries (although subordinated debt holders of some other 
banks since rescued abroad have in effect been made whole by the rescue method 
employed).   Inclusion of this debt limited the range of loss-sharing resolution options in 
subsequent months, and likely increased the potential share of the total losses borne by 
the State.  
8.51 In addition to influencing financial stability policy, a key role of the Central Bank in a 
crisis is to ensure adequate provision of liquidity.   It was prepared on the night of 29/30 
                                                          
166
  Cynical critics might suggest that the introduction of the guarantee immediately following the steepest 
one-day share price fall for an Irish bank might have reflected an attempt to protect even the shareholders.   
However, the evidence provided suggests that this was not a concern of policymakers.  
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September to extend a modest amount of ELA, but not enough to ensure that Anglo 
would get through the week.   Thus back-up liquidity provision was instead hastily 
secured from the two largest commercial banks, and, crucially, backed by Government 
guarantee.   In effect, the commercial banks were stepping in to provide the lender of 
last resort facility – which of course was in their own interest to do.   The reluctance to 
deploy more significant ELA facilities from the Central Bank is open to question:  such 
facilities were being used elsewhere and too much was likely made of the reputational 
risks involved (especially given that the guarantee was about to be announced).   It is 
unlikely that even extensive use of the facility to buy time to facilitate nationalisation 
the following weekend would have been viewed negatively by partner central banks 
under the circumstances.   While use of ELA would only have been a temporary 
solution, it might have bought some breathing space while other possibilities were being 
explored to address the unprecedented situation that many  not only in Ireland  were 
facing. 
8.52 The decision not to proceed with nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank on 29/30 
September has become the subject of considerable public debate and controversy.   Two 
questions are raised.   First, should policy makers have had a greater sense that Anglo 
was facing not only a liquidity, but also a potential solvency problem?   The answer is 
probably yes.   Second, would nationalisation of Anglo on 30 September  compared 
with its nationalisation five months later  have made a significant difference to the 
overall cost of the bank bail out to the taxpayer?   Here the answer is ―probably not‖.  
8.53 Finally, there has been some criticism, including from abroad, as regards the hurried 
nature of the decision and in particular, the lack of prior consultation with partners.   
This criticism may have some basis, especially since, as argued above, there was scope 
for more thorough exploration of options  including vis-a-vis European partners  in 
the period leading up to 29 September.   At the same time, given the position the 
authorities found themselves in on that night it is understandable why, given the 
extreme time pressures, all efforts were devoted to finding an immediate way to save 
the Irish banking system from looming disaster.  
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ANNEX 2:  MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND BOARD OF THE CENTRAL 
BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY OF IRELAND AND THE 
IRISH FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
 
1. This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) sets out principles for cooperation between 
the Governor and Board of the CBFSAI (hereinafter referred to as ―the Bank‖) and 
IFSRA (hereinafter referred to as ―the Financial Services Regulator‖) in the field of 
financial stability.   It sets out the role of each party and explains how they will work 
together towards the common objective of financial stability.  
2. Financial stability is a situation where the components of the financial system (financial 
markets, payments and settlements systems and financial institutions) function smoothly 
and without interruption, with each component resilient to shock.  A financial stability 
matter may include, but would not be restricted to, any event which could threaten the 
stability of an important financial institution or number of institutions;  disrupt the 
workings of financial markets and/or the payment system, or undermine the soundness 
of, or public confidence in, the financial system. 
3. Three guiding principles will govern cooperation between the parties: 
  i) clear accountability and transparency:  each party will be accountable 
for its actions as set out in this MoU; 
 ii) no duplication:  each party will ensure that duplication does not occur, 
as far as is reasonably possible;  and 
iii) data and information exchange:  both parties will ensure that the 
content and frequency of exchange of data and information will enable 
each party to discharge its responsibilities as efficiently and effectively 
as possible. 
4. The Bank’s Responsibilities for Financial Stability 
The Bank is responsible for contributing to the overall stability of the Irish financial 
system.   This mandate for financial stability is derived from:  
 i) the Bank‘s statutory duty under the CBFSAI Act of 2003.   The Act 
specifies that ―the Bank has … the objective of contributing to the 
stability of the financial system‖;  and 
ii) the mandate of the European System of Central Banks, which requires 
the European Central Bank and National Central Banks to contribute 
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to financial stability in the euro area.   This, therefore, requires that the 
Bank contribute to financial stability, both in Ireland and, as far as is 
practicable, elsewhere, through its involvement in international fora. 
To carry out the Bank‘s mandates for financial stability, the Governor and the Board‘s 
responsibilities therefore involve: 
  i) stability of the monetary system.   This will be monitored as part of the 
ESCB monetary policy function.   As necessary, actions will be taken in 
the markets and fluctuations in liquidity dealt with; 
 ii) financial system infrastructure, in particular the payments and 
securities settlements system.   The Governor and/or Board will advise 
the Minister and Financial Services Regulator on any significant matter 
affecting these systems.   The Governor and/or Board will continue to 
promote the smooth operation of the payments and securities settlement 
systems and will also seek to strengthen these systems to reduce 
systemic risk; 
iii) overview of the domestic financial system as a whole.   The Governor 
and/or Board will advise all relevant parties on the implications for 
financial stability of developments in domestic and international 
markets and payments systems and assess the impact on monetary 
conditions of events in the financial sector; 
 iv) analysis of the micro-prudential  where appropriate  as well as 
macro-prudential health of the financial sector.   In this context, the 
Governor and/or Board‘s objective is to identify developments which 
could endanger the stability of the system as a whole and will advise 
accordingly;  
  v) undertaking official financial operations.   The Governor and/or 
Board may authorise official financial operations in exceptional 
circumstances, in order to limit the risk of difficulties affecting 
particular institutions spreading to other parts of the financial system;  
and 
 vi) in addition to the above mainly domestic responsibilities, they 
contribute to promoting improvements in the international financial 
system, mainly through involvement in international fora. 
5. The Financial Services Regulator’s Role in contributing to Financial Stability 
The Financial Services Regulator is responsible for contributing to the maintenance of 
proper and orderly functioning institutions and exchanges and protecting depositors, 
insurance policy holders and clients of investment firms.   In carrying out these 
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functions, the Financial Services Regulator will support the Bank‘s objective of 
contributing to financial stability. 
The Financial Services Regulator‘s responsibilities in this area therefore include:    
  i) the prudential supervision of banks, building societies, insurance 
companies, stockbrokers, exchanges, investment firms, retail 
intermediaries (both investment and insurance intermediaries), credit 
unions and collective investment schemes (managed funds);  and  
 ii) providing advice, information and assistance in relation to the Bank‘s 
functions to the Bank‘s Board and the Governor, both on request and at 
other times as may seem appropriate. 
6. Data and Information Exchange  
There will be close and regular contact between the parties and a framework of 
cooperation will be developed with regard to financial stability matters.   Information 
sharing arrangements will be established, to ensure that all information relevant to the 
discharge of their respective responsibilities will be shared fully and freely between the 
parties.   Each party will seek to provide the other with any additional information on 
request and as appropriate. 
7. Crisis Management 
The parties will immediately inform and consult with each other in relation to any 
matter which either party deems to have the potential to threaten the stability of the 
financial system.   The general procedures to follow in such an event will continue to be 
for agreement between the parties. 
8. Consultation on Policy Changes affecting Financial Stability Matters 
The parties will consult and inform each other about any policy changes which will 
have a bearing on the responsibilities of the other. 
9. Financial Stability and Membership of Committees 
The parties will cooperate fully in their relations with and participation in international 
fora on financial stability issues.   In some cases, this will involve dual representation in 
certain fora.   In cases where only one party is represented, the other undertakes to 
contribute information and advice in advance of any meeting.   The party attending will 
fully brief the other after the meeting.   
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10. Records 
The Financial Services Regulator will be responsible for the custody of all records 
relating to the prudential supervision of authorised institutions.   The Governor and 
Board of the Bank will have free and open access to these records on matters relating to 
financial stability. 
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ANNEX 3:  BANK RESCUES WORLDWIDE IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE 
IRISH GUARANTEE  
 
Although financial authorities in the US and other countries are now criticised for 
treating the crisis that emerged in July/August 2007 as primarily a crisis of liquidity – 
with which they dealt well – whereas important systemic solvency issues underlay it, 
there is no doubt that action to deal with the particular banks that came under particular 
pressure was in general prompt and decisive.  
Thus, that governments in Europe and the US were not slow to contain emergent 
solvency problems at specific banks from the start of the crisis in July/August 2007 is 
evident from the treatment of such entities as Sachsen Bank, IKB bank, and Northern 
Rock in July-September 2007, Bear Stearns in March 2008, Indymac, Roskilde Bank, 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in June-September 2008, among others.   But not before 
September 2008 was there a full recognition that solvency problems could be broad-
based. 
The much-discussed events of the middle weekend on September 2008 culminated in 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on Monday, 15 September.   The decision not to 
save Lehman Brothers now appears to be regretted by most of those concerned, though 
the decision to allow the failure had its defenders at the time, given the moral hazard of 
repeated bail-outs, and the fact that Lehman Brothers was an investment bank – not an 
insured bank.  
Following this shocking event – the largest bankruptcy in history – containment 
measures by the authorities gathered momentum.   In particular, the two weeks before 
the introduction of the Irish guarantee saw an accelerating trend of bank rescue actions 
by governments to contain emergent problems and try to prevent the spread of the crisis.   
This started in the US, which was already exploring system-wide interventions, but by 
the weekend of 25 September had spread to Europe where some large individual banks 
had to be dealt with.  
First, the large US insurance company AIG, which had been a key player in providing 
credit insurance products to large commercial and investment banks, was nationalised 
and recapitalised on 16 September.   The announcement on Tuesday 16 September that 
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the net asset value per share of a sizeable, famous and long-established US money 
market mutual fund, Reserve Primary, had fallen below the target floor of $1 (―breaking 
the buck‖), as a result of losses on Lehman-related assets, prompted huge withdrawals – 
amounting to 5 per cent of the total – from other money market mutual funds.   This 
prompted the US Treasury to introduce, on Friday, 19 September, a $50 billion 
insurance programme allowing money market funds to insure themselves (for a fee) 
against ―breaking the buck‖.   The program stabilised the liquidity of the money market 
segment.  
That same day (19 September), the US Treasury Secretary initially recommended to 
Congress the creation of a very large program, eventually called TARP, to stabilise the 
banking system.   The initial design envisaged that the funds would be used to buy up 
toxic and hard-to-value mortgage-backed securities from troubled banks (though in the 
end the funds were used in a quite different manner).   The rejection by Congress of this 
proposal on Monday, 28 September, was a destabilising factor for the markets.
167
  
The 7th largest US bank Washington Mutual (WaMu) was intervened by the FDIC on 
Thursday evening 25th September following deposit withdrawals totalling $17 billion in 
the previous 10 days.   Its mortgage book and deposits were sold to JP Morgan, but its 
debt (senior and subordinated) with a face value of $23 billion was left to recover what 
it could in the bankruptcy. 
UK mortgage lender Bradford and Bingley was also nationalised and the retail business 
sold to the Spanish bank Santander over that weekend, following downgrades by rating 
agencies and withdrawal of its license on Saturday 26th by the FSA with the shares 
being suspended as from the opening of business on the Monday.   The UK Government 
promised to repay all outstanding unsubordinated wholesale deposits and borrowings 
when due, and to continue this guarantee for a period of six months.  
In a complicated three-government rescue, Fortis was part-nationalised over the 
weekend and supported with promised injections of capital and, as was subsequently 
made public, a massive ELA line of credit.   This was not sufficient to restore market 
confidence however, and the bank‘s share price fell sharply on Monday and it continued 
to suffer outflows for the rest of the week until a revised package was announced the 
following weekend.  
                                                          
167
 The scheme was eventually approved in modified form on 3 October. 
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The Fortis Case 
 
  
Fortis was structurally a liquidity-deficit bank.   Because of a capital weakness following 
its over-ambitious participation in the purchase of ABN-AMRO (a purchase designed in 
part to strengthen its structural liquidity position), it was, from June 2008,
168
 seen as a 
vulnerable bank and began to lose liquidity rapidly at end-September.   By Friday 26
th
 it 
suffered a silent run (unable to raise its usual €15 to €20 billion in the overnight interbank 
market) and started to lose institutional and retail deposits.   That day it resorted to the 
ECB‘s standing Marginal Lending Facility (MLF) in the amount of €5 billion to meet its 
immediate liquidity needs.   It was clear that it would not be able to get through Monday 
without defaulting, having exhausted its ECB-eligible collateral.   A complicated three-
government capital injection deal was negotiated over the weekend, with Belgian, Dutch 
and Luxembourg Governments announcing that they would inject a total of €11.2 billion 
between them to acquire 49.9% of the group.   ELA was also authorised (but not 
announced at the time).    
 
Despite being described by the Dutch Ministry of Finance in a statement as offering a 
‗solid guarantee‘ to ensure financial stability and protect the interests of account holders at 
Fortis and ABN AMRO, these measures were insufficient to boost market confidence on 
Monday.   Indeed, the bank was downgraded and its share price fell sharply on Monday.   
By Friday October 3
rd
, according to the Shareholder Circular and the Panel of Experts‘ 
report (p. 49), ELA drawdown reached €61 billion, out of €65 billion that had been 
authorised (€58 billion from the Belgian National Bank and €7 billion from the 
Netherlands Bank – in addition to classic ECB funding and drawings on the MLF and the 
US Federal Reserve‘s discount window).   At this point a second round of equity 
acquisitions and capital injections from governments was undertaken, leaving the 
Netherlands subsidiary wholly in the hands of the Dutch government and with the French 
bank BNP acquiring most of the remainder of the banking assets.   (The Dutch 
government statement did not provide a general explicit guarantee.
169
 However, it did 
guarantee the long-term debt of the Dutch subsidiary to the Belgian parent in the amount 
of €16 billion).   After that weekend, ELA declined speedily with the payment of €51 
billion from the Netherlands government and with additional funding from BNP.   (The 
use of ELA had fallen to €6 billion already by 9 October). 
 
 
 
The German bank Hypo RE, which had acquired Irish-based DePfa in 2007, was bailed 
out early in the morning of Monday, 29 September, by a consortium of German banks 
and the Federal Government, reflecting the funding difficulties of the highly leveraged 
DePfa (as well as – it later proved – solvency issues in the parent).   (This particular 
deal fell through but was replaced on 4 October by another deal involving banks and the 
Bundesbank).   Total funding required was €50 billion.  
Dexia hit problems on Monday, 29 September, with a sharp fall in its share price.   The 
following day Moodys downgraded its intrinsic strength to C-.   Expected losses from 
                                                          
168
  When a capital need of €8.3 billion was announced. 
169
  It stated: ―This provides a strong safeguard for all those involved in these institutions and for the 
stability of the Dutch financial system.   Under the current exceptional circumstances, the interests of 
account holders and other parties concerned must be safeguarded.‖ 
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its US subsidiary and a large loan to DePfa were mentioned as causes.   Rescue 
measures involving a capital injection of €6 billion and a government guarantee 
covering new borrowings,
170
 plus ELA from BNB, were announced on 30 September. 
Intervention by FDIC and the sale of the 6th largest US bank Wachovia to CitiGroup 
was announced Monday, 29 September.   (The deal was subsequently renegotiated with 
Wells Fargo as the buyer – at no cost to the FDIC).   This followed withdrawals of €26 
billion by corporate depositors, or one quarter of their total, mainly in the last days of 
September. 
Bearing in mind the Congressional rejection of the first version of the US TARP plan 
that day also, this, then was the state of play on the evening the Irish authorities faced 
the decision to introduce its blanket guarantee.   The crisis continued to deepen over the 
following days with, for example, the UK starting, without publicity, to extend ELA 
facilities to HBOS (from Wednesday 1
st
 October) and RBS
171
 (six days later), before the 
summit meetings later in the month that led to the coordinated cross-country 
announcement of huge rescue packages – not all of which were subsequently drawn 
down. 
While the range of containment measures finally adopted was wide, including equity, 
preference share and hybrid capital injections, asset insurance and loss-sharing 
agreements, assisted and encouraged mergers, asset purchase programmes, guarantees 
for depositors and other creditors, and emergency liquidity provision, it is worth noting 
that most, if not all, of these had already been employed in the period from August 2007 
to the day of the Irish guarantee. 
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  The guarantee covered Dexia's liabilities towards credit institutions and institutional counterparties, as 
well as bonds and other debt securities issued for the same counterparties, provided that these liabilities, 
bonds or securities were falling due before 31 October 2011 and had been contracted, issued or renewed 
between 9 October 2008 and 31 October 2009. 
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  The peak drawings from the two banks totalled £62 billion by mid-November, and HBOS had not 
fully repaid it until mid-January 2009. 
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ANNEX 4:  DEPOSITS, BONDS, SUBORDINATED DEBT, AND THEIR 
RELEVANCE FOR LOSS ALLOCATION 
 
A bank funds its loans not only with deposits placed by its depositors and by its 
common equity shareholders.   Indeed, in recent years, customer deposits and equity 
formed a diminishing fraction of Irish banks‘ resources, and they became dependent on 
other sources, including large amounts coming from abroad. 
Thus in particular, banks also (i) borrow money from other banks, financial institutions, 
large companies and public institutions, often pledging collateral (or through a 
collateral-like mechanism called repo); (ii) issue uncollateralised debt instruments (e.g., 
bonds, notes or corporate paper) at various maturities ranging from a few days up to 
several years; (iii) issue asset-backed securities such as covered bonds – this was not a 
large part of Irish banks‘ business in the run-up to the crisis;172 and (iv) issue explicitly 
subordinated debt instruments, preference shares and other instruments which explicitly 
rank behind deposits and other debt.  
Regulators insist that a certain fraction of the bank‘s assets be financed by risk capital, 
made up mainly of equity and various forms of subordinated debt which rank behind the 
rest of the bank‘s debt in a liquidation.   The purpose of these regulations is to ensure 
that the bank can (a) survive despite losses, if the losses do not exceed the equity (b) 
depositors need not lose even if the bank becomes insolvent, if the losses do not exceed 
the sum of the equity and the subordinated debt.   Equity can be seen as going concern 
capital, because it can be replenished before the bank becomes insolvent; while 
subordinated debt is gone concern capital – which need suffer loss only in the case of 
insolvency. 
The various forms of non-equity capital which make up what we are calling 
subordinated debt can be divided into two main groups: those which qualify as ―upper 
Tier 1‖ capital – in particular these must not have a fixed redemption date, and the rest.   
In addition to the fixed redemption date, at which bonds must be repaid, there can, 
however, be an earlier date at which the bank can choose (with the approval of the 
regulator) to repay.   The practice has been to repay at this earlier date, and some argue 
that to do otherwise is almost like a default, though that is not legally the case. 
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 Though notoriously it was central to the problems emanating from the US mortgage market. 
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Loss allocation 
The isolated failure of a bank entails costs which will be borne by some stakeholders.   
Even from the narrow contractual point of view of the direct financial losses, it is an 
important policy issue as to whether to intervene in the loss allocation that will result 
from the liquidation of the bank and the distribution of the proceeds to the creditors in 
accordance with their strict priority: shareholders to bear the first losses, then 
subordinated debt holders before the rest.  
Containment and loss allocation are logically separate aspects of financial crisis 
management, but different containment measures can have implications for what is 
possible in terms of loss allocation.   This is most evident in debt-insurance schemes, 
but is true for other measures also.   An injection of equity capital protects all more 
senior creditors of the bank, for example, whereas ELA can protect (by allowing the exit 
of) depositors, but leaves equity and subordinated debtholders at risk.   The Irish 
guarantee in effect protected all creditors with claims of less than two years‘ remaining 
maturity. 
Of course, the failure of one or more systemically important institutions will entail 
losses going well beyond the contractual claimants on the bank‘s assets.   It is indeed for 
the purpose of protecting some of these innocent others that governments may do well 
to choose an allocation of the direct financial losses that seems arbitrary or even 
regressive.  
When considering the allocation of losses in the case of an insolvent bank, there is an 
important difference in the law between the United States on the one hand and Ireland 
(and the UK) on the other.   Since 1993, US law gives depositors priority over 
bondholders and general creditors in their entitlement to be paid out of the proceeds of a 
bank liquidation.   Irish and UK law make no such distinction: unless explicitly 
subordinated, bond-holders are entitled to share pari-passu with depositors and other 
general creditors.   This is an important distinction presenting complications to the idea 
of discriminating between such creditors in a liquidation.  
The relative importance of different funding sources in practice 
Market value of shareholders‘ funds in the four listed Irish banks peaked in 2007 at an 
aggregate of around €60 billion.   Market value of equity of course takes account not 
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only of the book value (share subscriptions and retained earnings, etc.) but also the 
market‘s expectation of future profits.   Aggregate book value of shareholders‘ equity in 
these banks at the end-year balance sheets on or before end-September 2008 was €22 
billion.   Considering that most of this value is being wiped out by actual and 
prospective loan losses (the value of the life company in ILP being an exception), and 
the current estimates of the long-term direct fiscal cost of interventions to recapitalise 
the banks at around €25 billion, it can be argued that the State has paid for roughly one 
half of the banking losses; the shareholders for most of the rest.   (That does not take 
account of the knock-on or indirect effects of the worsening of the recession 
exacerbated by the banking failure, which have been borne widely.) 
Chart A4 shows the funding sources of AIB and Anglo in 2007-08, broken down into 
these categories.   Note that less than half of AIB‘s funding came from customer 
deposits and about half of that for Anglo.173 Senior, i.e., unsubordinated debt accounts 
for between a sixth and a quarter of the financing sources, with banks (including central 
banks) representing another large element.   Equity and subordinated debt represent 
only a relatively small cushion. 
Table A4:  Tier 2 Sub Debt, etc. in the Banks according to their 2008 Reports 
€ billion Dated sub-
debt 
Undated sub-
debt, etc. 
Shareholders’ 
funds* 
AIB  3.0 1.6  8.4 
Bank of Ireland  4.6 3.2  6.5 
Anglo Irish Bank  2.1 2.8  4.1 
Irish Life and Permanent  1.1 0.6  2.3 
Irish Nationwide Building Society  0.3 0.0  1.3 
Educational Building Society  0.3 0.0  0.7 
Total 11.4 8.2 23.2 
*  Reserves in the case of Building Societies 
 
Most of the banks covered by the end-September 2008 (CIFS) Guarantee conduct 
sizeable business (both assets and liabilities) outside the State.   Heading into the 
guarantee they had sizeable net liabilities to non-residents: about three-quarters of the 
debt issued by these banks was held abroad, while about a quarter of the deposits (from 
nonbanks) were held by non-residents.  
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 The customer deposit figures for Anglo do not include the large deposit received from ILP at end-
September 2008. 
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About a half of deposits were held by individuals – the bulk of the remainder were held 
by nonbank financial institutions and nonfinancial firms.   It can be assumed that a large 
fraction of the personal bank deposits were owned by relatively well-off individuals.   
Indeed, judging from data available for other countries, aggregate bank accounts of 
individuals in the bottom half of the income distribution likely accounted for well under 
10 per cent of total personal bank accounts.   All of the bank deposits of these 
individuals were fully covered by the permanent Deposit Guarantee Scheme.   So the 
guarantee protects the less well-off not directly by covering their bank deposits (if any), 
but by underpinning the functioning of the economy which provides employment and 
generates the tax revenue needed to pay for public services.   Relatively little of the 
guarantee goes to protecting the bank deposits of the more prosperous members of 
society – though it does do that, in effect socialising their losses. 
Chart A4:  Composition of the liabilities of AIB and Anglo Irish Bank 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AIB, Anglo Irish Bank annual reports. 
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ANNEX 5:  CRISIS TIMELINE 
Date National developments International developments Eurosystem measures Fed initiatives BoE initiatives Other CB initiatives 
       
23/06/2007  US: Bear Stearns pledges $3.2 
billion to aid one of its ailing hedge 
funds 
    
26/06/2007      SEC begins 
investigation of 12 
CDO issuers 
28/06/2007    FOMC maintains the target fed 
funds rate at 5.25% 
  
09/08/2007  BNP Paribas freezes three funds 
after an inability to value subprime 
mortgage based assets 
The ECB notes that there are tensions in the 
euro money market and announces a 
liquidity-providing fine-tuning operation 
aimed at assuring orderly conditions in the 
euro money market.   The ECB allows 100% 
of the bids it receives 
   
10/08/2007   Another liquidity-providing fine-tuning 
operation is conducted aimed at assuring 
orderly conditions in the euro money market 
Fed issues statement that it 
stands ready to provide liquidity 
via the discount window 
  
13/08/2007   Another liquidity-providing fine-tuning 
operation is conducted 
   
14/08/2007   Another liquidity-providing fine-tuning 
operation is conducted 
   
17/08/2007    Spread between the primary 
credit rate and the target fed 
funds rate is reduced to 50bp 
  
20/08/2007   ECB allots above benchmark in regular MRO 
but announces that it intends to gradually 
reduce the large reserve surplus which has 
accumulated in the first weeks of this reserve 
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maintenance period 
22/08/2007   ECB announces a supplementary liquidity-
providing longer-term refinancing operation 
with a maturity of three months for an 
amount of €40 billion 
   
27/08/2007   ECB continues to allot above benchmark in 
MROs 
   
03/09/2007   ECB continues to allot above benchmark in 
MROs 
   
06/09/2007   ECB announces a supplementary liquidity-
providing longer-term refinancing operation 
with a maturity of three months.   This 
operation aims to support a normalisation of 
the functioning of the euro money market.   It 
is to be conducted in addition to the regular 
monthly longer-term refinancing operations, 
which remain unaffected.   The operation will 
be carried out as a variable rate tender, with 
no preset allotment amount. 
   
13/09/2007  UK : Northern Rock receives 
emergency loan from the Bank of 
England 
    
18/09/2007    FOMC lowers target fed funds 
rate 50 bp to 4.75% 
  
08/10/2007   ECB announces that it will reinforce its 
policy of allocating more liquidity than the 
benchmark amount in main refinancing 
operations to accommodate the demand of 
counterparties to fulfil reserve requirements 
early within the maintenance period. 
   
10/10/2007      US Treasury 
Secretary Paulson 
makes statement on 
"private sector 
alliance" to prevent 
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mortgage default 
16/10/2007  US : Citigroup begins a string of 
major bank writedowns based on 
subprime mortgage losses 
    
31/10/2007    FOMC lowers target fed funds 
rate 25 bp to 4.50% 
  
02/11/2007    Fed approves Basel II   
08/11/2007   ECB announces that it will renew the two 
supplementary longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) that were allotted on 23 
August 2007 (€40 billion) and on 12 
September 2007 (€75 billion) that mature on 
23 November 2007 and on 12 December 
2007, respectively.  In addition, it will 
conduct two new supplementary LTROs 
which will be carried out through variable 
rate tenders, each with a preset amount of €60 
billion.  The first operation will be settled on 
23 November 2007 and will mature on 
Thursday, 21 February 2008.   The second 
operation will be settled on 12 December 
2007 and will mature on Thursday, 13 March 
2008. 
   
27/11/2007  US : Citigroup raises $7.5 billion 
from the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
    
30/11/2007   ECB announces that, as an additional 
measure over year-end, that it will lengthen 
the maturity of the main refinancing 
operation settling on 19 December 2007 to 
two weeks. The new maturity date will be on 
4 January 2008 instead of 28 December 2007. 
In this operation, the ECB will aim to satisfy 
the banking sector‘s liquidity needs for the 
entire two-week period, covering both the 
Christmas holidays and the end of the year 
   
11/12/2007    FOMC lowers target fed funds   
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rate 25 bp to 4.25% 
12/12/2007   ECB announces that it will conduct two US 
dollar liquidity-providing operations, in 
connection with the US dollar Term Auction 
Facility, against ECB-eligible collateral for a 
maturity of 28 and 35 days.  The US dollars 
will be provided by the Federal Reserve to 
the ECB, up to US $20 billion, by means of a 
temporary reciprocal currency arrangement 
(swap line). 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) is 
announced and swap lines are 
established with the ECB and 
SNB for $20 billion and $4 
billion, respectively 
  
17/12/2007   ECB announces that the allotment amount in 
this two week operation (see above) will not 
be bound by the benchmark amount. 
Specifically, as a minimum the ECB will 
satisfy all bids at or above the weighted 
average rate of the MRO settled on 12 
December, i.e. 4.21%. 
The first TAF auction takes 
place for $20 billion of 28-day 
credit 
  
21/12/2007   ECB announces, in conjunction with the 
Federal Reserve and in the context of the 
Term Auction Facility (TAF), that it will 
further offer US dollar liquidity in January.   
The operations will have the same size and 
will be conducted according to the same 
procedures as those carried out in December 
2007. 
Fed extends TAF auctions "for 
as long as necessary to address 
elevated pressures in short-term 
funding markets". 
  
11/01/2008  US : Bank of America announces 
purchase of Countrywide Financial 
for $4 billion 
    
22/01/2008    FOMC lowers target fed funds 
rate 75 bp to 3.5% 
  
28/01/2008      Economic Stimulus 
Act of 2008 
proposed 
29/01/2008  US : Rating agencies threaten to 
downgrade Ambac Financial and 
MBIA, two major bond insurers 
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30/01/2008    FOMC lowers target fed funds 
rate 50 bp to 3% 
  
01/02/2008    TAF auction size increased to 
$30 billion every two weeks 
  
06/02/2008 Irish Life & Permanent Chief 
Executive Denis Casey says 
sharp falls in Ireland's banking 
stocks have been a "huge over-
reaction" given the resilience and 
sound fundamentals of Ireland's 
economy and banks. 
     
07/02/2008   ECB announces that it will renew the two 
supplementary longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) that were allotted on 23 
November 2007 (€60 billion) and on 12 
December 2007 (€60 billion) and which will 
mature on 21 February 2008 and on 13 March 
2008, respectively. 
   
13/02/2008      Economic Stimulus 
Act of 2008 signed 
into law 
17/02/2008      Britain nationalises 
Northern Rock 
07/03/2008      SEC proposes a ban 
on naked short 
selling 
11/03/2008   ECB announces that it will provide US$ 
liquidity (via TAF) for as long as is needed 
Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) is introduced 
and swap lines with the ECB 
and SNB are increased 
  
13/03/2008  US : Bear Stearns reports a $15 
billion (88%) drop in liquid assets 
    
14/03/2008  US : Bear Stearns receives 
emergency lending from the Fed via 
 Fed approves purchase of Bear   
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JP Morgan Stearns by JP Morgan 
 
16/03/2008 Over this week (to 20/03) shares 
in Anglo Irish fell sharply circa -
18%, with analysts worrying 
about their exposure to the UK 
commercial property market 
US : JP Morgan announces it will 
purchase Bear Stearns for $2 per 
share 
 The spread between the primary 
credit rate and target fed funds 
rate is cut to 25 bp  
 
The spread between the primary 
credit rate and target fed funds 
rate is cut to 25 bp 
  
18/03/2008    Target fed funds rate is lowered 
75 bp to 2.25% 
  
19/03/2008      Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac capital 
requirements are 
eased to allow for 
increases in lending 
24/03/2008 Over this week (to 28/03) Anglo's 
share price recovered somewhat 
but its CDS widened 50bps to 
425.  During the week S&P gave 
a positive outlook on Irish banks. 
US : JP Morgan's purchase price for 
Bear Stearns increases to $10/share 
    
28/03/2008   ECB announces that it will conduct 
supplementary longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) with a maturity of six 
months. In addition, the Governing Council 
decided to conduct further supplementary 
LTROs with a three month maturity.   One 
supplementary six-month LTRO with a preset 
amount of €25 billion will be allotted on 
Wednesday, 2 April.   Another supplementary 
six-month LTRO, in the amount of €25 
billion, will be allotted on Wednesday, 9 July. 
Target fed funds rate is lowered 
25 bp to 2% 
  
24/04/2008 Over this week CDSs on Irish 
financials tightens significantly. 
This tightening of CDS spreads 
amid falling equity prices seen as 
consistent with the 
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recapitalisation initiatives (viz. 
RBS), which are seen as shoring 
up banks and strengthening their 
solvency but diluting their 
earning potential. 
30/04/2008    TSLF eligible collateral 
expands to include AAA rated 
ABS 
  
02/05/2008 Over the week (to 02/05) Anglo 
Irish Bank is the best performer 
on the ISEQ (up 15% to €9).  
Irish financials together with 
international banking indices are 
buoyed by improved investor 
sentiment on the growing belief 
that the worst of the credit crisis 
is over.  In addition, providing 
some extra support to Anglo is a 
report in the Sunday Independent 
that a group of Anglo Irish Bank 
clients plan to set up a fund to 
buy shares in the troubled bank 
 The ECB announces, in conjunction with the 
Federal Reserve and in the context of the 
Term Auction Facility, to increase the amount 
of US dollar liquidity provided to the 
counterparties of the Eurosystem to US $25 
billion in each bi-weekly auction. The 
operations will be conducted every second 
week with a maturity of 28 daysTAF and 
swap lines increase 
   
07/05/2008 Over the week to 07/05, Irish 
financials rise following the 
earnings announcement from 
Anglo (with pre tax profits up 
17% in the 6 months to March 
‘08) and a management statement 
from IPM that they would 
achieve earnings targets for 2008 
buoyed the bank stocks. CDSs on 
Irish financials tightened over the 
week. 
     
21/05/2008 Bank of Ireland becomes the first 
of Ireland's leading banks to hint 
profits may fall, responding to the 
worsening economic slowdown 
at home and the deepening credit 
crisis globally. Its share price 
falls 8%. 
  Bank of America's purchase of 
Countrywide Financial is 
approved 
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05/06/2008  US : S&P downgrades the two 
largest monoline bond insurers 
from AAA to AA 
    
06/06/2008  US : Lehman reports a loss of $2.8 
billion in the second quarter 
    
16/06/2008      The FDIC takes over 
IndyMac 
11/07/2008  US : After FDIC take-over, 
IndyMac experiences a run on 
deposits 
    
11/07/2008    Lending to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac at the primary 
credit rate is authorised 
  
13/07/2008      Treasury Secretary 
Paulson requests 
government funds to 
potentially support 
Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac 
15/07/2008 Allied Irish Banks says first half 
earnings fell 4 percent and warns 
of a 10 percent drop for the full 
year but offers shareholders a 
chunky dividend hike that it says 
reflects the bank's capital 
strength. 
  84-day TAF auctions are 
introduced and the ECB swap 
line is increased 
  
06/06/2008 Over week Anglo and BoI share 
prices (-7% and -6% 
respectively) fall sharply 
following news after Bradford & 
Bingley (B&B), the largest UK 
buy-to-let mortgage lender 
reported a near 50 percent year-
on-year slump in profits for the 
first four months of 2008. 
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13/06/2008 Shares in Irish banks continue to 
fall (ISEF down more than 10%) 
amid general sell-off in financials 
together with broker downgrades 
and worries over exposure to UK 
and domestic property market 
     
27/06/2008 Irish Financial shares continue to 
fall (-9%), in line with sector 
peers amid heavy falls in shares 
of Fortis, Citibank and worries 
over monoline insurers 
     
04/07/2008 In the week to 04/07, Irish 
financials fall sharply and 
underperform European peers.  
Irish Life & Permanent (IL&P) 
fall sharply as Standard & Poor's 
downgraded its long-term credit 
rating on the bankassurer from 
A+ to A amid a weakening 
outlook for banking stocks.  S&P 
also lowers its outlook for the 
ratings of Allied Irish Banks, 
Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish 
Bank. S&P lowers the outlook for 
its A+ ratings for both AIB and 
Bank of Ireland from 'positive' to 
'stable', while its outlook for 
Anglo's A rating from 'stable' to 
'negative'. 
     
10/07/2008 In the week to 10/07, Irish 
financials continues their sharp 
fall.  BoI in its interim 
management statement says that 
the deteriorating Irish economy is 
―adversely impacting‖ earnings. 
There are negative comments on 
Irish banks from Goldmans, 
Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, 
Lehmans and RBS.  In addition, 
IL&P ratings outlook is lowered 
to negative by analysts at 
Moody‘s, citing dependence on 
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wholesale funding and falling 
profit.  The CDS spread on IL&P 
subsequently hits a record high. 
18/07/2008 In the week to 18/07, Irish 
financials fall following Fitch‘s 
decision to change AIB‘s outlook 
from ―stable‖ to ―negative‖ .  In 
addition, the use of contracts for 
difference (CFDs) come into 
focus over the period amid media 
reports that Ireland's richest man 
Sean Quinn, is estimated to be 
nursing a €500mn to €1bn loss 
from his 15pc leveraged 
derivative position in Anglo Irish 
Bank. 
     
25/07/2008 Fitch reaffirms its stable ratings 
for Bank of Ireland, saying that 
the bank is ―relatively well-
placed‖ to cope with a reasonable 
amount of stress in the markets.   
     
30/07/2008   CB announces, in conjunction with the 
Federal Reserve, its plan to establish a cycle 
of 84-day Term Auction Facility operations. 
Starting on 8 August, the ECB will conduct 
84-day operations under the Term Auction 
Facility, while continuing to conduct 
operations with a maturity of 28-days. The 
ECB will conduct bi-weekly operations, 
alternating between operations of US $20 
billion of 28-days maturity and operations of 
US $10 billion of 84-days maturity 
  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are 
placed in Federal 
conservatorship 
31/07/2008   ECB announces that it will renew the two 
outstanding three-month supplementary 
longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
that were allotted on 21 May 2008 (€50 
billion) and on 11 June 2008 (€50 billion) and 
that will mature on 14 August 2008 and on 11 
September 2008, respectively 
   
01/08/2008 Over the week, AIB‘s H1 results      
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are released and are generally in 
line with expectations with the 
company reporting pre-tax profits 
of just over €1.3 billion for the 
first half of this year, up 8.6% on 
the same period last year.   
However, AIB notes it now 
expects adjusted earnings per 
share to decline by 8-10 percent 
instead of the previous low single 
digit growth.  Financial shares 
finish the week lower, with 
Anglo down more than 20% on 
downgrade from NCB.  In 
addition, Anglo Irish Bank Corp. 
are among banks ―most exposed‖ 
to falling commercial real-estate 
values in the UK, according to 
Merrill Lynch 
15/08/2008 The main news on the week is the 
release of the Anglo Irish Bank‘s 
IMS statement that is in line with 
expectations with the company 
reiterating its forecast that 
earnings would rise 15 per cent 
for the full year to September 
30th.  Anglo says that the 
economic environment would 
remain ―significantly 
challenged." Following the 
statement Fitch Ratings affirms 
Anglo‘s long-term rating at A+ 
and maintains its outlook as 
―stable.‖ 
     
22/08/2008 Irish financials lower this week, 
particularly Anglo after UBS 
slash its forecasts for the coming 
two years and downgrade its 
stance on the bank‘s stock to 
outright ―sell‖.   There is some 
positive news however, with 
Fitch Ratings affirming Irish Life 
& Permanent's Individual and 
Support ratings at 'B' and '3', 
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respectively. 
04/09/2008   ECB announces that it will renew the 
outstanding six-month supplementary longer-
term refinancing operation (LTRO) of €25 
billion that was allotted on 2 April, and that 
will mature on 9 October 2008.   It also 
decides to renew the two three-month 
supplementary LTROs (€50 billion) that will 
mature on 13 November and 11 December 
2008, respectively. 
   
07/09/2008  US : Lehman announces $3.9 
billion loss in third quarter 
    
10/09/2008  US : Moody's and S&P threaten to 
downgrade Lehman 
    
11/09/2008 A volatile week for Irish 
financials (-7%), amid general 
negative market news (GSE 
rescues, worries over Lehman) 
while Irish Nationwide is 
downgrads by Fitch to BBB+, 
EBS reported a H1 drop in profits 
of 37% while JP Morgan and 
Dresdner cut estimates for Irish 
banks. 
     
12/09/2008    Eligible collateral for TSLF and 
PDCF expanded 
  
14/09/2008  US : 10 banks create $70 billion 
liquidity fund 
    
14/09/2008  US : Bank of America purchases 
Merrill Lynch 
    
15/09/2008  US : Lehman files for bankruptcy     
  US : AIG debt downgraded by all 
three major ratings agencies 
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    Fed funds rate maintained at 2%   
16/09/2008  US : RMC money market fund 
"breaks the buck" 
 $85 billion loan given to AIG   
  US : More money market funds 
come under pressure 
    
17/09/2008 Short Sales of financial stocks 
prohibited indefinitely by 
Financial Regulator 
Sweden : Government Issues large 
amount of T bills to counteract 
market shortage 
 Swap lines increased by $180 
billion 
  
18/09/2008  UK : Short Sales of financial stocks 
prohibited, disclosure of short 
positions required 
ECB announces that to reinforce its joint 
action with the Federal Reserve, it is adding 
an overnight maturity to its operations 
providing US dollar funding to Eurosystem 
counterparties and by increasing the amounts 
offered in the Term Auction Facility 
operations. As regards the overnight US 
dollar funding, the Eurosystem shall conduct 
US dollar liquidity-providing operations with 
its counterparties against Eurosystem-eligible 
collateral, applying a variable rate tender 
procedure. It is intended to continue the 
provision of US dollar liquidity for as long as 
needed in view of the prevailing market 
conditions. 
   
  France : Short Sales of financial 
stocks prohibited, disclosure of 
short positions required 
 AMLF established  Treasury establishes 
the money market 
guarantee program 
19/09/2008 Irish equities again volatile but 
benefits from the decision of the 
Financial Regulator to ban short-
selling in the four big Irish 
financial shares.  In addition there 
are reports about a takeover of 
Irish Nationwide by Anglo Irish 
Bank, while Reuters reports 
interest in Bank of Canada : Short 
Sales of financial stocks 
temporarily prohibited.  
    Paulson calls for 
government plan to 
purchase troubled 
assets from financial 
institutions 
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    Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley approved as bank 
holding companies 
  
21/09/2008    New swap lines opened with 
Bank of Australia, Sveriges 
Riksbank, Danmarks National 
bank, and Norges Bank 
  
24/09/2008 Ireland becomes the first euro 
zone country to slide into 
recession in 2008, with economic 
activity in the former "Celtic 
Tiger" at its weakest in a quarter 
of a century after its property 
bubble bursts. 
US :  Washington Mutual closed by 
OTS.  Its banking assets are sold to 
JP Morgan for $1.19 billion 
    
25/09/2008    ECB and SNB swap lines are 
increased by $10 billion and $3 
billion, bringing total swap line 
to $290 billion 
  
26/09/2008  Germany : Hypo Real Estate 
receives €35bn guaranteed 
financing 
ECB announces that it will provide US dollar 
one week funding over the quarter end to 
Eurosystem counterparties against 
Eurosystem-eligible collateral, applying a 
variable rate tender procedure and with an 
intended volume of US €35 billion. 
84-day TAF allotments 
increased to $75 billion, two 
forward TAF auctions totalling 
$150 billion introduced, and 
total swap line doubled to $620 
billion 
 US :  Treasury 
bailout plan is voted 
down in the House 
29/09/2008  US : Systemic risk exception allows 
open bank assistance to Wachovia 
ECB announces that it will conduct a special 
term refinancing operation settling on 30 Sept 
and maturing on 7 November.  This operation 
would later become the maintenance period 
operation. 
Fed agrees to provide Citigroup 
with liquidity to aid in 
Wachovia purchase 
  
  UK : Bradford & Bingley 
nationalised, branch system and 
deposits sold to Banco Santander 
    
30/09/2008 Six domestic banks receive 
guarantees on all deposits and 
some debt instruments 
France : Government and state-
owned bank contribute €3bn to 
Dexia recapitalisation 
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01/10/2008  Italy : Short Sales of financial 
stocks temporarily prohibited 
    
03/10/2008  UK : Deposit Insurance increased to 
GBP 50,000 
ECB announces that, from 6 October 2008 
until further notice, all institutions that are 
eligible to participate in Eurosystem open 
market operations based on standard tenders 
and that fulfil additional operational or other 
selection criteria specified by the respective 
national central bank will also be eligible to 
participate in quick tenders, i.e. the tender 
procedure normally used for fine-tuning 
operations. 
  Revised Treasury 
plan passes the 
House along with 
new clauses raising 
FDIC insurance 
limits to $250,000 
  Canada : Prohibition on short sales 
extended until end of SEC's ban 
    
05/10/2008  Germany : Government guarantees 
all private banks 
    
06/10/2008  Sweden : Deposit Insurance 
extended to all types of deposits, up 
to SEK 500,000 
 TAF increased to provide $900 
billion of funding over year-end  
  
06/10/2008  Germany : Hypo Real Estate 
financing guarantee increased to 
€50 billion 
    
  Iceland : Announces part of a 
financial rescue plan for its banking 
sector.  The country's largest banks 
agree to sell off some of their 
foreign assets and bring them home.  
Iceland's PM warns country faces 
"national bankruptcy" 
    
  Denmark : Introduces guarantee on 
savings 
    
  Iceland : Icelandic government 
takes control of Landsbanki, which 
owns Icesave in the UK.  Icesave 
freezes all deposits in the UK 
 Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility (CPFF) established 
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07/10/2008  Iceland : Icelandic FSA appoints a 
Resolution Cmte for Icelandic 
banks Glitnir Bank and Landsbanki 
Islands 
    
  UK : First Parliamentary reading of 
Banking Bill - introduction of 
Special Resolution Regime 
    
  Sweden : SEK5 Billion liquidity 
facility created for Kaupthing Bank 
 In conjunction with cuts by 
other central banks, target rate 
lowered to 1.5% 
 In conjunction with 
cuts by other central 
banks, target rate 
lowered to 1.5% 
08/10/2008  Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) established 
ECB announces that as from the operation 
settled on 15 October, the weekly main 
refinancing operations will be carried out 
through a fixed rate tender procedure with 
full allotment at the interest rate on the main 
refinancing operation, i.e. currently 3.75%.  
As of 9 October, the ECB will reduce the 
corridor of standing facilities from 200 basis 
points to 100 basis points around the interest 
rate on the main refinancing operation.  
Therefore, as of 9 October, the rate of the 
marginal lending facility will be reduced 
from 100 to 50 basis points above the interest 
rate on the main refinancing operation.  The 
two measures will remain in place for as long 
as needed, and at least until the end of the 
first maintenance period of 2009, on 20 
January 
   
  UK : Credit Guarantee Scheme 
announced to guarantee debt of 
short maturity 
    
  France : Government guarantees 
36.5% of €150 billion Dexia 
refinancing 
 Payment of interest on reserves 
begins 
  
09/10/2008  Italy : Government states that no 
banks will fail, no depositors will 
suffer losses 
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  Iceland : Icelandic FSA appoints a 
Resolution Cmte for Kaupthing 
Bank 
    
  Canada : Government will purchase 
25bn in government insured 
mortgage pools 
 Sweden : Central bank 
announces it will discontinue 
repo ops for monetary policy 
and will issue debt to absorb 
liquidity 
  
10/10/2008  Spain : Government creates a fund 
of up to €50bn to buy top-rated 
assets from Spanish banks and other 
financial institutions 
    
    Wells Fargo's purchase of 
Wachovia is approved 
  
12/10/2008  UK : Capital Injections of 
GBP37bn to HBOS/Lloyds, RBS 
 Fed uncaps ECB, BoE, and 
SNB swap lines 
  
13/10/2008  France : €320 billion fund to 
provide loans to banks and other 
financial institutions announced 
ECB announces that starting on 15 October 
the Eurosystem will, every Wednesday, 
conduct a liquidity-providing US dollar 
operation with a term of 7 days. All future 
auctions with a term of 7 days, 28 days and 
84 days will be conducted at a fixed rate with 
full allotment 
   
  Germany :  €400 billion plan to 
guarantee bank financing 
announced 
    
  Italy : Government passes bank 
financing guarantee, will provide 
unspecified amount 
    
 The Irish Government hikes taxes 
and reins in spending in an 
emergency budget and predicts 
its budget deficit risks smashing 
EU rules. 
Japan : Disclosure of short positions 
now required by sector 
 Bank of Japan swap line is 
uncapped 
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14/10/2008  US : 9 Large banks agree to capital 
injection from the Treasury 
    
  US : DOW suffers its biggest 
percentage fall since 26 Oct 1987 
(7.87%) 
   Treasury announces 
$250 billion capital 
injection plan 
      FDIC insures all 
senior debt of 
regulated institutions 
15/10/2008  Switzerland : Government injects 
CHF6bn into UBS and creates an 
SPV to buy illiquid assets, funded 
by UBS capital and a central bank 
loan 
 Tier I capital definition changed 
to include stock purchased by 
Treasury 
  
16/10/2008  Sweden : Government will 
guarantee up to SEK1.5trn in new 
debt issues 
    
20/10/2008  Sweden : Stabilisation fund 
announced, with SEK15bn initially; 
government will be given the right 
to buy out shareholders in 
systemically important institutions 
at market price 
    
  France : Government subscribes to 
€10.5bn in subordinated debt issue 
by six largest banks 
    
21/10/2008      Rate paid on excess 
reserves increases by 
40 bp 
22/10/2008  Canada : Canadian Lenders 
Assurance Facility announced to 
guarantee debt up to 3 years 
 Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF) is 
established 
  
23/10/2008  Sweden : SEK1bn liquidity facility 
created for Carnegie 
   Rate paid on excess 
reserves increases by 
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40 bp 
27/10/2008  Germany : Financial rescue fund 
Soffin begins operation, with power 
to guarantee financing, buy assets, 
and recapitalise firms 
ECB announces that in the 3 month longer-
term refinancing operation which settles on 
30 October and in which all bids will be 
satisfied (i.e. there will be full allotment), the 
fixed rate will be equal to the rate on the main 
refinancing operation of 3.75%. In 
subsequent longer term refinancing 
operations with full allotment, the fixed rate 
may include a spread in addition to the rate 
on the main refinancing operation depending 
on the prevailing circumstances 
   
  Japan : Naked short selling banned, 
exchanges must disclose holders of 
0.25% short position, until end 
April 
    
  Sweden : Carnegie liquidity facility 
increased to SEK5bn 
    
28/10/2008  Italy : Prohibition on short sales 
extended to year-end 
  Fed funds rate 
cut 50 bp to 1% 
 
29/10/2009     US $ Swap lines 
established with 
Brazil, Mexico, 
Korea and 
Singapore for 
$30 billion each 
 
04/11/2008   ECB announces that, in co-operation with the 
Swiss National Bank, it will start to conduct 
84-day CHF swap tenders. 
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